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The Irish University Question

ALFRED O'RAHILLY

1—The Catholic Attitude

(1) *Canon Law*

THE university question in this country cannot be satisfactorily considered except in the light of universally valid Catholic principles. Canon 1374 of the general law of the Church (*Codex Juris Canonici*) reads as follows:

> Catholic students (*pueri*) should not attend schools which are non-Catholic, neutral, mixed (i.e., which are open also to non-Catholics). Only the local Ordinary is competent to decide, in accordance with the instructions of the Apostolic See, in which circumstances and with which guarantee against the danger of perversion, attendance at such schools can be tolerated.

Three types of schools are rejected:

(*i*) Confessional non-Catholic schools. These may be controlled by one particular Protestant church. But the term applies to multi-denominational schools with an 'agreed syllabus', such as exist in England[1]. The religious course is part of the official curriculum, though exemption may be obtained.

(*ii*) Mixed schools do not mean co-educational schools (with boys and girls), nor does the term designate Catholic schools to which (within limits) non-Catholic pupils are admitted. Mixed schools are those which 'afford combined secular and separate religious instruction to children of all religions'.[2] Pius XI says: 'Nor can the Church tolerate the type of mixed school . . . in which Catholics, although receiving religious instruction apart, are taught other subjects in common with non-Catholics by non-Catholic teachers.'[3]

(*iii*) Finally there are the 'so-called neutral or secular schools, from which religion is entirely banned'. These 'are subversive of the whole

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[1]Such schools are decidedly not 'neutral'. In *The Durham County Agreed Syllabus of Religious Instruction, 1946* (p.37), pupils are told of 'the growing resentment against the tyranny of the Papacy over the English Church, and the widespread hostility to the unscriptural practices and doctrines (e.g., Indulgences) introduced into the English Churches by the worldly representatives of the Papal Court.'

[2]This is the definition of the so-called 'system of National Education,' which Irish Catholics fought and conquered. The project though finally invalidated by the Constitution of 1937, is still published by the Department of Education.

[3]*Divini Illius Magistri* (1929) n.97.

foundation of Christian education.'[4] Examples are the lay schools of France and the public schools of the United States.

Exactly the same verdict is applicable to higher schools or universities. From consideration of other documents and pronouncements it can be shown that the term *pueri* in the Canon just quoted includes undergraduates.[5] Apart altogether from ecclesiastical law, the unsuitability of mixed or secular universities for Catholics is clear from (*a*) the proper concept of integral education (as distinguished from mere technical training) and (*b*) the natural right and duty of parents and pupils to avoid unnecessary dangers to faith and morals.

Today the danger of a secular university, at least of the British type, is not so much due to anti-religious aggression but rather to the profession of a bogus neutrality, a morbid cult inhibiting all intellectual commitment. Sir Walter Moberly thus criticizes the situation:

> Most students go through our universities without ever having been forced to exercise their minds on the issues which are really momentous. Under the guise of academic neutrality they are subtly conditioned to unthinking acquiescence in the social and political *status quo* and in a secularism on which they have never seriously reflected. Owing to the prevailing fragmentation of studies, they are not challenged to decide responsibility on a life-purpose, or equipped to form such a decision wisely. They are not incited to disentangle and examine critically the assumptions and emotional attitudes underlying the particular studies they pursue, the profession for which they are preparing, the ethical judgments they are accustomed to make, and the political or religious convictions they hold. Fundamentally they are uneducated.—*The Crisis in the University,* 1949, p. 70.

The Catholic view of university education is entirely different. Education cannot dispense with value-judgments and basic presuppositions. Religion is not irrelevant or unimportant; it colours a man's whole outlook. Christianity is not just a speculative opinion external to living and learning. A deeper grasp of religious truths must proceed *pari passu* with advance in secular knowledge. The function of a university is not just to train a student to be, say, a chemist. It is to educate a man, an integral human person, while helping him to be a chemist.

(2) *Catholics at Secular Universities*

A neutral or secular university may be acceptable to liberal Protestants or agnostics. For Catholic students, at the most formative period of their lives, this boycott of religion and this indifference to

[4]Pius XI, ibid., n.95.
[5]Sokolich, *Canonical Provisions for Universities and Colleges,* 1956, p.67.

basic morality are obviously perilous. The warning or advice issued by the Church is accepted by them as authoritative. The obligation not to incur such risk already exists by natural law; it is confirmed by authority, but is not created by it. But what is *per se* wrong may sometimes *per accidens* become lawful, for grave reasons and with due safeguards against spiritual harm.

But here the Church intervenes. The decision as to allowability in particular cases is reserved to the Ordinary. This serious religious decision falls within the episcopal jurisdiction. Catholic parents and students are gravely bound to obtain the permission of the local bishop. This is a universal rule of the Church; its application varies with the conditions of different countries.

Canon 1113 declares the obligation in natural law: 'Parents are bound by a most serious obligation to provide, to the best of their ability, for the religious and moral, as well as for the physical and civic education of their children'. This is reproduced in our Constitution (a.42). This grave obligation, dependent on circumstances and opportunity for its fulfilment, holds for all parents. In general, before the promulgation of the Code of Canon Law in 1918, the decision to utilize mixed education with due safeguards was left to the parents.[6] The increasing menace of Statist and secularist education, together with the development of Catholic schools and colleges as alternatives, decided the Church to protect both parents and children by requiring episcopal approval. Thus ecclesiastical legislation has been superimposed to strengthen the pre-existing natural obligation for Catholics. This ensures that insufficient or worldly motives will not prevail in influencing Catholic parents to send their sons and daughters to secularist institutions. This applies to all educational establishments for adolescents.

(3) *America and England*

Before investigating the Irish situation, it will be useful to premise a brief reference to different conditions prevailing elsewhere. The necessity for Catholic universities as alternatives to secular institutions has always been recognized in the United States, where there are hundreds of degree-giving Catholic colleges and universities. Legislative sanction for incorporating and empowering such institutions has been readily granted by the various States—but without any public financial aid whatever. This gallant assertion of an educational ideal

[6]As early as 1884, the Third Plenary Council of Baltimore ordered the establishment of parochial schools, to which parents were bound to send their children 'unless either at home or in other Catholic schools they may provide for the Christian education of their children, or unless it be lawful to send them to other schools, on account of a sufficient cause approved by the Bishop and with opportune cautions and remedies'.—N. G. McCluskey, S.J., *Catholic Viewpoint on Education*, 1959, p. 32.

from which religion is not boycotted, this heroic implementation of the rights of parents and conscience, is now faced with almost insuperable difficulties. Rapidly rising costs of equipment and upkeep, competition with heavily endowed secular and State universities, perhaps soon to be aggravated by discriminatory financial proposals before Congress, together with a vast increase in the influx of undergraduates: these are serious menaces to Catholic university education in America. It has become practically impossible to accommodate all Catholic students in Catholic colleges. There are about half a million Catholic students now in secular universities; and the number is expected almost to double in a few years. The percentage of Catholic students in non-Catholic universities averages about 15, varying from 2 to 67 (at the University of Southwestern Louisiana). The proportion of Catholics on the teaching staffs appears to be only about 2 per cent. Some idea of the enormous scale of the problem may be gained by mentioning that there are 10,000 Catholic students at New York University, and 5,600 at that of Albany. Unaided Catholic resources simply cannot cater for half the Catholic undergraduates.[7]

To cope with the problem, 750 Newman Clubs, many with a full-time chaplain, have been established in secular campuses. This remedial measure does not mean any repudiation of the Catholic ideal. The National Association of Newman Club Chaplains has declared:

> There can be no ideally perfect education which is not Christian education. This is best achieved by the Catholic college and university, where God is centrally studied and daily worshipped. The presence of more than 500,000 Catholic young men and women in colleges which are not Catholic necessitates the Newman Apostolate.

These Newman Clubs, doing excellent work under extraordinary difficulties, are of course no substitute for an integral Catholic education. They provide religious training which is a mere external accessory to courses which are secularist and materialist. Moreover the majority of Catholic students, misled by their environment, take little or no part in them.

> It is strange and even alarming to find many Catholics who are unaware of even the fundamental moral problems connected with the question of Catholic students in a non-Catholic educational institution.—Connell, p. 229.

Faced with such a large-scale problem, the local Bishops can do little to provide really effective safeguards for Catholic undergraduates.

> Most of our Bishops tacitly tolerate the attendance of Catholics at secular colleges and universities, in the sense that they issue no

[7]See F. J. Connell, C.SS.R., The Catholic Student in a non-Catholic College, *Am. Eccles. Review* 140 (1959) 229-236.

> prohibitions or conditions to students entering such colleges and universities.—Connell, p. 235.
>
> In granting permission for attendance at secular colleges, some Bishops . . . insist on Newman Club membership or its equivalent; other Ordinaries presume that a loyal Catholic will seek to affiliate with the only authorized Catholic student organization on his campus. Unfortunately the percentage of Catholics across the country who do join and pay dues to the Newman Clubs is not particularly high: about one out of five Catholic students.—W. J. Whalen, *Catholics on Campus,* 1961, p. 36.

But so much importance do the Church authorities in the United States attach to higher Catholic education that there has arisen a serious discussion as to whether it would not be advisable largely to abandon parochial schools and to concentrate on high schools and colleges. That is, in our terminology, to risk abandoning Catholic primary schools in order to use their limited resources to extending Catholic secondary schools and universities.

Conditions in Great Britain are even more precarious. Apart from difficulties of personnel and money, a Catholic University would never be granted a charter by the British Government. The erection of Catholic halls or even faculties in secular universities may come up for practical consideration in the future. But meanwhile all that the Hierarchy, harrassed by huge financial commitments for schools, can do is to provide university chaplaincies. Catholics form about 8 per cent. of the students, the highest percentage being 16 in Liverpool. (The proportion on the staffs is much less.)

One gets the impression—it would be easy to cite evidence—that many English Catholics regard the presence of Catholic undergraduates in secular universities not merely as tolerated through necessity, but as a positive educational requirement for integrating Catholic adolescents into the national life. It also seems to be assumed that in this belief they are following Newman. But the Cardinal always opposed mixed education in universities:

> Even at this time it is well to emphasize the opposition of the Church to mixed education, where persons of different religious beliefs are educated together. The term 'neutral' is more expressive and less liable to misinterpretation.—Preface to *The Idea of a University.*
>
> While you have professors of different religions, you never can have a *genius loci,* and the place is no longer a genuine university.—Newman (1853), *My Campaign in Ireland,* ed. W. P. Neville, 1896, p. xliv.

He admitted, however, that in particular circumstances mixed or neutral education might have to be accepted as the lesser of two evils:

> There are multitudes of Protestants who are advocates of mixed

> education. . . . They are those for the most part who have no creed or dogma whatever to defend, to sacrifice, to surrender, to compromise, or to 'mix'. . . . I can conceive the most consistent men, and the most zealously attached to their own system of doctrine, nevertheless consenting to schemes of education from which religion is altogether excluded, from the stress of necessity or the recommendations of expedience. . . . Thus a system of mixed education may, in a particular place or time, be the least of evils.—Newman (1854), *My Campaign,* p. xv.

So long as there was hope of a Catholic University (even in Dublin) being available for English Catholics, he was opposed to their attendance at Oxford:

> Speaking according to my knowledge of Oxford, I should say that it was a place very dangerous to a young man's faith; and though he might be preserved from defection, he might be indelibly stamped with indifferentism, which would be his character through life. He would be saved from this if there were a Catholic hall or college there. . . . I am personally alarmed at the notion of the Bishops of England allowing (should they allow) young Catholics to go to the English Protestant Universities. What is Ireland to me, except the University here is a University for England as well as for Ireland? . . If I went by my own wishes and tendencies, of course I would far rather do good to English Catholics in Oxford than in Dublin.—Letter to Bishop Grant, 7th March, 1856: *My Campaign,* p. xlvi.

The case was altered by the failure of the Dublin scheme. In a memorandum of 1872 (p. lv) he stated that he resigned his Rectorship in 1858 'because the hope of the university being English as well as Irish was quite at an end.' So naturally his eyes turned now to Oxford where since 1854 degrees were obtainable without a religious test. But this required residence in one of the colleges, very few of which were willing to admit even a few Catholics. Hence the University remained practically closed to Catholics. In 1864 Newman obtained permission to open a Mission (Oratorian) in Oxford. He was interested chiefly in helping Catholic undergraduates. There is no doubt that his ultimate aim was to have a Catholic College in Oxford; for him the chief advantage of university education lay in collegiate life in a residential institution.

Manning, who even before the death of Wiseman had great influence, was violently opposed to Catholics going to Oxford, and even more to Newman returning there.[8] After a biased consultation with Oxford converts (but not with Newman), the Bishops met in December 1864 and 'passed resolutions in favour of an absolute prohibition

[8]In 1865 permission was renewed for an Oratory in Oxford, but Propaganda forbade Newman himself to go there.

of Oxford'.[9] The Rescript from Propaganda[10] arrived early in 1865. As far as the laity were concerned, the first official notification was the Bishops' Pastoral of 1867. However strong the language of condemnation, there was no formal prohibition. Manning, who had become Archbishop of Westminster in 1865, thus explains in 1866: 'We are quite content . . . that Catholics should be discouraged without being forbidden?[11] Referring to the condemnation of the Queen's Colleges in Ireland, he wrote to Disraeli in 1868:

> No censure at all, much less refusal of the Sacraments and excommunication, has ever been passed on the laity on this subject. They have been warned and left to their responsibility. We have followed the same course in England as to Oxford and Cambridge.—Leslie, p. 442.

As Dr. Cohalan remarked, it is not easy to reconcile the discipline approved for England with that formulated for the University of Berne where, according to the Holy Office, bishops and priests were bound to help Catholic students.

> In the Berne case the question was treated by the Holy Office on purely intrinsic theological grounds; but in the English case it was treated on external grounds. Injurious rumours were in circulation about the orthodoxy of a class of English Catholics; and Newman was regarded as the leader of the minimisers of Roman claims. It was alleged that the university atmosphere would be specially favourable to the growth and extension of this particular type of Catholic.—*Irish Eccles. Record* 20 (1906) 321.

To put it bluntly, the Roman authorities were misled from England and were also given to believe that a Catholic University was possible in England. In 1874 Manning started the Catholic University College at Kensington. He boycotted Newman and the Jesuits, and appointed an incompetent Rector (Mgr Capel). The scheme was an utter failure.

Manning died in 1892. Two years later a group of Catholic laymen was gathered by the Duke of Norfolk and Wilfrid Ward, and Cardinal Vaughan was approached. The Duke told Ward that they should not rest their case 'on arguments which would mean that Catholics ought to use Eton and Harrow and the unsectarian system in elementary schools.'

> Both Wilfrid Ward and the Duke were strongly opposed to any such extension of the undenominational idea. Both held that a Catholic school education was vital for an after life to be spent in a largely hostile or indifferent world. Doubtless a first-rate

[9] W. Ward, *Newman* ii. 64.
[10] According to Newman the decision included the London University and Trinity College, Dublin—ibid. p. 68.
[11] Shane Leslie, *H. E. Manning*, 1921, p. 184.

> Catholic University was a desideratum where the Catholics were strong enough in numbers and intellectual standing to maintain one. Since this was emphatically not the case in England, life in the world must be held to begin on leaving a Catholic public school.—Maisie Ward, *The Wilfrid Wards and the Transition,* 1934, p. 268f.

In other words, the ideal of Catholic 'unmixed' education was still asserted, but could not be carried out in the higher reaches of education. The Church being in such a powerless minority, Catholics would be not only justified but bound to run the risk of attending the secular universities. This was accepted by the Bishops and approved by Propaganda in 1895. The Bishops nominated a Council (later called the Catholic Universities Board), including clergy and laity, to provide for the safeguards 'imposed by the Holy See before tolerating the frequentation of the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge by Catholic young men'.[12] Propaganda had intimated that lectures or conferences should be given to the Catholic undergraduates in which philosophy, history and religion shall be treated with such amplitude and solidity as to provide effectual expression of the Catholic ideal.

Dr Beck, Bishop of Salford, expresses the general dissatisfaction with the present ineffective arrangements:

> We ought to ask ourselves whether this matter can be put right by a process of patching up under our existing organization. Is anything short of a Catholic University, or at least a Catholic Faculty, going to solve this problem? We tend to say very easily, perhaps too easily, that in this country a Catholic University is out of the question. . . . We would be foolish to allow the unhappy Kensington experience to close our minds to the possibility of something more ambitious in the sphere of Catholic Higher Education than a mere strengthening of the university chaplaincies and their weekly conferences.—*Tablet,* 20 September, 1958, p. 235.

This historical excursus is necessary in order to rebut the not uncommon argument: Why should Catholics not go to Trinity College with the same freedom with which they enter a British university? The answer, now apparent, is that conditions which are tolerated (not approved) in England are in our power to eliminate here. Newman wrote in 1865:

> As to Oxford and Cambridge, it is plain that the Church *ought* to have Schools (Universities) of her own. She can in Ireland; she can't in England, a Protestant country.—Ward, *Newman* ii. 70.

In 1859 he observed that 'the gates of Trinity College have been opened wider than before' to entice Catholics. This he declared to

[12]Cardinal Vaughan, in op. cit. by Maisie Ward, p. 274. Notice the word 'tolerated'.

be 'a deep design of English statesmen upon the faith of Ireland.'[13]

Wilfrid Ward, who was active in securing the admission of Catholics to the English universities, and was a member of the Robertson Commission (1901-03), saw the difference between the siutations in England and in Ireland:

> Whereas in England it had been a question for a mere handful of Catholics, in Ireland it was a question for the whole nation. . . . An English Catholic boy grows up among Protestants and has been acclimatized from his earliest youth to mixed surroundings. An Irish boy going to Trinity would come from a Catholic atmosphere and be plunged at once into a hostile atmosphere. . . . Trinity College was not merely, like Oxford and Cambridge, neutral in the matter of religion, but was, as represented by most of its professors, positively bitter against the Catholic faith.—Maisie Ward, *Insurrection versus Resurrection,* 1937, p. 59.

Nevertheless, among many English Catholics there appears to be a serious misapprehension concerning conditions in Dublin. For example we read:

> We have recently read of university ordinances in Ireland, which do indeed raise controversy, at least in this country where there is a widespread sense that Catholic education should be broader, not narrower.—*Catholic Herald,* 10 March, 1961.

This looks uncommonly like an unwitting repudiation of the Catholic standpoint, a positive glorification of mixed education. Canon Law, with its implied ideal, is as valid in England as in the Irish Republic. Its application is of course different in a country where Catholics form only 10 per cent. and in one where they are 95 per cent. The allegedly 'narrow' ideal, which our British coreligionists so valiantly essay to carry out as regards primary and secondary schools, cannot be extended by them to university education. They must perforce accept the makeshift of neutral or post-Christian universities. Inured to this compromise, many of them think that we should do the same. Fortified by constitutional safeguards for parental rights, we take a different view.

There seems to be a rationalization of the fact that English Catholic students, who have failed to gain admission to their own universities, find ready acceptance in Trinity College.[14] English Catholics—I have met several of them—who come over here to enter T.C.D., seem mostly to be under the delusion that they are not under Irish episcopal jurisdiction. They regard it as quite unnecessary to apply for permission to the Archbishop of Dublin.

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[13] *My Campaign,* p. 383.

[14] Provost Traill told the Fry Commission (q. 126): 'We are pushing in every direction we can to bring in colonial students.' To-day we can add: English Catholic students.

This attitude is completely at variance with what is laid down in Canon Law:

> When Catholic students seek to attend a college or a university of a neutral or mixed character in a territory in which they have a parochial or a diocesan domicile, or at least a diocesan quasi-domicile, they are subject to the Ordinary of that diocese in the matter of securing the toleration spoken of in Canon 1374.—Sokolich, p. 98.

II—The Irish Catholic Defence

(1) *Primary Education*

In order to elucidate the Irish Catholic attitude, it is necessary to make a brief retrospective survey, for many of the present misunderstandings have a history of more than a century. The claim for State-aided Catholic education was made by the Bishops in their 1824 petition for primary schools. Their attitude was stated clearly:

> In the Roman Catholic Church the literary and religious instruction of youth are universally combined; and no system of education which separates them can be acceptable to the members of her communion.

A Royal Commission on Education in Ireland, reporting in 1825, confirmed that this policy was being carried out in the existing unendowed Catholic schools:

> We entered into the consideration of this subject with our minds deeply impressed by the inexpediency of establishing a system of separate education. We had observed that . . . in the practice of these schools, religious and general instruction are so blended together that, unless the course of teaching should be wholly changed, they could never afford any other than strictly Roman Catholic education. On examining the books, we generally found them to be such as would be used only by Roman Catholics. Were we to recommend a grant of money in aid of such schools, . . . the Roman Catholic children would no doubt universally withdraw from every other description of schools.

Realizing the practical impossibility of obtaining public aid for separate Catholic schools, the Bishops, without renouncing the Catholic ideal and claims, declared their willingness to try a compromise in 1826:

> The admission of Protestants and Roman Catholics into the same schools, for the purpose of literary instruction, may under existing circumstances be allowed, provided sufficient care be taken to protect the religion of the Roman Catholic children and to furnish them with adequate means of religious instruction.

A Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1828 reported in favour of a scheme of mixed education: the pupils were to be united 'for the purpose of instructing them in the general subjects of moral and literary knowledge', facilities being provided 'for their religious instruction separately'. In December 1830, Wyse submitted to the Government a plan, which contained this clause: 'Let Catholics and Protestants be educated wherever possible in the same school. . . . Let religious instruction be given regularly . . . by their respective pastors.' Finally in 1831 Parliament voted the necessary finance. Chief Secretary Stanley (afterwards Lord Derby) delegated the working of the scheme to a Board of Commissioners (4 Protestants and 2 Catholics), telling them that the system was to provide 'a combined literary and a separate religious education . . . from which should be banished even the suspicion of proselytism'.

Thus was inaugurated the system of the so-called National Schools.[15] Naturally there was a difference of opinion concerning their acceptability, even under financial pressure. In 1841 Propaganda refused to pass judgment and left the matter to 'the prudent decision of the individual Bishops', provided precautions were taken concerning books, teacher-training, etc. In 1866 the Holy Office issued an instruction.[16] Parents were justified in sending their children to these schools 'in special circumstances of necessity forcing attendance' such as tyrannical oppression or lack of resources. Priests could visit or collect for instruction Catholic children who attend such schools:

> If through their own fault they thus acted, still they ought to be rescued; *a fortiori* they deserve sacerdotal care when they have been led through the fault of others. The Fathers were not moved by the objection that no gain would ensue or that the desertion of those attending would deter others or that scandal was to be feared.

As we are concerned only with the principle, it is unnecessary to enter into the details of the long struggle against the denial of parental rights, petty interferences and attempted proselytism. In June, 1904, the Bishops could recount an almost complete victory:

> The power of appointment of the teachers in National Schools is the principal guarantee that Catholic parents have that the education of their children will be placed in trustworthy hands. . . . The national system as it actually exists is the growth of sixty years. It has gradually been transformed from its original irreligious conception into a form that is in harmony with the actual conditions

[15]Sir Thomas Wyse wrote in 1836: 'To class our National Schools under partial designations of Protestant and Catholic and Presbyterian is a contradiction. By becoming sectarian, they cease to be national.'—*Notes on Educational Reform in Ireland*, ed. W. M. Wyse, 1901, p. 34. The term is now completely outmoded and should be abandoned.

[16]Published in the *Acta et Decreta* of the Maynooth Synod of 1875, pp. 337ff.

> of the country . . . Although there are still many defects, we are convinced that these may be remedied under the present system, . . . especially if the appointment of Commissioners is carefully made and on educational qualifications.

This brief account illustrates the Irish Catholic attitude to State-aided education. With some misgivings the so-called 'national' schools, formally endorsing mixed education, were accepted under duress. A long struggle ensued; but finally our primary schools *de facto* ceased to be 'national'. They became Catholic, Protestant or Jewish; our dissident fellow-citizens, once hostile, have now positively adopted our view. And, since the Constitution of 1937, it is now the *de jure* position. If our Department of Education still uses an outmoded vocabulary, it is merely a harmless but irritating hangover from the British régime.

(2) *The Bishops and the Colleges Bill*

In the 1830's there began an agitation for 'provincial colleges' in the south and west. This movement was greatly aided by the influence of Thomas Wyse and Smith O'Brien.[17] On 9th May, 1845, Sir James Graham introduced the Colleges (Ireland) Bill. A meeting of the Bishops was held in Dublin on 21–23 May. They unanimously declared that the projected system was 'dangerous to the faith and morals of the Catholic pupils'. But being 'disposed to co-operate on fair and reasonable terms', they presented to the Lord Lieutenant a memorial which proposed certain amendments, which may be thus summarized:

> (1) 'A fair proportion of the professors and other office-bearers' should be Catholics. All the office-bearers of each college should be 'appointed by a Board of Trustees', on which the Catholic Bishops should be represented.
>
> (2) There should be certain dual chairs, namely, Catholic professors for 'history, logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, geology, anatomy'.
>
> (3) Any professor convicted of interfering with the faith or morals of any student should be removed by the Board.
>
> (4) In each college there should be a salaried Catholic chaplain 'to superintend the moral and religious instruction' of the Catholic students.

Here once more we have the Bishops, while asserting Catholic rights and ideals, prepared under duress to accept a working compromise. As is well known, a minority, even in the Repeal Association,

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[17]Observe a curious gap: secondary education was, for Catholics, left unaided. The best succinct account of the Queen's Colleges is in F. McGrath, S.J., *Newman's University*, London, 1951. Also valuable is Denis Gwynn, *O'Connell, Davis and the Colleges Bill*, Cork, 1948.

was in favour of mixed education as a positive ideal. But in accounts of the controversy two essential points are generally neglected.

(1) The Young Irelanders in favour of mixed education did not hold this as an *educational* ideal; they did not argue for this on educational grounds. It was the mixing of the students, not of education, with which they were concerned, in the interests of *political* unity as regards repeal or federalism.

(2) There was, and continued to be, agreement with the Bishops on the *practical* plane, on the part of those who espoused mixed education as their ideal. It is a sheer perversion of history to represent the Bishops as an isolated bigoted clique.[18]

At a meeting of the Repeal Association on 26th May, 1845, Thomas Davis spoke:[19]

> I rise to express my strong approval of the memorial of the Catholic Bishops. That memorial contains four propositions, and to every one of them I yield my cordial concurrence. . . . Beyond all, I denounce the Bill for giving the Government a right to appoint and dismiss professors, a right to corrupt and intimidate. For these reasons, I and those who think with me are prepared to give this Bill in its present shape an unflinching opposition.

In *The Nation* of 14th June, 1845, there was published a petition signed by numerous citizens of Dublin.[20] After declaring that they 'highly approve of the principle of mixed education', they proceed to advocate the same amendments as the Bishops. They go further. They want 'the students of the provincial colleges to take degrees in the Dublin University'. And they advocate drastic improvements in Trinity College, by way of 'a proper system of practical and industrial education', as well as 'the opening of the existing scholarships and lay fellowships' to all creeds.

It is therefore clear that the stand made by the Bishops represented the views of the vast majority, whether they advocated or merely submitted to mixed education. This was clearly expressed by Smith O'Brien, a Protestant Young Irelander, writing to Davis in August, 1845:

> We have declared that we would repudiate the College Scheme unless it gave security to religious men of all parties that religion should not be excluded wholly from these institutions, and unless

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[18]Davis was of course wrong in representing the Bishops as voluntarily and positively endorsing mixed education. Some of his outbursts were rather hysterical. In 1844 he wrote to Smith O'Brien: 'Now or never we Protestants must ascertain whether we are to have religious liberty.'—Gwynn, p. 20. As if the rights of the huge majority, the Catholic parents, were not being trampled upon!

[19]Gavan Duffy, *Young Ireland* ii. 176. Duffy himself admits (p. 172): 'The conference of the Catholic Bishops had a result creditable to their sense and moderation. . . . The amendments were neither exacting nor inordinate.'

[20]There were 170 signatories. These included Young Irelanders (Davis, Duffy) and 84 barristers (a class notorious for place-hunting).

> public liberty should be protected from the corrupt influences of such extensive Government patronage. . . . No practical difference now arises between us and the separate educationists.—Duffy, *Young Ireland* ii. 184.

What was the attitude of the British Government? On the second reading (30th May), Graham declared the Bishops' amendments were 'inconsistent with the principle of the Bill'. But he made some minor concessions at the committee stage (23rd June). The Bill received the royal assent on 31st July, 1845.

The Crown monopoly of the appointment and dismissal of professors and officers was the crucial issue. On the second reading Peel promised that the Government would 'take the utmost care in selecting proper persons' for Cork and Galway. O'Connell retorted: 'I mean you no disrespect, but I will not take your word for it.' (How right he was!) The Government finally conceded an amendment of section 10. The power of appointment was to be vested in the Crown 'until the end of the year 1848, and afterwards as shall be otherwise provided by Parliament, or in default of any provision to the contrary' in the Crown. Smith O'Brien pointed out that 'it was only necessary for the Government *not* to bring forward any measure on the subject to ensure the continuance of the power in their own hands'. And in fact Dublin Castle retained its monopoly to the end.

Anxious to cozen some of the Bishops, Lord Clarendon wrote to Archbishop Murray on 18th March, 1848: 'In the Council, Professorships and other posts of each College, the Catholic religion will be fully and appropriately represented.' Namely, by two chairs out of twenty in each college! In his pastoral of 26th November, 1850, Cardinal Cullen wrote:[21]

> With what show of truth can it be said that Catholics enjoy religious equality in those colleges, when the choice and appointment of all superiors and professors is vested in the hands of the ministry of this empire which is almost exclusively Protestant? . . . Would the Protestants or Presbyterians of Ireland be satisfied with an arrangement placing the appointment of persons to teach their children in the hands of Catholics?

This State stranglehold over the Queen's Colleges was their fatal defect. The Bishops continued their protest on behalf of parents and conscience. The Pastoral Address issued from the Maynooth Synod of 1875 contained this passage:

> The control of the State over the education of the country has been enlarged in a degree perilous to liberty, while the circle

[21] *Pastoral Letters* i. 100. In connection with the Ecclesiastical Titles Bill, Cullen wrote to MacHale in 1851: 'I think a little persecution would be quite necessary to wean us from the Castle.'—O'Reilly, *MacHale*, 1890 ii. 262.

within which the rights of parents or of conscience should have sway has been proportionately narrowed.

One recalls Edmund Burke's letter to Dr Hussey in 1795:

> Be well assured that they never did and that they never will consent to give one shilling of money for any other purpose than to do you mischief. If you consent to put your clerical or any other part of your education under their direction or control, then you will have sold your religion for their money.—*Correspondence* 4 (1844) 298.

The other requests of the Bishops (e.g. dual Chairs) were also rejected. Some reference may be made to the so-called deans of residence, to be appointed by the Government. According to the Statutes (18.7) of 1849, these unsalaried officers had no function outside the licensed boarding houses. In a letter of 13th February, 1850, Clarendon asked the Presidents to give them facilities for giving the students religious instruction inside the colleges. But this was first validated in the new charter and statutes issued in 1863: 'The College Council shall have power to assign lecture-rooms' for this purpose. A Visitation of 1867 (and again 1870) of Queen's College, Cork, upheld the Council's right to refuse these facilities to the Episcopalian dean of residence, declaring that these words were merely permissive.[22] Under such conditions it would not have been much use to have had Catholic deans of residence.[23]

(3) *The Condemnation of the Queen's Colleges*

The Bishops were unanimous in considering the scheme dangerous to faith and morals. But a minority thought that, as in the case of the primary schools, an attempt should be made to try it out experimentally. On 18th November, 1845, the Bishops unanimously decided to refer the matter to Rome. In two Rescripts—9th October, 1847, and 11th October, 1848—Propaganda decided that the colleges constituted a grievous danger to religion, and urged the Bishops to found a Catholic university on the model of Louvain. Some Bishops thought that the danger would be mitigated if some priests accepted office. But in a third Rescript (18th April, 1850) Propaganda forbade this, and reiterated that it was for the Bishops to see 'that the faithful should be dissuaded (*retrahantur*) from attending these colleges'. Further consideration was postponed to a National Synod, which was held in Thurles in August, 1850: the first since 1642. Its decrees

[22]A. G. Dann, *George Webster*, 1892. It was Webster who built Berkeley Hall now the Honan Hostel).

[23]The University of Dublin was left undisturbed; the new Queen's University was established in 1850. Sir J. Graham introducing the Colleges Bill, declared: 'Neither policy nor equity nor justice will admit of any interference with Trinity College. . . . That college is an entirely Protestant foundation.' *Therefore* the Queen's Colleges in Cork and Galway should *not* be Catholic! I would like to add that the split between Old and New Ireland was not based on educational grounds, but on the issue of using physical force.

were unanimously approved by the Cardinals of Propaganda and confirmed by Pius IX on 4th May, 1851.

In accordance with the Rescripts the Synod forbade priests to hold any office in the colleges and declared that 'owing to grave and intrinsic dangers they were to be rejected and avoided by the faithful'. The matter was again considered at the next Synod, held in Maynooth in 1875:

> After a long discussion it seemed to the Fathers to be more expedient that, following the example of the Thurles Synod, they should, avoiding a formal prohibition, merely declare the grave dangers to which those attending these colleges are exposed.—*Acta et Decreta,* p. 48.

The same attitude was taken by the Maynooth Synod of 1900. There never was any *ecclesiastical* law against the attendance of lay students at the Queen's Colleges. They were merely declared intrinsically dangerous; this declaration did not create the danger, it presupposed it.

> These colleges were declared intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals. Catholic students, however, were not prohibited by ecclesiastical law from going to them; and the only prohibition was the prohibition of the natural law which forbids persons to go without necessity into the proximate danger of mortal sin.—Dr Cohalan (afterwards Bishop of Cork), *Irish Eccles. Record* 20 (1906) 322.

It is clear that, on Catholic principles—indeed, even on natural grounds—the colleges involved dangers to Catholic students. On this the Bishops were unanimous. Some were not so happy about the prohibition of priests on the staffs. There never would be more than one or two, handpicked by Dublin Castle. Moreover, the success of a Catholic university was assumed[24]; and it was considered inadvisable to give encouragement to parents to send their sons without necessity to the colleges. The absence of any organized attempt to give religious help and instruction to Catholics legitimately in attendance is a matter on which opinions still differ.

> There is one point in which we ecclesiastics cannot justify our action or rather our inaction in reference to the condemned colleges, namely, our comparative neglect or desertion of the Catholic students who were obliged from necessity to go to them and who legitimately went to them for their education.—Dr Cohalan, p. 323.

But as time went on there was a certain relaxation of attitude, especially for medical students in Cork, who had previously been attending private medical schools. Under Windle there was in the city a confraternity for the Catholic students of Queen's College, Cork.

[24]Newman in 1853 expressed the view that the withdrawal of the censure on the Queen's Colleges would simply 'extinguish the projected [Catholic] University, for both cannot flourish'.—*My Campaign,* p. *xliii.*

By way of contrast, a few words may be added about the Belfast College and the Government's attitude thereto. It was generally accepted by the Bishops (except Archbishop Crolly of Armagh) and by O'Connell and others that, while they demanded colleges in Cork and Galway suitable for Catholics, the Belfast College might be adapted to Presbyterians. At the committee stage of the Bill (23rd June, 1845) Peel read a letter from Rev Dr Cooke, 'declaring his conviction that one Roman Catholic or Arian [Unitarian] professor in the undergraduate course . . . would at once decide the General Assembly to withdraw every student'. On seeing the list of the staff, the General Assembly in October, 1849, declared that they were satisfied with 'the qualifications and character of the persons appointed' and permitted Presbyterian students to attend. An amendment to permit Presbyterians to attend the colleges of Cork and Galway was defeated. The latest historians of the Queen's University of Belfast find it embarrassing to uphold the allegedly liberal non-sectarian ideal of the Irish Presbyterians. They admit:

> All three presidents were Presbyterian ministers; and down to the close of the nineteenth century the Government was prepared to recognize the special interest of the General Assembly in appointments both to the presidency and to the chairs of Greek and of logic and metaphysics.—Moody and Beckett, *Queen's, Belfast,* 1845–1949, p. 543.

(4) *The Catholic View of Trinity College*

Since 1873, when tests were abolished in Trinity College, there have been four National Synods. The first was held in 1875. After condemning the Queen's Colleges, the same decision was applied to Trinity (n. 334–5):

> We have decided to lay down the same concerning attendance at the non-Catholic Trinity College of Dublin, all the more so as the system of purely secular education has been introduced into that institution.

That is, priests and clerics were put under a grave obligation not to advise parents or youths in favour of attendance. As to lay Catholics, all they say is: 'We will deter (*avertemus*) them as far as we can.' This was repeated verbatim in the decrees (n. 490-1) of the 1900 Synod.

The National University was founded in 1908, and the Code of Canon Law was promulgated in 1918. The next Synod, held in 1927, under the heading 'On schools in general' reproduced Canons 1372 and 1374 (n. 384–5). It also decreed as follows (n. 404–5):

> Non-Catholic colleges, being intrinsically dangerous to faith and morals, remain prohibited.

> Since there are in the Irish Free State three university colleges sufficiently safe as regards faith and morals, we strictly and under grave obligation forbid all priests and clerics to recommend by advice or otherwise parents or others having charge of young people to send these to Trinity College. We similarly forbid them to recommend young people themselves to attend that college.
>
> Care should be taken that the colleges of the National University continue to be imbued with religious teaching and feeling.

Finally in the Synod of 1956 we have (in n. 287) a strict application of the new Canon Law:

> We prohibit under a grave obligation: (1) Catholic youths to attend that college, (2) Catholic parents or guardians to send to that college Catholic youths committed to their care, (3) clerics and religious to recommend in any manner parents or guardians to send Catholic youths to that college or to give advice or aid to such youths to attend that college.
>
> Only the Dublin Ordinary is competent to decide, in accordance with the instructions of the Apostolic See, in which circumstances and with what guarantees against the danger of perversion, attendance at that college can be tolerated.

Let us be quite clear about the background of this decree. It assumes the Catholic rejection of mixed or neutral education in general. That Trinity College embodies this rejected principle is admitted by its friends and adherents. Consider, for instance, this rather idealistic statement made by Professor E. J. Gwynn (afterwards Provost) in 1906:

> Trinity College seeks to unite all creeds in a system of mixed education. . . . The ideal which we in Trinity College have kept before us since 1873 is that the university should be the meeting ground of all sections of the community; that it should be, as it always has been, a place of religion and learning; that the direction of its affairs and the teaching of secular knowledge should be free from partisan spirit and religious bias; that the moral and spiritual welfare of its students should be cared for as well as their physical and intellectual development; and to this end such discipline should be imposed and such facilities afforded, as are best adapted to the needs of the several denominations.—Fry Comm. First Report, p. 49.

Even if this apologia is accepted, T.C.D. clearly stands for an ideal of education which is rejected by the Church and repudiated by Catholic parents. This rejection holds independently of the college's location in Ireland; the decision is valid quite apart from any subsidiary objections based on national or political issues. And even prescinding from our view of the relation of our religion to life and secular knowledge, we Catholics hold that such an allegedly neutral ideal is in practice quite unworkable. We shall presently see that in actual practice T.C.D. is not, as it could not be, neutral.

Moreover, as in the case of the Queen's Colleges, the control of teaching appointments is a paramount issue.

The question then concerns not the educational ideal of Trinity College, which we Catholics repudiate, but how far it can be tolerated by the Church.

There is nothing specifically Irish or local in this ordinance. It merely repeats the general law of the Church, which is itself founded on natural duty. It applies to Trinity College the prescriptions of Canon Law concerning the attendance of Catholics at neutral or mixed universities. The prohibition (*ne frequentent*) of Canon 1374 is now declared to be of grave obligation in the present conditions prevailing here, where there are alternative high-grade institutions which may be considered fully Catholic. In the three university colleges the students, and the staffs also, are close on 100 per cent. Catholic.[25]

The hostile slogan of 'The Archbishop's ban' is either innocently inaccurate or (more probably) camouflaged for an attack on the general law of the Church and on the Catholic ideal of education. The paragraph of the Maynooth decree referring to his Grace is a literal transcription of Canon 1374 already quoted. With the general prohibition the Archbishop has nothing to do. He is involved in the matter only for the purpose of granting exemptions from the 'ban' in particular cases. The only accurate phrase would be: The Archbishop's exemptions from the general prohibitions of Canon Law.

It will be observed that the Maynooth decree makes no specific reference to Queen's University, Belfast. That does not mean that Canon Law is abrogated in Northern Ireland, where the conditions approximate to those of England. It means that the Bishop of Down and Connor gives a general or tacit permission to Catholic students, who have no local alternative. Catholics constitute 22 per cent. of the students of Queen's. (But only about 8 per cent. of the teaching staff.) There is a flourishing Newman Society. Scholastic Philosophy (with a staff of three) is fully recognized; 110 students (of whom only 20 are clerics) attend this course. Canon Law, by remitting decisions to the local hierarchy, envisages this elasticity of application, which is exemplified in the United States and elsewhere. The Irish Bishops are not so unreasonable or obscurantist as some assert.[26]

[25]In U.C.D. in 1960-61 there are 5,114 Catholic students (11.2 p.c. being clerics or religious) out of 5,253. In U.C.C. there are 1,365 Catholic students (17.6 p.c. clerics or religious), 8 Protestants and 3 Jews.

[26]There are cordial but unofficial relations between the Department of Scholastic Philosophy and those of Logic and Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy. (Psychology is not regarded as a philosophical subject.) Scholastic Philosophy is always an alternative option, whenever Philosophy is required as part of a Degree course in Q.U.B. On the other hand, I have met Catholic undergraduates of T.C.D. part of whose course was Philosophy, which apparently began with Descartes and then moved on to Spinoza and Kant.

III—TRINITY COLLEGE

(1) *No Tests*

This college was founded in 1591/92 for the propagation of Protestantism and the extinction of Popery. For several centuries it endeavoured to carry out its mission. In 1807 it was aptly described by J. L. Foster, M.P. for T.C.D., as 'a Protestant garrison in a land of Catholics.' After the Act for the Disestablishment of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Ireland (1869) came Fawcett's Act (1873) abolishing religious tests in T.C.D. except for the Divinity School. The Bill was strongly opposed by Trinity College as well as by the Irish Members of Parliament. It was carried by the votes of the Non-conformists, who in the outcome were the sole beneficiaries. In theory College posts were thrown open to Catholics; but the Act left intact the machinery by which Catholics could be excluded. There is still prevalent the illusion that a college is 'undenominational' or 'non-sectarian' just because it imposes no religious tests. In actual fact the real control may be Catholic or Protestant. It is significant that after 1873 Trinity College continued to be openly declared to be still Protestant (only in our day is this camouflaged). A few illustrative quotations may be given.

> The Irish Catholics, who are in the immense majority in Ireland, want a Catholic university . . . The Protestants of Ireland have in Trinity College, Dublin, a university where the teachers in all those matters which afford debatable ground between Catholics and Protestants are Protestant. Matthew Arnold, *Mixed Essays,* 1880, p. 102.

> If not by its constitution, at all events by its composition, Trinity College is now what it has always been: a Protestant institution by its religious flavour and complexion . . . The whole current of thought in such an institution is and must be antagonistic to the current of thought which would be acceptable to the large majority of the Irish people. [Arthur Balfour, Speech on 2nd December, 1889.]

> Their University was founded by Protestants, for Protestants and in the Protestant interest. A Protestant spirit had from the first animated every member of its body corporate. At the present moment, with all its toleration, all its liberality, all its comprehensiveness, and all its scrupulous honour, the *genius loci,* the guardian spirit of the place was Protestant. And as a Protestant, he said and said it boldly, Protestant might it evermore remain. Judge Webb at a T.C.D. meeting in 1891.

> The present government of the College, though secular and admitting all persons to its honours, is distinctly Protestant. Mahaffy in 1892: cited by W. Delany, S.J., *Irish University Education,* 1904, p. 27.

A Professor of T.C.D. wrote in 1907:

> Since Fawcett's Act of 1873, which found it chiefly at the service of the Protestant Episcopalian party, it has been (in spite of opposition) liberalising itself as far as possible, and has achieved for itself a large measure of liberation . . . The relics of particular denominationalism are about to disappear, and the consequences intended by Fawcett's Act are about to be realised. [J. I. Beare, *Memorandum on T.C.D. and the Irish University Question,* 1907, p.6.]

This talk about 'liberalizing' is very deceptive. All it means is that the Protestant Episcopalians had gradually to share control with Presbyterians, Methodists and other sects, all Protestant and all agreeing to keep the Papists out. Catholics do not belong to the 'Irish Council of Christian Churches and Religious Communities.' 'There is nothing in its constitution,' wrote Beare (p.8) 'to prevent a Roman Catholic priest . . . from attaining the highest position in the College.' Nothing whatever except the Protestant Board.

Unfounded alarm was expressed that the abolition of tests would mean the 'secularization' of the College. Thus Provost Lloyd wrote in 1868:

> The secularisation of Trinity College would satisfy no party in Ireland. The members of the Established Church would thereby lose the privilege which they now possess and prize: that namely of having the religious instruction of their sons provided for and imparted along with their secular teaching. [*The University of Dublin in its Relation to the several Religious Communions,* 1868, p.20.]

In the outcome T.C.D. has never really become as 'secular' as its British counterparts. A few Catholics on the staff make little impression on the centuries-old tradition of semi-Calvinistic Protestantism, with some streaks of liberalism. Seventy years ago Archbishop Walsh[27] declared: 'The day is past when they could plead, with any hope of being listened to, that their College is not really a Protestant institution.' The issue is: Has it been transformed in the interval? Has Salmon's ultra-Protestanism been superseded by Lecky's indifferentism? Even if this were so, the Catholic objection would remain. Fawcett's Act was based on a misapprehension, still prevalent today, namely, that a mixed or neutral university would be approved —not merely tolerated in the absence of an alternative—by Catholics.

(2) *Proposals Rejected*

During the past century various proposals were made to enable Catholics—equitably and with conscientious approval—to avail themselves of the advantages of Trinity College. They may be briefly summarized under two heads.

(*a*) The University of Dublin is a shadowy simulacrum, completely

[27] *The Irish University Question,* 1897, p. 224.

dominated by Trinity College. But it was originally envisaged that there should be several Colleges, as in Oxford. In 1903 the Chief Secretary, George Wyndham, proposed that there should be set up in the University of Dublin a second constituent College, acceptable to Catholics but without religious tests. The scheme was approved in its main principles by the representatives of the Catholic Hierarchy. In 1904 Lord Dunraven proposed that within the University of Dublin there should be two additional Colleges, Queen's in Belfast and King's in Dublin. As regards Catholics, the proposal was accepted by the Bishops, Catholic educational bodies, and numerous prominent laymen. But it was rejected by the Board of Trinity College. In 1907 the members of the Fry Commission reported (with one dissentient) that a new college acceptable to Catholics should be established in Dublin; the majority proposed that it should be a constituent college of Dublin University. Adopting this view, Bryce in 1907 proposed 'a single university for all Ireland,' without religious tests. 'The university was to provide teaching in non-controversial subjects into which religious controversies entered.'

Trinity College, alarmed by the proposed contamination by association with a College as much under Catholic control as itself was under Protestants, formed a Defence Committee. The slogan 'Hands off Trinity' was adopted. A deputation travelled over to England, enlisting the support of British Universities against any Catholic infection not of, but beside, Trinity.

(*b*) A second type of proposal involved an internal reform, in fact a breach in the Protestant monopoly, of T.C.D. In 1906 about 460 laymen published a statement of the conditions necessary in any solution 'based upon Trinity College being constituted as the sole college of a National University.' These included 'a substantial representation from the start upon the Governing Body,' the establishment of dual Professorships in at least Philosophy and History, a Faculty of Catholic Theology, provision af a chapel and chaplains. In concert with these Catholic laymen a number of the staff of T.C.D. —twelve Junior Fellows, one ex-Fellow and eight Professors—published a similar scheme, which however whittled down the 'substantial proportion' of Catholics to one-quarter of the Board for a period of 25 years. An interesting observation concerning Philosophy was made by one of the signatories, E. P. Culverwell of T.C.D.

> You may take from anywhere in the world a Professor of Mathematics . . . But it is entirely different when you go to such subjects as Ethics, Philosophy and perhaps History . . . Philosophy is so closely connected with life that it is impossible that it should not touch either directly or indirectly on . . . religion. [*Fry Commission, Appendix to Final Report, q.*781.]

Dean (afterwards Archbishop and Provost) Bernard agreed with Culverwell that it would be 'quite consistent with the spirit of Fawcett's Act, although perhaps inconsistent with its letter' to appoint 'Roman Catholic Professors of History and Philosophy, whose lectures Roman Catholic students might have no scruple in attending.' But Bernard was opposed to any attempt to conciliate Catholic views:

> Those who promote the scheme seem to be blind to the source from which Trinity College is fed. Let us remember that 80 per cent. of the undergraduates of Trinity College are Church of Ireland members. They represent the Church that has stood for all that has formed around Trinity College. Are we to alienate their sympathy in the hope of conciliating those who are hostile to it? It is the most foolish of proposals.—*Fry, q.*743.

The Board of T.C.D. opposed this scheme too. But its death-stroke was delivered by the Catholic Bishops on 25 July, 1906:

> Under no circumstances will the Catholics of Ireland accept a system of mixed education in Trinity College as a solution of their claim.

This uncompromising stand has contemporary significance. An offer, far exceeding any concession available today, was turned down.

Thus Trinity College rejected both a second constituent College for Catholics and an internal reform with greater Catholic representation. In self-protection against further raids, T.C.D. finally proclaimed itself in favour of an independent university acceptable to Catholics, namely the National University. This, however, was not the final phase. In recent years a vigorous campaign has been set on foot to convince Catholics that they have made a mistake, that Trinity College (even without any of the concessions proposed in 1906) is perfectly suitable for Catholic students.

(3) *Staff*

When the Queen's Colleges opened in 1850 there were two Catholics out of twenty Professors in Belfast, three out of twenty in Cork, two out of twenty in Galway. Sixteen years later there were in the three Colleges 28 Professors in Arts, only one being a Catholic. In the College of Science, after thirty years' existence, there were only two Catholics out of a staff of 23, though 50 per cent of the students were Catholics. This was the kind of higher education provided for Irish Catholics by the British Parliament.

As regards Trinity College, we are told[28] that 'there is a considerable Catholic element among the staff.' I have therefore carefully inquired into the religious affiliations of the staff whose names appear in the Calendar for 1960-61. Naturally I ignored the transient

[28] *Trinity News*, 24 Nov. 1960.

subordinate category of Assistants. Under the term 'Lecturer' I included Reader, Junior Lecturer and (in the case of the Medical Faculty) Clinical Tutor. To comprise the Faculty of Arts I took the subjects: Philosophy, Education, Economics, History, Mathematics and Modern Languages. I use the term 'Protestant' in the widest sense to include non-Catholics of the type of the historian Lecky, to whom there is a memorial in St Patrick's Cathedral. The results may be tabulated as follows:[29]

	Protestant		*Catholic*	
Faculty	*Professors*	*Lecturers*	*Professors*	*Lecturers*
Arts - -	15	34	2	10
Science - -	10	24	—	3
Medicine - -	15	44	1	8
Total	40	102	3	21

The overall result is that 7.5 per cent of the Professors, 20.6 per cent of the Lecturers are Catholic. There is no Catholic at all in Classics, Economics, Spanish or English. What is really significant is that in the vital departments of Philosophy and Education, and in the subject of Midwifery (where contentious moral issues of medical ethics occur) there is not a single Catholic.

The following officers are all Protestants: Provost, Bursar, Registrar, Senior Lecturer, Senior and Junior Proctors, Senior Dean (who is also Catechist) Junior Dean, Librarian, Senior Tutor, and all 18 Tutors. These latter, it should be noted, are declared to be each *in loco parentis*.

The Board elects the Fellows. Of the Senior Fellows 5 are Protestants and 1 a Catholic. Of the Junior Fellows 15 are Protestants and 1 a Catholic. The Board itself consists of 15 Protestants and 2 Catholics. The Council comprises 14 Protestants and (at most) 5 Catholics. Most of the Professors are elected by the Council with the consent of the Board.[30]

It is beyond the bounds of probability that this preponderant Protestant majority is the result of accident. It is the expression of a deliberate policy of keeping ideological control of the College. Catholics, except as a manageable minority, are unacceptable. We Catholics have no objection whatever to this Protestant stranglehold —provided Trinity College does not camouflage this Protestant control and pretend to be an institution suitable for Catholic students. Nor

[29]I have, by inquiry, made every effort to make the results accurate.

[30]The Professors of Medicine, Materia Medica and Midwifery are appointed by the Royal College of Physicians. All three are Protestants.

need the pruning down of Catholic personnel be alleged to be due to purely credal differences. It can be based on a total life-outlook covering natural law, attitude towards science and philosophy, acceptance of the interrelations of religion and secular education. Neither can we assume that the caricature of Catholic Professors, published by a T.C.D. Professor in 1907, is entirely extinct. A quotation is worth giving. It is an amusing expression of superiority over these benighted Catholics, so prejudiced and fundamentalist.

> The Professors of Philosophy and History would have their hands tied . . . A Professor of Greek should beware how he criticised the fundamental assumption of Plato's arguments in the *Phaedo* or Aristotle's theory of *nous* in the *de Anima*. A Mathematical Professor who theorised of space other than the tridimensional might be anathema to a disciple of Thomas Aquinas. A Professor of Geology or Palaeontology would not be free to speculate on the age of the earth or the evolution of terrestrial forms. . . . Chemistry and Physics have their dangers. Modern Literature would have to be presented in carefully arranged selections, or lectured on by someone willing and able to provide an antidote for every bane in that garden of weeds. [Beare, p.20f.]

When dealing with our university claim, we are not really concerned with Protestant precautions against too much alien Catholic influence, nor with the private or public views of the staff concerning Catholicism. What we emphasize is that we are not going to submit to education of Catholic youth under such terms. If conditions were reversed, we should not expect Protestants to be satisfied with a university similarly dominated by Catholics. Under the British régime we fought this ideal of mixed education—applied to us—on the democratic ground of our overwhelming majority. Since 1937 we rely on our constitutionally guaranteed rights.

Let me guard against misunderstanding by endorsing what Archbishop Walsh declared as long ago as 1889:

> In former days it was, as we are told, far from unknown that efforts were deliberately made by men of high influence in Trinity College to undermine the faith of Catholic students there. I must not be understood as making any charge that such things occur there at the present time. I have no reason to believe that they do. The danger . . . is one that exists altogether independently of any conscious effort at perversion. It is a danger inherent in the very nature of the 'mixed' system as worked out amongst youth in such a place of education. And this is what the Catholic Church means when she condemns that system as 'intrinsically' dangerous to faith and to fidelity in the fulfilment of Catholic duty.—*The Irish University Question,* 1897, p.155f.

What we object to nowadays is not open proselytism in the mixed university. It is rather the unexamined assumptions; the mental attitudes which are deep-seated, emotionally coloured; inherited archtypes, only partially conscious. All this could be illustrated from the writings of Trinity scholars such as Bernard, Bury, Dowden, Lecky, Mahaffy, Salmon, Tyrrell.

When, as in the case of T.C.D., a university professes to cater for various religious groups (including Catholics), it must necessarily, if it is to be fair, seek a superficial common denominator and avoid the basic vital issues which inspire men's lives. This is how Sir Walter Moberly puts it (p.50f.):

> Broadly speaking, the university today is not asking the really fundamental questions . . . Whatever its causes or excuses, such a taboo is disastrous and indefensible. It confines university education to the use of means as opposed to the choice of ends, to training in the acquisition and handling of tools as opposed to appreciation and criticism of the larger purposes for which those tools are to be used. It abjures any contribution to answering the master-question: How shall a man live? For instance, a university professor of French may say: 'I have studied the French language and literature and institutions with some thoroughness and I can expound them with authority. But whether Voltaire or Pascal has the truer apprehension of reality, whether Talleyrand or Fénelon has better mastered the secret of living, I have no idea. There you enter a region not of knowledge but of private taste or guesswork. My guess is no better than the next man's, and I have nothing to offer my pupils.'

A clear picture of the allegedly neutral teaching in Trinity may be gathered from *Irish Education : A Historical Survey* published in 1937 by J. J. Auchmuty, Lecturer in the History of Education in T.C.D. A few quotations are illuminating.

As to the Reformation, Ireland 'was completely unfitted either to receive the new doctrines boldly or to criticize them on any intellectual basis' (p. 41). 'The English Government came to realize to the full that without [a university] there was no possible chance for the Reformed religion to obtain and retain a grasp on the Irish people' (p. 127). A large porion of the book (pp. 68-123) is devoted to Sir Thomas Wyse, 'by far the most considerable figure in the whole history of Irish education'. It would take us too far afield to criticize this biased account. One would hardly gather from it that Wyse supported the Bishops' stand on the Queen's Colleges. Wyse voted for dual chairs in certain subjects and he voted against the nomination of professors by the Crown. Alexandra College (1866) was 'one of the pioneers in the cause of female education' (p. 141).

No mention whatever of Nano Nagle, Catherine McAuley or Teresa Ball! About Maynooth he writes (p. 143): 'In the period 1800-1871 a lay college was associated with the ecclesiastical seminary; but in the latter year it was done away with as the students were not considered a good influence on the budding ecclesiastics.' It was the British Government which intervened. Already on 18th April, 1845, Sir Robert Peel stated in the House of Commons: 'The Trustees of Maynooth College were desirous of establishing a lay college. . . . In consequence of the intervention of the British Government it was prevented'. The real gem is contained in the last page of Auchmuty's book: 'Northern Ireland proclaims the modern doctrine of State supremacy in education; the Irish Free State admits that in such matters the State is the servant of the Church.'

General statements about the myth of neutralism seem rather abstract. It seemed therefore preferable to give a concrete example. You simply cannot treat education and history and maintain a suspension of judgement or avoid fundamental presuppositions.

Besides these intellectual arguments, there is something else in the atmosphere of T.C.D., which might be considered too delicate to touch upon. Fortunately we can quote J. Joly, Professor of Geology, who gave evidence before the Fry Commission (pp. 358f.). 'If Trinity College is nationalized', that is, opened to low-class Catholics, 'it must cease to be a home of the upper Protestant classes.' Catholics fit for Trinity are 'small in number compared with the Protestants of similar standing in the country.' 'A body of some 1,100 represents the whole mass of that part of the Irish Roman Catholic laity who require the type of education we can offer.' The other Catholics 'have neither the money nor the family influence'.

Financial stringency has since compelled Trinity to cater for the *hoi polloi*. But it still relies on this unmentioned attitude of snobbery, to the appeal of which certain Catholics succumb.

(4) *Students*

Except for some evidence given in 1906 to the Fry Commission[31] I do not know any published statistics concerning the religious affiliations of students in Trinity College. I turn to some other figures, the latest available to me.

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[31] *Fry Comm.* App. p. 337. Total students in T.C.D. on 1st May 1906: 1,250. Prot. Episcopalians 929; Catholics 140; Presbyterians 88; Methodists 33; Others 60. Thus Catholics were slightly over 11 per cent.

Home Residence of Full-time Students
Session 1958/59

	T.C.D.	U.C.D.
Dublin and within 30 miles	632	2,180
Rest of State - - -	351	1,717
Six Counties - - -	320	78
Great Britain - - -	600	44
Elsewhere - - - -	365	198
Total	2,268	4,218

From this table we deduce:

Home Residence	*Percentage of Students*	
Dublin - - - -	27.8	50
Outside the State - -	57	7.6

That is, for 100 Dubliners in T.C.D. there are 345 in U.C.D. For every one outsider (foreigner) in U.C.D. there are four in T.C.D. For every one student domiciled in the State in T.C.D. there are four in U.C.D. In fact the number of students from the State is appreciably less in Trinity College than in University College Cork.[32]

It is therefore clear that Trinity College has swollen its numbers by the generous admission of students from outside the country. The figure of 600 from Great Britain is significant. For it is unofficially asserted that there are 600 Catholics in Trinity. It would be interesting to know how many of these Catholics come from England, where they failed for the most part to obtain competitive entrance to one of their own universities. Also how many Irish Catholics, with the easier conditions of entry,[33] attend Trinity?

In the *Catholic Times,* 17 January 1930, there was published an interesting letter, signed T.C.D., enumerating the reasons why Irish Catholics—a very small fraction, of course, of the total attending the Colleges of the N.U.I.—go to Trinity. Here they are for what they are worth. (Many, I think, are valid today.)

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[32]In round numbers: U.C.D. 3,900, U.C.C. 1,200, U.C.G. 850; T.C.D. 980. Session 1958-59.

[33]'Ninety per cent of Catholics found within the walls of Trinity are there because it is so much easier to get in than into the National, and because a Degree in Trinity is so much easier than getting a Degree in the National'—Bishop Dignan, *Catholics and Trinity College,* 1933, p. 14. The list of prizes and scholarships awarded by T.C.D. was published in the *Irish Times,* 15 June 1961. All the recipients came from Protestant schools; 12 from schools in the Six Counties, 9 from Dublin schools.

The following reasons have been given to me and others:

(1) The comparative ease of the entrance examination.
(2) The absence of Irish in that examination.
(3) The fact that B.A. can still be got without attending any lectures.
(4) The real student resident life in one's own rooms.
(5) The comparative ease of the medical examination.
(6) The comparative prestige of the T.C.D. medical degree out of Ireland.
(7) The openings in the English Army and Navy and Indian services.
(8) The preference given to T.C.D. graduates in certain 'big business concerns'.
(9) The social prestige and worldly plans and ideals.
(10) Irish lack of self-confidence, the disbelief in one's own . . . People and priests are poisoned by a spirit of acceptance of defeat.
(11) The acquiescence of, or the encouragement given by, many priests for pupils of schools to go to Trinity College.
(12) The ignorance among Irish laymen of everything connected with the Catholic Church.

There is a current delusion that 'if Catholics were permitted to enter Trinity, they would in due course be so strong as to dominate'.[34] There is no possibility whatever of 'permitting' in the sense of positively approving or encouraging. T.C.D. can hardly request an amendment to the Canon Law, and a derogation of Catholic principles of education, just to enable it to entice more Irish Catholics from their own institutions. Behind this piece of Trinity propaganda there is the suggestion that Catholics refrain from attending that College, not from conscientious conviction but through clerical intimidation. This is the echo of an old refrain to which many Protestants still cling. It is time to realize that Catholic parents and young people have firm convictions about their education and their Faith, for which in the past they were—and are today—prepared to make sacrifices.

We are told that if Catholic students poured into T.C.D., 'they would in due course be so strong as to dominate' it. As many well-meaning Catholics are misled by this catch-cry, this hazy fantasy should be confronted with the real situation. In the past the penal laws were designed, not to produce a mass 'conversion' to Protestantism—that would have been regarded as a calamitous accession to privileged status—but rather to seduce a minority of Catholics and to keep the

[34] *Times Educ. Suppl.*, 3 Feb. 1961 (p. 194).

majority in subjection. Today Trinity does not wish to be swamped by Catholic students, but only to entice a manageable minority. But even if the majority were really or nominally Catholics, they might create a few shindies but they could never obtain academic control. The Board and the Council, overwhelmingly Protestant, are quite immune from any influence of the students or of the public. These bodies have complete control of teaching appointments. Any attempt to interfere would be met by a vociferous and widespread cry that academic freedom was in danger. So, apart from condoning a condemned mixed education—*ex hypothesi* lasting for many years to come—the scheme of these Catholic advocates is shattered by the carefully designed constitution of Trinity College.

(5) *The Irish Protestant Outlook*

What is often overlooked is that in Trinity College the atmosphere is very different—and therefore more dangerous to Catholics—from that in the secular universities of Great Britain. In the latter the authorities, Protestant and agnostic, are generally tolerant of, if not indifferent to, Catholicism, which is regarded as innocuous. But Irish Protestants, like a beleaguered garrison in hostile territory, are militant, defensive and suspicious. This is quite understandable in a small minority fearful of being absorbed, thinking regretfully of their past ascendancy. Hence too their strategy for retaining and even extending their part in professional and business life.[35] They are keenly watchful in retaining their Protestant schools, primary and secondary, and even their hospitals.[36] Is anyone so naive as to suppose that they will quietly abandon the Protestant control of their central educational citadel?

Trinity contains a Church of Ireland Divinity School,[37] which is anomalous in these islands as an internal University Faculty of Theology: (1) it is controlled by one unestablished church; (2) it functions not only for scholarship but for pastoral training as a

[35]Could you imagine this type of advertisement appearing in English newspapers: City firm requires Protestant girl as Junior Clerk; Large drapery firm (South) has vacancies for boy apprentices (Protestant); Footwear salesman, young man (Protestant); Junior girl C.I. required for city office. All these vacancies are advertised in one issue of the *Irish Times* (13 January 1961). The firms remain anonymous: their Catholic customers might be perturbed!

[36]They have recently proposed a Bill to federate seven Protestant hospitals in Dublin. The Board of the Adelaide Hospital reported that under the federation it 'would retain its Protestant character and tradition.'—*Irish Times,* 10 May 1961.

[37]One has only to read the Consolidated Statutes of T.C.D., published in 1926, to see how inextricably the Divinity School is intertwined with the Board. The Divinity School Council is composed of: the Provost (if Church of Ireland), 5 members elected by the Board, 3 by the teaching staff, 3 by the Bishops of the Church of Ireland. The Board must approve all regulations concerning studies, lectures, examinations. All powers of nomination are subject to the approval of the Board. The Divinity School Council has no control over the conditions on which Degrees are given.

seminary. I might add indeed its pronounced negative character of anti-Catholicism. Its important text-book is Provost Salmon's attack on 'the Romish Church.' I have before me the Divinity examination papers of T.C.D. for 1941. A few quotations are given here:

> Give a full account of Salmon's criticism of the Essay on Development.
> Does the Church of Rome believe in her own infallibility? Sketch Salmon's answer.
> The case of Pope Honorius.
> The Romish doctrine concerning Purgatory.
> What were Milner's axioms? Sketch Salmon's refutation.
> Summarise Salmon's conclusions about the Rock text.
> Mention some popes of the Middle Ages who favoured heretical opinions.
> The case of Liberius.
> The teaching of Rome on the doctrine of merit.
> Examine the 'hesitations of the infallible guide.'
> Write a note on: 'Transsubstantiation had a disastrous influence on the life of the church'.

Such outdated polemic would astonish, say, the Theological Faculty of Manchester or Oxford. But it reflects the outlook of the Church of Ireland. Dr Newport J. D. White, who was Regius Professor of Divinity in T.C.D. from 1930 to 1935, published in 1931 a booklet under the title of *The Average Man, how he may be helped in the Christian Life*. Let us cull a few phrases:

> Irish Protestants live in 'the atmosphere of aggressive Romanism'. 'Romanism makes Christianity light for the average man in many ways'. It is 'an idolatrous belief', it has 'little of genuine worship', it practises 'the grave abuses of auricular confession'. It 'forbids, or at least strongly discourages, recourse to the Great Healer of all.'

This is how a Trinity Professor of Divinity views us.[38] It is worth adding the Protestant historical view of the Catholic Church in Ireland, as I have found that it exists in several—and presumably in all—Church of Ireland clergymen.[39] It can best be expressed in the report of a speech in Trinity by an erstwhile Provost, Dr Traill (13 November 1900):

> (1) Their Church was the lineal descendent of the ancient Church of Ireland; and (2) the present Church of Rome in this country could trace no such descent, but was imported at the beginning of the seventeenth century.

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[38]It is only fair to add that our Presbyterian fellow-citizens have a similar view of us. The outgoing Moderator (Dr Austin Fulton) declared: 'We repudiate the Mass and we reject Mariolatry. We do so . . . because they are idolatrous both in principle and practice.'—*Irish Times*, 6 June 1961. After this he said: 'We ought to draw closer to Roman Catholics in Christian charity."

[39]We are keeping alight the flame lighted by St. Patrick in the Celtic twilight 1,500 years ago.'—Archbishop Gregg in Westminster Abbey, 1st August 1948.

I am not now engaged in religious controversy or in dealing with bowdlerized history. So far as the university issue is concerned, our dissident brethren may continue to hold these views—but only for internal consumption. However, I ask: Is a university, where a body of influential students, a whole Faculty and an undisclosed number of Professors regard Catholics as usurpers and idolators, a fit place for educating our young people?

We can go farther. We have no reason to assume that Trinity Protestants hold these views speculatively *in camera*. They surely cannot remain indifferent and inactive in presence of a luckily enticed lot of priest-ridden idolators. No rough stuff, of course; external amenities must be observed. Past history has taught us that mixed education is regarded as a chance for the Protestant apostolate. A former Protestant Archbishop of Dublin is likely to have successors in Trinity, with the same guile:

> I believe that mixed education is gradually enlightening the mass of the people, and that, if we give it up, we give up the only hope of weaning the Irish from the abuses of Popery. But I cannot venture openly to profess this opinion. I cannot openly support the Education Board as an instrument of conversion.—Abp. Whately, *Life* ii. 246.

(6) *The New Campaign*

The background of the present situation can be briefly recapitulated. Trinity College refused to share its status and privileges by being associated with a college in which Catholics would have fair play. It also opposed all proposals for internal reform, which would make the governors 'mixed' as well as the students.[40] To retain its isolation and to forestall further criticism, Trinity finally gave its support to the proposal to establish an independent university which Catholics could accept. All these manoeuvres presuppose that T.C.D. is under Protestant control and is not acceptable to Catholics. Thus, with the founding of the National University, a pluralist solution was found, a truce would appear to have been effected.

But not for long! Trinity, separated politically from its British counterparts, began to feel the competition of its more successful rival, U.C.D. Foreigners and Irish Protestants were not enough; so it began to fish for Irish Catholic students. A reversal of outlook was gradually and adroitly publicized. Flaunting the results of past confiscations and discriminatory taxation, Trinity initiated an extensive propaganda, proclaiming itself to be the best place for Irish Catholic university students. Site, buildings, prestige, snobbery, easy admission

[40]Mixed education, W. K. Sullivan wrote long ago (op. cit. p. 29), is 'a happy phrase which some cunning man invented to express the true condition of the Queen's Colleges: students of different religions united under teachers belonging to one.'

—all were used to bolster up the new claim. And by way of comparison it availed itself of every opportunity to depreciate its rival. It took advantage of the disabilities under which U.C.D. laboured: crowded site, insufficient accommodation, an over-rigid Charter, utterly inadequate finance. Settling its own disputes in private, with its own Visitors, Trinity encouraged the washing of dirty linen in public, and exploited the internal differences of its rival. Not realizing the ulterior object of this campaign, many of our people were duped into abetting it. Trinity seemed to have won the paper war; but it has lost the real battle. In spite of serious drawbacks, U.C.D. has astonishingly developed. It has four times as many Dublin students as the 'University of Dublin.' It has at least ten times as many Catholic students.



We, on our side, have observed the articles of peace. In this religiously pluralist country, we have accepted parental rights, allow-

ing non-Catholics to decide for or against 'mixed' education. We support Protestant (and Jewish) schools and a Protestant university.[41] This latter expensive duplication would have no justification whatever if an important principle of liberty were not involved. We Catholics claim that attendance at Trinity would be 'in violation of conscience' and that we have a right to a type of education in consonance with Catholic homes and parental choice.

But T.C.D. has begun to object; it proclaims that its education is quite suitable for Catholics.[42] I am afraid that they do not realize the fateful consequences of this claim. If T.C.D. is perfectly adapted to Catholics and should be so acccepted by them, then why on earth should we have to incur the expense of a second university institution in Dublin? Suppose that Trinity is right in its contention, that it convinces us as it professes to desire. Then of course we should concentrate on T.C.D. as a common national establishment. In that case, does anyone seriously think that it would be left in its present monopolistic autonomy? Its Charter would have to be changed, the Protestant stranglehold eliminated; probably representation of outside individuals or public bodies would be introduced.

I submit therefore that the present campaign of Trinity College, no longer protected by the British Parliament, is a very dangerous adventure; if successful, it would be suicidal. Far safer for Trinity to be content to remain a Protestant institution, offering so-called mixed education to those who want it, grateful that we, the erstwhile targets of its proselytism and penalizing, have no desire to force our own ideology upon it.

Trinity's take-over bid is ostensibly based on the delusion that the Catholic laity are thirsting for mixed or neutral education, that they are prevented only by what is designated 'the Archbishop's ban' from flocking into T.C.D. I have already dealt with this matter, but some further remarks are called for. We do not interfere with non-Catholic students; we do not prescribe for them; we oversubsidize facilities for them; moreover we have no objection whatever if Protestant students are discouraged from, or advised against, the National University. In other words, the so-called 'ban' is a purely internal ordinance. It lies in the domain of theology and morals; its violation involves no civic penalty, no disability within the cognisance of court or parliament. On a more serious scale, it is analogous with the prescriptions of the Medical Council concerning 'infamous conduct', or even with the rules of a club (e.g., forbidding playing for

[41]In the estimates for 1960-61, T.C.D. is assigned £163,250. This, being designated a 'grant-in-aid', is not accounted for to the Auditor General, T.C.D. also receives a 'non-recurring grant' (£10,000) which has been recurring for several years.

[42]Protestants agree with us against mixed education for pupils up to the age of 16 or 17. 'It is the inalienable right of the parent to decide the form of education which his children shall receive.'—Prof. Johnston of T.C.D. in the Senate, 3 Feb., 1943.

another team). Even under the British régime, in connection with the famous O'Keeffe Case (1872-75),

> the court decided that the Catholic Church in these countries—being in the eye of the law a tolerated church or society composed of members voluntarily associated together, professing the same religion—is competent to make regulations for enforcing discipline within its own body.—P. J. Walsh, *W. J. Walsh, Archbishop of Dublin,* 1928, p.49.

Regretfully but firmly we must tell Trinity to mind its own business, to abandon its futile attempt to have the general Canon Law of the Church amended in its favour.

The Trinity campaign is not the only instance of objection being taken to the right of a spiritual organization to give moral guidance independently of the State.[43] There is a touch of totalitarianism about all this. It is we Catholics, not the Trinity spokesmen, who are liberals and pluralists.

More than a century ago, Newman wrote:

> We see in the magnificent institution of Elizabeth nothing more or less than an instrument of monopolizing literature and science for the uses of the State [Protestant] religion, of making the name of Protestant synonymous with mental illumination and of Catholicity with bigotry and ignorance.—*My Campaign in Ireland,* p. 364.

This spirit of intellectual smugness and social snobbery, prevailing in Newman's time, has not yet been completely exorcized. Hence the 'cold war' now in operation. Under the present conditions of active hostility against Catholic principles of education and sociology, it is impossible to secure that friendly spirit of co-operation and mutual respect which should characterize the two university institutions demanded by our pluralist society.

IV—A Catholic University

(1) *Different Types*

It is important to realize that the term 'Catholic university,' like that of 'Catholic school', is applied to different kinds of institutions.

(*a*) *Papal.* Let us begin by referring to the medieval prototypes, established in a juridical context which no longer exists.

> Previous to the Reformation, 81 universities were established. Of these 13 had no charter, they developed spontaneously *ex consuetudine;* 33 had only the papal charter; 15 were founded by imperial or royal authority; 20 by both papal and imperial (or royal) charters . . . In the civil order, the emperor was supreme; hence he conferred on the universities founded by him, without any papal

[43] One recalls the *Irish Times'* vehement denial of the right of our Bishops to criticize, on purely religious grounds, certain provisions of the Mother and Child scheme.

> charter, the right to grant degrees in all the faculties, theology and canon law included. The imperial charters were recognized by the popes.—E.A. Pace, Universities: *Cath. Encycl.* 15 (1912) 191.

Kings could and did found universities, but their degrees were valid only within the limits of the kingdom; the power of bishops and municipalities was still more restricted. Only the Pope or the Emperor could establish a *studium generale* with international recognition.[44] Thus St Andrew's, started in 1411 by Bishop Wardlaw, was next year given a charter by Benedict XIII. The Popes also often intervened to protect universities against local authorities, or to secure the payment of professors' salaries.

(*b*) *Pontifical-Civil.* With the cessation of the international recognition of papal authority, the rôle of the Papacy has become circumscribed. In the modern world it is in practice confined to the granting of what may be called non-secular degrees: Theology, Canon Law, Philosophy. Canon Law declares:

> 1376: The canonical establishment of a Catholic university or Faculty is reserved to the Apostolic See. 1377: Academic Degrees with canonical effects in the Church can be conferred only by permission granted by the Apostolic See.

The civil validity of secular degrees requires the authorization of the State. Hence there are many examples of Catholic universities with both papal and civil charters, which enable them to confer both kinds of degrees.[45]

The University of Louvain, to which Newman made many references, is an example of a papal-civil university. It was founded by Pope Martin V in 1425, and received a new charter from Archduke Albert. The French suppressed it in 1797; it was re-established in 1833 by Gregory XVI. Its degrees were recognized by the State. The university is thus described by Professor Leo van Puyvelde:

> To what extent is the University of Louvain a Catholic univertisy? The direction of the university is in the hands of the Council of Bishops of Belgium. The Rector, almost always a cleric, is their representative. There are some priests on the staff of professors, not only in Theology but also in other faculties. No explicit act of adherence to the Catholic Faith is asked from the students . . . The professors are free in their teaching and are not inclined to link their teaching up with religion. It cannot be said that this university is Catholic as putting over a philosophy of life. It is

[44]This is the strict meaning of the term; it does not imply the inclusion of all faculties. The term *universitas* is only a specialized application of the legal entity we call a corporation.

[45]Laval: civil 1854, papal 1876. Ottawa: civil 1866, papal 1889. Peru: civil 1917, papal 1942. University of the Sacred Heart (Milan): papal 1920, civil 1924. Maynooth has a pontifical faculty; for degrees in arts or science it avails itself of the National University.

> Catholic in so far as the professors are chosen amongst Catholics and the students are understood to be Catholics. It is Catholic in the sense that the community of professors and students are living in an environment which is consciously and subconsciously impregnated by Catholic thought and practice. An excellent course in religion is open to the students of all the faculties; but attendance is not compulsory.—*Blackfriars,* January 1944, suppl. p. ix.

Here we see certain provisions and also some limitations, which are not to be found in other Catholic universities. While there are no tests for the students, who are not all Catholics, the professors must be Catholics.[46] On the other hand, Louvain relies on a Catholic environment, without 'putting over a philosophy of life'.

The University of Navarre in Pamplona is another interesting example. It was founded, under *Opus Dei,* in 1952, by a decree of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities. By a further decree of 1959 it was further authorized to confer degrees in Canon Law under the formal sanction of the Lateran University in Rome. The students, mostly lay, in other faculties sit as externs for the examinations of the State University of Saragossa, which also confers the degrees. The Provincial Council of Navarre has helped the university with site, buildings, hospital; a successful fund-raising campaign was also undertaken. The State, which has considerable power over universities in Spain, has not yet given recognition to the new institution, in spite of Article 31 of the Concordat of 1953, which reads.

> The Church may freely exercise her right . . . to found and direct public schools of all types, even for lay people. As regards the regulations for the civil recognition of the studies carried out in these schools, the State will act in agreement with the competent ecclesiastical authority.

(*c*) *Civil.* State authorization of a university may formally presuppose that it is a Catholic institution, e.g., Laval in Canada and Nijmegen in Holland. Or, as in the United States where no public aid is given, the State may charter a university whose religious status it does not assume or prescribe; it may be Catholic or Lutheran or secular. In the United States there are hundreds of degree-giving Catholic colleges and universities. These derive their authority from a State charter.[47] The word 'charter' in America merely means a special Act of the State Legislature. Take the case of the College of Notre Dame in Baltimore. In 1864 it was made a 'body politic and corporate' by an Act of the General Assembly of Maryland. Its

[46]Contrast this: 'To-day Notre Dame's 483 faculty members, less than one-fifth of them priests, include men of many faiths'.—*Time,* 21 April 1961.

[47]Apart from the Catholic University of America, in Washington, which, by Leo XIII in 1889, was made a Pontifical University empowered to grant ecclesiastical degrees.

charter,[48] conferring power to grant certain degrees, was a further Act passed in 1896.

It is worth recording that such a civil institution is not debarred from giving degrees in Theology. St Mary's College, managed by the Sisters of the Holy Cross in Notre Dame (Indiana), established a School of Sacred Theology in 1944, the faculty members being seven priests, two nuns and two laywomen. It is intended for training women teachers of religion; and it has, of course, the approbation of the Ordinary (the Bishop of Fort Wayne). 'This school,' we are told, 'functions under the charter of St Mary's College, granted by the State of Indiana in 1855.' It is not a Pontifical Faculty of Theology. But in 1949 it received a letter of commendation from Pius XII, sent through Cardinal Pizzardo, Prefect of the Sacred Congregation of Seminaries and Universities. The subjects are Scripture, Dogmatic and Moral Theology, Church History. The degrees obtainable are M.A. and Ph.D.

A rather special case is presented by a Catholic university, under the Basilian Fathers, in Windsor, Ontario. From 1919 to 1953 Assumption College was affiliated with the non-denominational University of Western Ontario, following the prescribed curriculum except in Philosophy and Theology. The Ontario Legislature conferred university powers on the College in 1953 and in 1956 gave it the title 'Assumption University of Windsor.' The peculiar circumstances are as follows: In 1956 Essex College was affiliated with this Catholic university. This is an autonomous non-denominational college specializing in science, engineering and commerce; it is in receipt of substantial government grants, for Ontario does not finance denominational universities. In 1957 the Anglican Canterbury College was affiliated with Assumption University, preferring this to being associated with a secular university. This college has its own courses in Philosophy and Theology. The Catholic constituent college contains the Faculty of Arts.

This conglomerate institution is a loose federation, depending for its success on co-operative goodwill. The Board of Governors (the Basilian Fathers) 'retained full control of the university.' But there are two non-denominational bodies: the Senate and the Board of Regents (the latter for finance). Of the students 40 per cent are non-Catholics, comprising 21 different religious groups as well as some non-Christians. Though the Catholic students receive a full Arts course under Catholic auspices, the situation cannot be described as ideal. But in a community in which Catholics are a minority, it has great advantages over a purely secular university, and it secures public aid and expensive equipment.

[48]Reproduced in J. Tracy Ellis, *Documents of American Catholic History*, 1956, p.546. It was signed by the Governor, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Delegates.

These observations suffice to show that the term 'Catholic university' comprises many gradations of meaning.[49]

(2) *The Essential*

In the light of present-day circumstances, thus briefly outlined, we must see what is the essence, the 'idea', of a university which can be called Catholic. According to Canon 1375, 'the Church has the the right to establish schools of every kind, not only elementary but secondary and higher.' This right, which was acknowledged in the middle ages, may be conceded today through a Concordat. But in the typical modern State, which is religiously pluralist, this abstract right must be juridically based on natural law and distributive justice. A commentary on the above-quoted Canon contains this passage:

> The right to teach is not the monopoly of anyone as regards secular subjects; or rather it pertains to knowledge. Whoever possesses sufficient knowledge is from the standpoint of natural law qualified to place himself at the disposal of parents and to become their collaborator in the work of instructing their children: —Michel, s.v. scolaire, *Dict. de théol. catholique.*

In any State the Church possesses this right by natural law. But the contentious issue is that of distributive justice in a mixed State. The Church, as a religious association representing numerous parents, claims that an acceptable university should be available for Catholics, under acknowledged guarantees by the State. This involves financial subsidy and recognition of degrees. Great Britain and many other countries refuse both demands. The United States grants recognition but refuses subsidy.

Nowadays Catholic university institutions, when they exist, are founded or authorized by the State. There are Pontifical Faculties of Theology, in which the State professes not to be directly interested. But in the strict sense there are no purely papal universities. What are the qualifications of a State-chartered university to deserve being called Catholic? This can be considered under three heads.

(*a*) *Personnel* (*Governors and Teachers*)

First consider universities due to Catholic initiative, the chief examples being in the United States. Now in fact the vast majority of these were started by, and remain under the control of, religious orders. Now this is quite intelligible in view of historical circumstances. The religious were organized, they had to make great financial

[49] I omit such an institution as Al-Hikma, the Jesuit University of Baghdad, whose students are practically 100 p.c. Mohammedan. I would like to refer to two anomalous cases. (a) 'A relic of the Papal Degree is the Lambeth Degree still conferred by the Archbishop of Canterbury, who before the Reformation was *legatus natus*'.—J. Williams, *The Law of the University*, 1910, p. 8. (b) Under a Charter of 1881, the Presbyterian Theological Faculty of Ireland (Presb. Coll. Belfast and Magee) was empowered to grant Degrees in Divinity.

commitments, they provided guarantees of stability and continuity, they were dedicated to this apostolate. But this, while explaining and justifying clerical control, does not make it essential to a Catholic university. The lay teachers in these American institutions outnumber the clerical by three to one. And with the growing realization of the lay apostolate, these lay teachers are beginning to claim greater responsibility and higher status.[50]

The Catholic secondary schools in Ireland present a similar situation. We owe their existence to the initiative and self-sacrifice of clergy and religious. But this historical fact does not mean that ecclesiastical ownership and control are necessary qualifications for such schools. In fact, there are more than fifty Catholic lay secondary schools doing excellent work, chiefly in small towns and remote villages. Their managers and headmasters have a Federation, one of whose aims is declared to be 'the inculcation of Catholic principles by sufficient religious instruction and good example.'

A recent example from England may be quoted.[51] Redrice School in Hampshire has been started under the patronage of the Archbishop-Bishop of Portsmouth and with the encouragement of the authorities of Downside, Ampleforth, Beaumont and Stonyhurst. It aims at being 'the only Catholic public school for boys to be an entirely lay foundation with lay headmasters and staff.'

It is therefore clear that, apart from practical difficulties, a secondary or higher college can fully be termed Catholic while under lay management and staffing.

The same applies to a university initiated by the State for Catholics. The governing body must be such as to provide and to guarantee Catholic education. That it should be composed chiefly of ecclesiastics is neither necessary nor desirable. Similarly for the professorial staff.

> The Church recognizes the right of the State—or corporations or individuals under the control of the State—to establish purely secular faculties, e.g., of Law and Medicine . . . The Church requires that in universities founded by the civil power for Catholics, the faculties of Theology and Canon Law, once they are canonically established, shall remain subject to the supreme ecclesiastical authority; and moreover that professors in the other faculties shall be Catholic and that their teaching shall accord with Catholic doctrine and moral principles—Pace, Universities, *Cath. Enc.* 15 (1912) 198.

We are not now concerned with the Faculty of Theology, which lies outside the jurisdiction of the State except by way of granting facilities. But as regards the other faculties it is not demanded that

[50]See J. G. Lawler, *The Catholic Dimension in Higher Education*, 1959, pp. 138ff: The Layman's Rôle.

[51]*Tablet*, 25 March 1961, p. 279.

all the professors must be Catholics, but only that faith and morals must be safeguarded.[52]

Neither is it necessary that the students should all be Catholics. But naturally—and the same holds for professors—the proportion of non-Catholics may be so great as to nullify the Catholic character of the university (or school).[53]

This question of lay co-operation and initiative is so increasingly important that I add some further remarks. The integration of the laity into the life of the Church, the growing co-partnership of clergy and laity in liturgy, education and mission work, receives to-day authoritative and world-wide recognition. With the relaxation of post-Reformation polemics, there has ensued a greater positive appreciation of the doctrine of the Mystical Body. As regards education, this has been accentuated by the growing development of secondary and higher education, which has already occurred in some countries and will prevail elsewhere. This trend has already had repercussions on Catholic education in the United States, where since 1940 pupils in Catholic elementary and secondary schools have doubled and those in Catholic colleges and universities have almost quadrupled. Accordingly the rôle of the lay teachers is gradually becoming predominant.

> The old notion of the lay teacher as merely a substitute for a religious teacher is dying out, and is yielding to the recognition that the lay teacher holds the key place in any future expansion of Catholic education. . . . Dedicated personalities, academic preparation, classroom competence, even religious influence itself, can be as much the possession of lay teachers as of religious teachers. . . . One can expect that the purely administrative and academic functions of the American Catholic school will more and more become the normal responsibility of the laity. . . . It has not been a lack of good will, but a tradition of isolationism and the general poverty of the Catholic community, that has retarded the clerical-lay partnership in Catholic education.—N. G. McCluskey, S.J., *Catholic Viewpoint on Education,* 1959, p. 105.

That a similar evolution is occurring in French Canada is shown by a recent address of Cardinal Leger of Montreal. He announced and justified the transformation of the College of Saint Paul into an institution directed by laymen and the appointment of a layman as vice-rector of the University of Montreal:

> The innovations of the College of Saint Paul . . . show that even a college directed by laymen, without an ecclesiastical staff,

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[52]For example, the head of the Mathematics Department in Notre Dame is a Jew. In the old Jesuit U.C.D. I myself was taught Physics by a Protestant (McClelland).

[53]Georgetown, on its opening in 1789, declared that it was 'open to students of every religious persuasion'. Notre Dame in 1847 stated that 'in the reception of pupils no distinction of creed is made'. There is a discussion of the problem in Sokolich, pp.151ff.

> can remain completely religious both in its organization and its personnel. These innovations seek to be a 'lesson on things' in order that the true dimensions of the Church may be better understood: a Church that is not composed only of the clergy but also of the laity. Denominational education and education by laymen are not realities opposed to each other: far from it!—Cited in *The Furrow,* Sept. 1961, p. 568.

(*b*) *Catholic Education*

This is the vital question: *What* is provided, not by whom (whether cleric or layman). A university is not Catholic merely because most or all of the staff and the students are Catholics. There are, indeed, non-humanistic subjects which in themselves are neutral. But a Catholic university is not fulfilling its function if it allows occupational fragmentation and contents itself with offering isolated courses, plus separate facilities for a largely pietistic religion. A Catholic university must not only train a student for a professional career, as the secular institutions do. It must deal with him as a man and not merely as a careerist or a specialist; it must fortify him with the Catholic answers to the age-old questions of man's ultimate purpose and nature. Referring to British universities, an English Catholic writes:

> The main influence of university teaching is a subtle but important one: by ignoring ultimate questions of belief and purpose it creates the impression that such questions are irrelevant or fruitless when compared with the work of its specialized disciplines. . . . This influence will be most marked in the Science faculties. It follows that any attempt at religious education should not merely add religious knowledge as a further isolated subject competing for attention, but should rather attempt to integrate the basic questions of religious belief with the fundamentals of the special disciplines.—P. Black, *Dublin Review,* Summer 1960, p.122.

Addressing Catholics in a British university, Bishop Beck of Salford[54] pointed out a serious danger: 'The university man or woman was tempted to allow the influence of paganism to dominate his intellectual life to the detriment of the Faith, and to substitute pietism for a full spiritual formation integrated with growth in secular knowledge.' It is by considering the dangers incurred by Catholics in secular universities, and the difficulty of providing an effective remedy for them, that we can best appreciate the positive task of a Catholic university.

But we must beware of taking a narrow intellectualist outlook

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[54]Address to Manchester Newman Circle, quoted in the *Catholic Herald,* 10 March 1961.

in this matter, as many have misinterpreted Newman to have done. The inculcation of an objective moral order and of Catholic norms of morality, as well as the sacramental aids to moral practice, is an essential function of Catholic university education. Conditions in secular universities again serve to emphasize this need.[55]

(*c*) *The Authority of the Church*

That there are limits to the teaching-freedom of university professors is universally admitted. What is disputed is the extent of this limitation and the authority which is to decide on the abuse. The case of Trinity College is pertinent to our inquiry. Some quotations from the Appendix to the Final Report of the Fry Commission (1907) throw light on the subject. Provost Traill was asked whether a professor would be allowed to teach atheism. To this he gave the enigmatic reply:

> If he did that as against religion, he might be interfered with. But if he meant that investigation in physics and so forth led him to that conclusion, we would not interfere with him—q.59.

He was much more shocked by the suggestion that a T.C.D. professor would teach 'any doctrine that was contrary to law', i.e., British law. 'I cannot imagine,' he answered (q.61), 'any of our professors doing such a thing at all.' Admitting that a limitation existed, he declared that the decision should vest in 'a body of laymen' (q.63). He 'would object altogether to any ecclesiastical authority dictating inside this or any college of a university what the secular teaching was to be' (q.64). But he admitted (q.60) that 'one professor had to be rebuked for interfering in religious matters with a class on a secular subject.' Presumably the professor merely forgot to show that 'investigation led him to that conclusion.' When asked if a professor would be allowed to teach anti-Christian doctrine, the Provost vaguely replied that he 'did not think a professor in a secular subject would be allowed to make a crusade in religious matters' (q.60). But Dean (afterwards Archbishop) Bernard was more explicit. Antichristian doctrine would not be permitted 'in the Divinity School' (q.385). But in the Arts course, if the divinity of Christ or the inspiration of the Scriptures were denied in lectures, Bernard was 'entirely satisfied that the Board would not interfere' (q. 388). His reason was that 'it would be inconsistent with Fawcett's

[55] 'Most answers showed a good attitude and some sense of responsibility. But the only ones with a sense of definite moral law were those who declared themselves to be Catholics. Very few were actually in favour of promiscuity; but most would be content prepared to judge by circumstances—except the Catholics.'—Lady Pakenham citing a recent survey of university students, *Catholic Herald*, 20 January 1961. A recent survey of Harvard-Radcliffe undergraduates 'indicated that among all respondents only 7 p.c. disapproved of birth control, 14 p.c. disapproved of divorce, 18 p.c. disapproved of legalised abortion, 21 p.c. disapproved of premarital intercourse.'—W. J. Whalen, *Catholics on Campus*, 1961, p.22.

Act to lay down any such principle. There is nothing distinctively Christian in the constitution of Trinity College' (q.386).

Having thus dechristianized T.C.D., the Dean proceeded to contrast the ultramontane (i.e., Catholic) ideal (q.355):

> There are two ideals of education which are very well understood. One I may call for shortness the 'liberal' ideal, according to which all research and investigations should be free. It is not necessarily an irreligious ideal at all, but is quite distinct from the ultramontane ideal, which demands that at every point investigation should be checked by the ecclesiastical authorities.

This absurd travesty of the Catholic position was promptly demolished by a Catholic prelate:

> If we except books dealing professedly with faith and morals, the Catholic lay professor, like Protestant professors, is free to publish a book on any subject, without permission from or reference to any ecclesiastical superior. And again, if we understand science as it is understood in modern times as experimental [or observational] science, the Catholic professor is under no restriction in teaching.—Dr Cohalan (afterwards Bishop of Cork), *Trinity College and the Trinity Commission,* 1908, p.8.

Here is a statement made by another Catholic bishop[56]:

> I believe the late Professor Huxley was an eminent biologist. If he was teaching biology, he might teach it all his life, as long as he confined himself to biology. But if he gave his Lay Sermons to students, and went on to show the impossibility of Revealed Religion and the impossibility of the Supernatural, then I would stop him.—Bishop O'Dwyer, Robertson Commission, q.2753.

In a letter to Wilfrid Ward, Bishop O'Dwyer wrote:

> An officious interference with teaching in a university would be intolerable. But I should not like to lay down the proposition that in a university for Catholics there was the same absolute freedom for a professor, in relation to revealed truth, as there naturally is in Protestant universities, where there is neither a living authority to teach religion nor a defined faith.—Maisie Ward, *Insurrection versus Resurrection,* 1937, p. 71.

In 1855 Newman prepared for the medical school his lecture on 'Christianity and Scientific Investigation'. It was approved by theologians such as Fr O'Reilly, S.J., and Dr Russell of Maynooth. They, however, thought that it was inexpedient. So Newman refrained from delivering it, but published it in his *Idea of a University* in 1858.

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[56]It is extraordinary how virulently anti-Catholic a distinguished scientist can be. Commenting on this statement of Bishop O'Dwyer, Prof. Joly deduced that Catholic biologists 'are, in short, not to think!'—Fry Comm. Final Report. App. p. 356. The testimony of the President of Notre Dame (Rev. Dr Hesburgh, C.S.C.) is worth quoting: 'There is nothing to be afraid of in science except that it will be misdirected. . . . In nine years I have never said to a single professor that any book or doctrine is out of bounds.'—*Time,* 21 April 1961.

Wilfrid Ward rightly described the lecture as 'almost a Magna Charta of the freedom demanded by secular science in a Catholic University (*Life* i. 402). He sent a copy to Dr O'Dwyer, who wrote an enthusiastic agreement, and said he believed that all his fellow-bishops would accept Newman's thesis (Maisie Ward, p. 63). This is the accepted position to-day.

Perhaps a few words should be added about T. H. Huxley, to whom the bishop referred. A Belgian Jesuit, Père Hahn, a pupil of his in 1876, asked him why he never mentioned evolution in his lectures. Huxley replied:

> Here in my teaching lectures I have time to put the facts fully before a trained audience. In my public lectures I am obliged to pass rapidly over the facts and I put forward my personal convictions. And it is for this that people come to hear me.—*Life and Letters*, ii, 405.

Even under such restrictions, Huxley would hardly be a suitable professor in a Catholic university, for his published views (notoriously agnostic) would have a most deleterious influence on his pupils. This is recognized elsewhere. Dr Koch, Professor of Biology in the University of Illinois, was dismissed for advocating immorality in a students' magazine.

This case of an open attack on religion is very hypothetical and extremely rare.[57] The real danger is more subtle. It lies in the tacit assumption that the Catholic religion is irrelevant to, if not incompatible with, genuine scholarship; that a university (apart from a divinity school) can ignore ultimate issues. Yet the question must be faced. The right of final decision on appeal must be located somewhere. Instead of 'a body of laymen', as in the Trinity type of university, we Catholics accept the Church as the final court of appeal.

> In a Catholic country the Church does not claim the right of appointing or approving the professors outside the Faculty of Theology, but the right of exercising vigilance and remonstrating and commanding that a particular person reasonably suspected or proved to be dangerous to the faith or morals of the students be not appointed or (be) deprived of his appointment. The first and fundamental condition, therefore, for the formal approbation of a university by the Church is the recognition of the right of the bishops to exercise vigilance over the university for the preservation of the purity of faith and morals.—Dr Cohalan (afterwards Bishop of Cork), *Irish Eccles. Record* 20 (1906) 311.

[57]In forty years' experience of teaching and administration in U.C.C. I knew only one instance approximating to it; it was the case of a Queen's College appointee. During the years a few allegations of views offensive to Catholics in T.C.D. were conveyed to me. The statements cited were due to innocent ignorance of Catholic belief.

We must introduce a distinction. The decision on the question of *fact*—a serious teaching offence against Catholic *dogma,* not just a hypercritical appraisement of Catholic practice—lies with the diocesan Ordinary. The imposition of a penalty may well be left to the Senate.

There has never been a single case calling for episcopal intervention in the former or in the present U.C.D. The bogey of ecclesiastical terrorism, raised by T.C.D. Professors Beare and Joly, is a gratuitous and insulting invention. Witness the evidence given in 1906 by Dr E. J. McWeeney, Professor of Pathology:

> I have been first a student and afterwards a professor in the Catholic University School of Medicine. I have been connected with that school since 1882, and I have never heard of such a case.[58]

In this country our concern is with a properly equipped university founded by the State primarily for Catholics. The preceding investigation explains the minimal necessary conditions required for its being a Catholic institution which is not merely tolerated but approved by the Church.

(1) Tests are unnecessary and may even be regarded as undesirable. But there must be effective provisions that the teaching staff is and continues to be predominantly Catholic, though not necessarily clerical.

(2) Negatively there must be safeguards against any danger to faith and morals. Positively there must be facilities for imparting Catholic philosophy and principles.

(3) Spiritual guidance, religious instruction and theological teaching must be under the direct jurisdiction of the Church.

This is merely a slightly modified version of Canon 1381, applied to the case of a religiously pluralist State, in which the Church must base its claims vis-à-vis the civil power on natural and constitutional rights. Here is Canon 1381:

1. The religious training of youth in all schools is subject to the authority and the inspection of the Church.
2. The local Ordinaries have the right and the responsibility of watching out that nothing contrary to faith and morals be taught or take place in any schools in their territory.
3. They have the right to approve teachers and textbooks of religion; also to demand the removal of either teachers or books in the interest of religion and morality.

(*To be concluded in the Winter issue*)

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[58]Fry Comm. Final Report, App. q. 2892. His answer to the next question is worth quoting: 'Darwinism is a capital working hypothesis; and if you felt convinced of its truth, or considered it a good hypothesis, there is nothing to prevent your teaching it.'

Ireland and the Common Market: Some Basic Issues

EDWARD NEVIN

I—Exports and Welfare

THE Irish government's recent decision to enter into negotiations with a view to joining the European Economic Community, following the United Kingdom's decision to do so, is of tremendous and far-reaching significance.* The public discussion which has so far taken place of the issues involved, however, would not appear to have always been particularly profound, a matter for some concern in view of the vital importance and virtually non-reversible nature of entry into the Common Market. The purpose of this article is not to reach any conclusion regarding the correctness or otherwise of a decision that Ireland should become a member of the E.E.C.; rather it is to touch on some fundamental questions which the decision raises but which may not have been considered in sufficient depth in the mass of comment which the subject has attracted in the past few months.

In particular, it is necessary to examine carefully one or two items of terminology of a very elementary nature. Unhappily, a fair amount of technical jargon has passed into popular usage and in so doing has shed the crucially important qualifying concepts which properly belong to it. The first example of relevance here is the word 'exports'. In a great deal of contemporary commentary the impression left is that anything which increases the volume of Ireland's exports is *ipso facto* desirable, and—in the less careful specimens of such commentary—its desirability can be more or less measured by the value of the increase in exports itself. That is to say, some discussions appear to imply that a policy which increases exports by £10 million is twice as beneficial, in some sense, as a policy which increases exports by only £5 million.

It is perhaps necessary to point out the limitations of such a proposition:—

(a) In the first place it is important to remember that the end of all production is consumption, so that the export of goods

* The views expressed in this article are wholly personal and should not be regarded as necessarily reflecting those of the governing body or staff of the institution with which the author is professionally associated.

in itself represents a *loss* of welfare to the society concerned; it constitutes production which is *not* available to the community for consumption. For many countries, exports may be a necessity in the sense that they are the only means of procuring commodities whose domestic production is either impossible or prohibitively expensive; nevertheless they cannot be sensibly regarded as an end in themselves.

(b) Secondly, and following from this, the export of goods and services may or may not be justifiable as a means of purchasing commodities which a society wishes to obtain. It is no more than *an alternative* to producing such commodities within the domestic economy, or to going without them. A rise in exports, therefore, can never be considered as good or bad *in vacuo;* its desirability can be assessed only in terms of *a comparison with the alternative open* to that society in order to attain its given objectives.

(c) Even granted that the export of goods is a justifiable use of resources for a particular society at a particular time, it is an obvious fallacy to suggest that a rise of £x million in exports to a particular market is a gain of £x million in economic welfare, or at least of £x million less the import content of the goods concerned. The gain to Ireland of an increase of £5 million in exports to the Common Market area, for example, is in no meaningful sense a measure of the advantage derived by Ireland from membership of the E.E.C., even in crude import-purchasing-power terms. The true measure of the increase in Ireland's external purchasing power is the *difference* between this £5 million and the revenue which would have been obtained by the sale of the same goods in the next most profitable market—or the price cut which Irish producers would have found it necessary to accept in order to sell the same goods over the tariff barrier previously existing.

In this connection it is worth noting the conclusion almost invariably drawn, implicitly or explicitly, that membership of the Common Market will result in a substantial rise of Irish exports, especially agricultural exports, to continental Western Europe. Without attempting to explore all the detailed issues raised in the agricultural sphere, the assumptions underlying this type of conclusion should nevertheless be stated in general terms. At the moment, although Ireland enjoys virtually unrestricted access to the U.K. market it accounts for less than 2½ per cent of the total value of

British imports. Even in the particular context of food imports, Ireland's share of the U.K. total is less than 5 per cent. What reason is there for supposing, then, that the removal of tariffs by the E.E.C. countries against Ireland would result in an increased volume of exports which is not already forthcoming for the present British market? Clearly it postulates a fairly high price-elasticity of demand —that is to say, it assumes that the removal of, say, a 20 per cent tariff against Irish products, permitting them to reach the market at a correspondingly reduced price, would result in an increase of more than 20 per cent in the demand for them and hence a rise in Ireland's export earnings. Is this a justifiable supposition? It also postulates a fairly high positive elasticity of supply—i.e. that if the proceeds of agricultural exports rise, farmers will increase—or at least will not significantly reduce—the amount of their production. Is *this* a valid assumption?

2—The Meaning of Growth

A second piece of jargon which has passed into popular usage more recently—at the price of an even greater obscurity and looseness of meaning—is the word 'growth'. It is scarcely possible to read a paragraph of commentary on the Common Market issue in which the word 'growth' does not appear at least once—and without the slightest attempt at precise definition. Indeed, the obscurity of its usage is almost invariably heightened through the indiscriminate use, in association with it, of what threatens to become the decade's most abused parrot-cry—the word 'dynamic'—sometimes used as a noun, sometimes as an adjective, always as a mystic exhortation, practically never in any clearly-defined sense.[1] Confusion is frequently made complete by a liberal sprinkling of index-numbers and percentages which seldom have any real meaning or relevance in the context in which they are used.

Now it is clear that the concept of growth is not particularly well cast for the role of the economic equivalent of the Holy Grail. In a human being, for example, growth cannot be considered desirable or undesirable except in relation to the age and sex of the individual, the development of his mental, moral, organic and psychological faculties, and even the *distribution* of physical growth over his physiological structure as a whole. Similarly, growth in an economy, as it is commonly understood, is by no stretch of the imagination necessarily synonymous with increased economic welfare amongst the

[1] From limited personal experience, the writer would hazard the prediction that economic commentary's apparently vital need for at least one expression to batter into a meaningless pulp will be met by the word 'dynamic' in the 1960s, as it was met with 'too much money chasing too few goods' in the 40s, and 'productivity' in the 50s.

population, let alone with their increased social welfare. It is well known, to begin with, that apparent rates of growth are frequently influenced by the theoretically irrelevant fact that certain types of economic activity lend themselves to statistical measurement more easily than others, and are invariably given what amounts to disproportionate weight as a result. It is easily conceivable, for example, that one economy will devote more of its resources to raising welfare through increased leisure, extensive provision of health and education facilities, more stringent safety precautions in factories, more efficient public administration, the better enforcement of law and order and so on, than it does to the raising of welfare through the production of manufactures; its growth, as conventionally measured, will almost certainly be smaller than that of other countries pursuing an opposite policy, but it would be quite improper to conclude from this that its welfare was growing less rapidly.[2]

Secondly, economic welfare is merely part of total social welfare, and the fact that the economist disclaims any ability to *measure* the non-economic components of welfare in no way justifies him in implicitly assuming their relative insignificance, much less in ignoring their existence altogether. It is a matter of historical record that totalitarian states have achieved phenomenal rates of economic growth in the past—and are no doubt continuing to do so in the present—at an expense of overall social welfare which is almost universally considered in the Western world to be more than sufficient to outweigh the economic gains obtained. Growth is properly regarded as a net concept, not as a gross concept; growth in physical output is necessarily secured at the price of costs in other spheres, and it is the relationship between the two which is significant, not either taken by itself. Like the production of an individual commodity, output over the economy as a whole has to be considered in relation to its cost. The significance of a specified rate of economic growth can be assessed, therefore, only in relation to its welfare costs, economic and non-economic; the balance between additional output, on the one hand, and welfare sacrifices, on the other, will depend not only on their relative magnitude (assuming the innate measureability of both) but also on the importance attached to the one in relation to the other by the individual or society concerned.

The sacrifice of non-tangible forms of welfare in the interests of physical growth is, of course, by no means confined to totalitarian states. Economic historians are now largely agreed that, apart from questions such as the discovery of natural resources and the burst

[2] My own view would be that many of the rather loose generalizations about the relative 'stagnation' of the British economy in recent years are of very dubious validity because of this consideration.

of applications of human skill and ingenuity in the advance and exploitation of technology, the industrial revolution in Britain in particular, and Western Europe in general, during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was associated with, and critically dependent on, the social and economic environment of the time: upon enforced shifts of people from their accustomed homes and occupations—the enclosure movement in agriculture and the shift to densely-populated industrial cities—much facilitated by a cold and pitiless Poor Law system and unhampered by an over-zealous conception of the rights of the individual in comparison with those of private property; upon a sharply regressive taxation structure and marked inequality of income, through which the accumulation of wealth by the minority was encouraged, and physical capital formation accordingly stimulated; and upon an industrial system based on low wages, long hours and the labour of women and children as well as men, a system in which profits were large and the rate of monetary return on industrial investment high. The contemporary idol of physical growth was no doubt much in evidence, was no doubt well and faithfully served; but he would be a bold man who would attempt to assess the toll of welfare which it levied across the labouring masses of the industrial societies of modern Europe.

Nor is this wholly a matter of history. Economic growth in the modern society, as commonly conceived, is largely synonymous with mechanical production and with the increasing concentration of the population in large industrial units and industrial conurbations. It implies the conditioning of a society to a whole set of behaviouristic norms, to a particular discipline and a particular tempo, to an urbanization of living and a standardization of tastes, to a certain minimum ruthlessness of attitude and a certain blunting of sensibilities. All this may be a price well worth paying—if, indeed, price it be—for the immense material gains which follow. Nevertheless it is peculiarly significant to find a recent survey of contemporary economic theory ending with a note of doubt and dissatisfaction, a questioning of perspectives, a newly-found uncertainty of foundation and sense of inadequacy, all of which is remarkable in a subject which until a generation ago was supremely confident in its scorn of the economic philosophy implied in the scholastic writers. The passage is worth quoting at some length:—

> . . . a study of welfare which confines itself to the measurement of quantities of goods and their distribution is not only seriously limited, it is—at least in those countries where the mass of the people have advanced far beyond subsistence standards—positively misleading. For the things on which happiness ultimately depends, friendship, faith, the perception of beauty and so on, are outside

> its range; only the most obstinate pursuit of formalism would endeavour to bring them into relation with the measuring rod of money, and then to no practical effect. Thus, the triumphant achievements of modern technology, ever-swifter travel, round-the-clock synthetic entertainment, the annual cornucopia of slick and glossy gadgets, which rest perforce on the cult of efficiency, the single-minded pursuit of advancement, the craving for material success, may be exacting a fearful toll in terms of human happiness. But the formal elegance of welfare economics will never reveal it.[3]

The costs of growth in the modern industrial society may be less blatant and fundamental than those which, in the industrial revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, immersed a whole generation in brutishness and hardship, but they exist nevertheless. It is not only in the United States—that favourite model of the 'dynamic' society—that Galbraith's lament of public squalor in the midst of private affluence has found an echo.

None of this suggests, of course, that we must go to the opposite extreme of regarding economic growth as innately undesirable. It serves to emphasize, however, the essential superficiality of commentaries in which growth is treated as an absolute, as a kind of economic equivalent of the Kantian categorical imperative. Growth is *not* an absolute, even in the purely economic context; its desirability has to be assessed in terms of the qualities, conditions, costs and sacrifices required to attain it, and in terms of the alternative aims which economic and social policy might seek to attain. For example, to argue that the Common Market countries are displaying a high rate of growth and that Ireland must therefore join the Community in order to share in it (a viewpoint frequently expressed) is to fall into error on two separate grounds. In the first place, it by no means follows that membership of the Community would guarantee for Ireland the same rate of expansion as the Six currently display; economic growth is not secured in the manner of a man obtaining membership of a club by merely paying an entrance fee. Secondly, and perhaps more relevant here, economic expansion à la Six cannot necessarily be taken as a *self-evident* goal for Ireland, needing no reference to the conditions required for it or the alternatives foregone in its name. An extremely good case could certainly be presented in favour of it; many would say an unanswerable case. But it is no more than a case, and even the best case in the world needs to be argued.

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[3] E. J. Mishan, 'A survey of welfare economics, 1939-1959', *Economic Journal*, Vol. LXX, No. 278, June 1960, p. 256.

3—The Role of Tariffs

There is a third set of ideas which has found its way into popular discussion without universal appreciation of the qualifications and assumptions which properly go with those ideas, and it is here that the very core of the issue facing Ireland in connection with the Common Market is approached. In contemporary debate, 'tariff' has become an expression of odium; tariffs are said to obstruct and retard the movement towards 'efficiency' (regarded as a self-evident absolute good) and to insulate the economy from the forces of 'free competition' (regarded as a self-evident need). It is therefore concluded that our economic policy—and specifically our trade policy—should be such as to tend towards a state of affairs in which agriculture and industry operate at a high level of per capita output (implicitly or explicitly defined as the level prevailing in some specified foreign country) and in which per capita incomes (an ambiguous expression to which attention will be directed a little later) also attain a specified minimum (usually the level obtaining in the United Kingdom).

The issues at stake here are so fundamental that it is worth considering the theoretical substructure which (usually implicitly, or even unconsciously) underlies this type of argument. In essence it embodies the 'classical' comparative cost theory, on which the main corpus of modern international trade theory still substantially rests.[4] The doctrine of comparative costs holds that each country must allocate its resources amongst those activities in which its productive efficiency is highest (or inefficiency least), relying on imports to provide goods for which its productive efficiency is relatively low. By adopting this principle, each country (like all productive resources within a country) will occupy itself in the activities for which it is best suited; output as a whole, over the entire productive world, will be at the highest level possible. Completely free trade is essential to this happy state of affairs, of course, since hindrances to international trade (tariffs or quantitative restrictions) will prevent the fullest possible specialization and will thus reduce output below the potential maximum. Given free trade, however, specialization will naturally follow; 'uneconomic' industries in particular countries will find it impossible to compete with low-cost imports coming in from more efficient producers abroad and will be forced to release their productive resources into activities more suited to their talents. The free play of international market forces will thus bring about the optimum distribution of resources, both within individual countries and as between different countries.

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[4] The law of comparative costs is itself, of course, an extension of classical micro-economic theory to the special case of international trade.

Now all this reasoning rests on a number of necessary assumptions, some of which are of no particular relevance here. Of crucial importance, however, are the assumptions of complete mobility of labour within the country and the flexibility of wages (which together imply a continuous state of full employment), and of flexibility in the foreign exchange rate. Mobility of labour is necessary to the process in order to ensure that, when it is displaced from 'inefficient' production by low-cost imports, labour is transferred to the activities where its comparative advantage is highest. Wage flexibility is necessary to the same end because, when a shift of labour occurs towards these 'efficient' activities, wages must be driven down until the surplus labour is absorbed into them. Finally, flexibility of the exchange rate is necessary. If at the lowest feasible level of wages and prices a sufficient number of the productive activities of a country are still not able to compete with imports moving in freely from the outside world, then it must be possible for the external value of the currency to depreciate. As this happens, the country's exports become cheaper to foreigners until, at some level of the exchange rate, sufficient of the country's production becomes competitive on export markets to finance the import of its remaining needs from abroad.

Each of these assumptions, then, is necessary to the validity of the classical comparative cost doctrine. And not one of them would hold for Ireland. As is well known, the effect of creating unemployment in a particular industry is *not* in reality the transfer of labour to another industry but unemployment, or migration, or both.[5] Wages are nowadays notoriously inflexible—in a downwards direction at any rate—and in Ireland have the added element of inflexibility arising from a close dependence on prevailing British wage-rates.[6] The legal parity between the Irish and U.K. pounds effectively prevents a resort to devaluation—a device whose efficacy has in any case been shown by the experience of 1949 to be, for various reasons, both limited in degree and strictly temporary in effectiveness.

The essential mechanism of the process is thus destroyed for a society such as Ireland. In theory, the employment of resources in the domestic production of goods which can be made more cheaply abroad imposes a burden, a loss, on the economy. By shifting resources to more suitable activities total output could be increased, the goods previously manufactured at home could be imported at a

[5] Between 1951 and 1960, for example, the numbers employed in agriculture, forestry, and construction in Ireland fell by 105,000; the numbers employed in other sectors of the economy were virtually unchanged.

[6] Between 1956 and 1960 the index of wage-rates in 23 industrial occupations in Ireland rose from 108 to 124; between June 1956 and June 1960 the index of hourly wage-rates of all workers in British manufacturing industry rose from 105 to 123—*Statistical Abstract of Ireland, 1960,* (Pr. 5492), Table 336; *Annual Abstract of Statistics, No. 97 1960,* (H.M.S.O.), Table 150.

lower cost, and the economy as a whole could secure a net gain. But if the resources displaced by imports are *not* employed elsewhere in the economy this ceases to be true. From the point of view of society as a whole, the real cost of producing a commodity X is the output which the resources concerned *could* have produced if they had *not* been engaged in manufacturing X. If the alternative to making X is that the labour would merely be lost to the society because of unemployment or migration, however, then the social cost of the labour used up in the production of X is *zero*. Whatever the monetary costs involved, therefore, production in such a situation is worthwhile so long as the non-labour costs, direct and indirect, are less than the *total* value of the commodities produced. Suppose, for example, that labour costs amount to one-third of the total production cost of a commodity; a tariff of $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent on imports of that commodity would be perfectly consistent in such a situation with the optimum use of resources *from the point of view of the economy as a whole* so long as the total cost of the local product is not more than $33\frac{1}{3}$ per cent above the price of the imported equivalent.[7]

It is clear, then, that any argument which concludes that 'inefficiency' is necessarily involved wherever a domestic industry survives only with the aid of a tariff is superficial and inconclusive. Inefficiency, in some meaningful sense of the word, may indeed be involved; on the other hand, efficiency, in its widest sense and for the economy as a whole, may be achieved for a particular country *only* through the application of tariffs. Conversely, the assertion that the removal of tariffs will automatically eliminate inefficiency and raise income and welfare is invalid as a general proposition; it may indeed be so, but it is not at all a self-evident axiom.

4—Income and People

There is a fourth piece of jargon whose inadequately-defined use has hindered intelligent discussion of the Common Market issue. This is the expression '*per capita* income'. It is a highly ambiguous phrase, and upon its interpretation a great deal may hinge. It can refer *either* to the quotient of the income generated in a specified period and the number of *income-earners,* or it can refer to the quotient of total income and the *total population*. The distinction is crucial; the practical implications of statements such as 'the object

[7] The higher price paid by the consumer in such a situation is in a sense a tax paid by him towards the cost of the local product. In the limiting case in which the difference between the price of the local product and the corresponding import is equal to the whole of the internal labour cost, the process is a pure redistribution of income. The rise in the total national income at market prices would be a purely monetary phenomenon. Wherever the price differential is *less* than the whole labour cost, however, the real national income, as well as its monetary value, is increased.

of economic policy is to raise *per capita* income in Ireland' will be entirely different according to the interpretation adopted.

For example, suppose that, in the employment of a limited volume of resources at their disposal, the authorities face a choice between constructing, on the one hand, an enterprise which is highly capitalistic (in the technical sense)—such as a chemical plant, employing, say, a hundred men with an annual net output of £1,000 each—or, on the other hand, several less highly mechanized enterprises in, say, the woodworking trades, which would employ two hundred men with an annual net outut of £600 each. Which should be chosen in the best interests of economic policy? If the objective 'raising *per capita* income' is interpreted to refer to output per person *at work,* the first is clearly to be preferred since net output per employee would be £1,000 a year compared with £600. The fact that there would be an extra hundred men included in the unemployment returns would be irrelevant. If, on the other hand, *per capita* income is taken to refer to the *whole population,* then the second project is to be preferred, since it will add £120,000 to the national income rather than £100,000. The distinction is an elementary one; but it is the elementary which is most in danger of being overlooked.

5—WHAT IS IRELAND?

There is one final obscurity in the contemporary debate which is clearly related to this last point. The obscurity is simply stated: what is meant by 'Ireland'? (The political question of twenty-six or thirty-two counties is not being referred to, of course.) When it is said that membership of the Common Market will, or will not, raises incomes, productivity, efficiency, etc 'in Ireland', what exactly is meant? The Republic with its present population of 2,842,000? Or with some other defined population? The Republic with a population increasing every year by its natural increase of some 25,000 or 26,000? Or the Republic with whatever population it happens to have at the precise moment when the question is asked?

The connection with the hypothetical problem of resource-allocation just discussed is obvious enough. If the hundred men failing to get a job when the chemical works is chosen simply remain unemployed it will give (in comparison with the alternative project) a higher income per person at work but a lower average income per head of total population. If they had taken the next boat to Liverpool, however, the dilemma would have disappeared. The chemical plant, by giving a higher output per person employed, would *also* give a higher income per head of total population. In this sort of situation, a society can have a higher income per head of total population with

a smaller population, or it can have a lower average income with a bigger population. It may be that, faced with such a choice, all would agree where the balance of advantage lies; it is as well to acknowledge the existence of the problem nevertheless.

All this puts the problem in its simplest possible form. In reality things are complicated by the fact that if the average income falls below a minimum level emigration will occur anyway. On the other hand, that minimum level cannot be assumed to be the prevailing United Kingdom average; if it were there would be scarcely anyone left in Ireland by now. There is a range of incomes, in other words, within which the dilemma is encountered and the policy decision required.

6—Conclusion

Pulling all this together, the really crucial issues posed by the Common Market question begin to emerge. The concentration of so much of the contemporary debate on the relative merits of this form of agricultural price support or that, or on the prospects of one industry as compared with another, has tended to obscure them. The detailed problems of agriculture and industry are, of course, important and relevant; but they are not fundamental in the sense of the issues discussed here.

What is it, then, that is at stake? Membership of the European Economic Community clearly involves a primary reliance on free market forces (as least so far as industry is concerned) and therefore on a policy of allowing the economic structure of Ireland to be shaped by them. By definition, the use of trade policy—tariffs and quantitative restrictions—to influence the size, nature and location of industry in the pursuit of general economic and social aims must be virtually abandoned. The Treaty of Rome contains provisions whereby protective measures may be retained during a transitional period, of course, but its primary purpose is to ensure that in the long run they disappear.

The purpose of this paper has been to suggest that before any intelligent attempt can be made to assess the relative advantages and disadvantages involved in Ireland's membership of the Community, answers must be defined to questions such as these: —

> What exactly is meant by 'Ireland'? Over what population, in other words, should the horizons of official economic policy extend?
>
> Where is Ireland trying to go?—i.e. basically what sort of society is she trying to establish?
>
> How far are population movements determined by the level of income and related economic considerations? Are they likely to be

influenced by income changes of a magnitude such as to be within the control of Irish economic policy, now or in the future?

What relative importance should be attached to raising individual incomes, on the one hand, and retarding, or reversing, population decline on the other? Does such a choice really exist? If so, what decline in the average level of income per person at work is equivalent to what gain of population? Is it total income or average income which is thought to be important?

How far is non-economic welfare sacrificed in a process of economic growth of the kind considered likely to follow membership of the E.E.C.? How much growth is worth how much welfare? Or is non-economic welfare best raised only *through* conventional economic growth?

Whatever the answers given to these questions, it is well to beware of fatalistic indifference, such as that typified by the attitude that Ireland is in any case in the grip of inescapable forces outside itself. Fatalism of this sort is commonly encountered, for example, in the doctrine that if Britain enters the Community Ireland will have no option but to follow, and conversely. The validity of this view is by no means self-evident; to establish it one would need to know precisely what effect Britain's membership of the E.E.C. would have on its existing commercial relations with non-member countries. (It is not without significance that several countries of the British Commonwealth which a few weeks ago regarded United Kingdom entry into the E.E.C. as an unmitigated economic disaster from their point of view are now inclining to the view that it may in fact result in considerable commercial gain for them.) Further, there are more ways than one of belonging to the E.E.C.; the answers to some of these fundamental questions could very well influence the exact path chosen. But all this apart, it is surely proper to strive for an adequate appreciation of the consequences of an action, even if our freedom of choice in connection with that action is severely circumscribed.

Finally there are, of course, all the political consequences of accession to the Treaty of Rome, wide-ranging and profound as they are. These, however, are alien and treacherous fields for economists to travel; one, at any rate, is happier to leave them to bolder spirits better versed in their contours.

Britain and the Common Market

Links and Implications

JOHN MURRAY

ON August 2nd and 3rd a great debate took place in both Houses of Parliament at Westminster. Its theme was Britain's decision to apply for membership of the European Economic Community, more loosely known as the Common Market. The more precise terms of the government measure were 'to initiate negotiations to see if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special interests of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the European Free Trade Association': in other words, to discover on what conditions Britain could accept membership of the European Community and be accepted by the six countries as a member.

It was and is a decisive moment for the future of Britain and of Western Europe. The very resolution to discuss it so fully was epoch-making. The sixteenth century took England to a large extent away from Europe, breaking many of the links that had bound an older England to the Continent, to pursue a foreign policy frequently to Europe's disadvantage and almost always to the disadvantage of European unity. The twentieth century is gradually and relentlessly taking Britain back. Four hundred years ago, England cut herself adrift from the Continent in the cause of national independence and sovereignty. It is with the recognition that national sovereignty, economic and political, is no longer an absolute value that she is returning. Four hundred years ago she saw her best opportunities in a New World that focussed her interests overseas. She is now realizing that to-day those same opportunities are to be found in a re-awakening and reviving Europe.

It is certainly a most important turning point. It will affect the lives of the people of Britain and change the whole pattern of British life and work. It brings great possibilities, a very large export market for a people whose prosperity depends upon a large and balanced export. It can bring considerable benefits, not least of these a certain softening and broadening of the more rugged features of the British habit of life. But at the same time it includes a challenge, the challenge of very keen and skilful competition. The complacency and half-heartedness from which Britain has been suffering since 1945 will need to be removed by earnest resolution if they are not to be swept away by the more painful logic of hard facts.

The European Movement

In the past ten years I have contributed several articles to *Studies* on the various trends and tendencies in Western Europe towards closer co-operation and integration. And I confess that this European movement which has now progressed through the successive stages of the Coal and Steel Community, Euratom and more recently the Common Market is, in my opinion, one of the truly great, invigorating and civilizing developments of this century. Western Europe is the centre of Western civilization. The survival and influence of that civilization depend in no small measure upon Western European prosperity and vitality.

It must be remembered that Britain played an important part in bringing these countries together after 1945. There were then the obvious short-term problems of recovery and revival. The United States wisely insisted upon *self help* and *mutual help* as pre-conditions for American aid. A case in point is the Brussels Treaty concluded in 1947 between Britain, France and the three 'Benelux' States, Belgium, Holland, Luxembourg. Speaking in the House of Commons in January, 1948, Mr. Ernest Bevin declared :

> We must go beyond the circle of our immediate neighbours and consider other European civilizations, including the new Italy. Their eventual participation is no less important than that of other countries with which we must deal first, if only for geographical reasons. We are thinking now of Western Europe as a unity. The nations of Western Europe have already shown their capacity for working together effectively. That is a good sign for the future. We shall do all we can to advance the spirit and machinery of co-operation.

The contracting parties to the treaty expressed their resolution to 'co-operate loyally and to co-ordinate their efforts to *create in Western Europe a firm basis for European economic recovery*'. It should be noted that the Brussels Treaty of 1947 developed into NATO in 1949.

Side by side with government action went considerable private initiative. Many groups and societies were advocating collaboration, some of them to the point of Federal Union. Here longer-term views were particularly operative: the consciousness that the centre of world gravity had shifted Westwards to the New World and Eastwards to Russia, and that a disunited and disintegrated Europe would lie helplessly and dangerously between them; the wider understanding also, marked in post-war Germany and gathering force in France, that the absolute national State was an outworn concept and that men

must look and work for a larger political framework that could both satisfy and at the same time transcend national loyalties.

Out of the activity of these societies emerged the Hague Congress of May, 1948. Nine of the largest associations decided to co-ordinate their efforts, and their general purpose was 'to affirm the European objectives in the political, economic and cultural fields, to stimulate the peoples to an unanimous determination and stir the peoples themselves to action'. Nineteen countries participated in the congress, including Western Germany. Its importance may be gauged from the fact that the delegates included twelve former Prime Ministers, more than forty former ministers, some twenty ministers in office and about one hundred members of Parliaments. From this congress grew the Council of Europe, with its assembly that has met twice a year at Strasbourg, and its committee of ministers which, it was hoped at least by the more enthusiastic, would develop into a European Parliament and which, despite its limitations, has rendered a genuine service to the European cause. The Council included, from the start, ten countries: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Sweden, France and Britain. They were joined in August, 1949, by Greece, Turkey and Iceland and in March, 1950, by Western Germany.

In the same year, 1948, OEEC (Organization for European Economic Co-operation) was constituted, largely through the initiative of France and Britain. After the break-down of a conference with Russia, the Foreign Ministers of France and Britain invited European governments to a congress in Paris. Sixteen countries in all participated. They were the original members of an organization that has done a great deal to encourage and co-ordinate economic efforts and to prepare the way for subsequent collaboration.

The Dividing Line

Until 1950, Britain's role in the economic recovery of Western Europe was very important, and indeed it continued to be of importance through OEEC and NATO. But 1950 inaugurated an even closer association, first between Western Germany and France, and later also with Italy and the Benelux Powers in which Britain had no share.

On May 9th, 1950, M Schuman outlined his historic design for placing French and German production of coal and steel under a High Authority. His intentions were made perfectly explicit; these were to set up 'common foundations for economic development as *the first step in the federation of Europe*'. A more immediate objective was to rule out conflict between France and Germany.

> By pooling basic production and by instituting a new High Authority whose decisions will bind France, Germany and other member countries, these proposals will build *the first concrete foundation of the European federation* which is indispensable in the preservation of peace.

We must recognize this note from the beginning. Behind the proposals for the joint administration of coal and steel resources is the plan for a closer political integration, already expressed as European federation. This may well be the crucial point on which British negotiations with the six members will succeed or founder as will be clear from our analysis of the August debates. Two years afterwards, in August, 1952, when the European Coal and Steel Community was inaugurated, M Jean Monnet, President of its High Authority, could speak of its 'federal character'. Dr Adenauer, the first chairman of its Council of Ministers, said to its *Assemblée Générale*: 'You are the first sovereign Parliament in Europe built on a supranational basis. Our Council is an organic element inserted in the *new supranational European Community*'.

It was at this point that Britain parted company with the six countries of what came to be known as 'Little Europe'. Britain did not become a member of the Coal and Steel Community. Nor was she willing to participate in the European Defence Community when her participation would have overcome French fears and hesitation and certainly brought the Defence Force into existence. To be fair, it must be admitted that she took the initiative in making Western Germany a partner and ally in NATO.

Before we discuss the new approach of Britain to Western Europe, it must be granted that the position of Britain is special and indeed unique. Britain is the centre of a Commonwealth of nations. What this means in 1961 cannot so easily be assessed in practical terms. Britain's relations with the 'white' dominions of Canada, Australia and New Zealand form a very delicate pattern of spiritual, national, political and cultural as well as commercial threads. There is a history of ancient loyalties and common experiences, a proud record of joint sacrifice and achievement: and these are imponderable factors which move men's minds and feelings far more effectively than what can be weighed and measured. Yet, on the economic place, the Commonwealth is a most important and stabilizing institution whose influence on India and Pakistan, for instance, continues to be far-reaching and constructive and, it may be added, profoundly appreciated, as it is appreciated by the more intelligent leaders of the new African States more deeply than they dare confess in their public utterances.

This is of course well understood on the Continent. In the Commons debate Mr Harold Wilson quoted from a speech of M Spaak in the Belgian Assembly on June 14th:

> If the Commonwealth is one of the essential facts of our time, I understand this perfectly clearly and would not wish to face Great Britain with a choice between the Commonwealth and Europe. That is why it is necessary to find a technical solution which will enable us to make effective the maintenance of the Commonwealth and the adhesion of Britain to the Common Market.[1]

M Spaak was again quoted by Lord Layton in the Upper House from a meeting of the European Union movement, held in a committee room of the House of Commons :

> Europe will never ask Britain to choose between Europe and the Commonwealth for, if we were to do this, Britain would rightly choose the Commonwealth. We are not seeking the association of an island off the coast of France. What we are seeking is association with the Great Britain that is the leader and the inspiration of the great group of free countries overseas.[2]

Yet the fact remains that the Commonwealth cannot—and in any case would not—provide the solution required by the British economy. The picture of a mother country importing food and raw materials from dominions and these in their turn accepting her manufactured products is long since out of date. The Ottowa system of Imperial Preferences has been gradually whittled away in favour of the dominions, and Australia, for instance, has drastically curtailed her imports in favour of her new industries. British exports to Commonwealth countries have declined during the past fifteen years. It would be very pleasant, stated Lord Plowden, to imagine that large markets were available for us within the Commonwealth. But is it reasonable to suppose that the trend of recent years can be reversed and that the industries built up in the old dominions and now protected by high tariffs and quotas could be thrown open to the full blast of competition from British industry? Canada, certainly, the most advanced industrially of these countries, has emphatically answered, No. Nor could one expect newly-emerging States like Ghana and Nigeria to cease to protect their young industries to which they are so attached.[3]

What the Commonwealth wants is a strong and prosperous Britain that can be the source of capital for dominion development. In the

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[1]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 162, c. 1660.
[2]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 121, c. 237.
[3]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 121, cc. 239-240.

nature of things, the Commonwealth itself is unable to provide, still less guarantee, that prosperity. It has to be sought elsewhere. One of the most forcible arguments for the government motion was that the Commonwealth would be far more effectively served by an energetic and prosperous Britain within the European Economic Community than by a Britain, weak and insecure in isolation.

The Government Case

The government case was outlined in the Commons by the Prime Minister, and in the Lords by the Foreign Secretary, the Earl of Home. Mr MacMillan admitted that Britain's economic situation was unsatisfactory and regretted the fact that the government was negotiating from weakness rather than strength. Britain could not, he insisted, seek for a security in isolation which its geographical position no longer permitted. The growth of the Common Market, the opportunities which this offered to British industrialists and the spur it has given to competitiveness and efficiency—all this presents Britain with a great challenge. At the same time Britain will have to face the competition of very efficient industries throughout Western Europe. Mr MacMillan kept emphasizing the purely *economic* character of the Common Market. The Treaty of Rome, he maintained, was not concerned with foreign policy or defence; it dealt with trade and with some of the social aspects of human life most intimately connected with trade and production. As we have already observed, this was an understatement which could easily be misleading. Fortunately, there were other speakers to redress the balance and to point to the clearly expressed political views and aspirations of leaders of this new European movement. The Prime Minister added that he could see no indication that the members of the Common Market had lost their national identity because they had delegated a measure of their sovereignty and his view was that the only practical solution was to be found in General de Gaulle's *Europe des patries,* an association of fully independent States working together in clearly defined spheres for common interests.[4]

The Earl of Home was more precise. Britain, he declared, wished to retain her political influence on the world stage; she intended to maintain her position as a leading partner in the Commonwealth and the largest generator of capital for the development of the Commonwealth; the people of Britain also wished to enjoy rising living conditions. But it was calculated that if Britain was to fulfil her commitments and maintain her status within the Commonwealth she must earn roughly £500,000,000 more than she was now doing.

[4]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 161, cc. 1480-1493.

In theory this might be done within the Commonwealth but in point of fact Britain's exports to the Commonwealth had decreased from 47 per cent. to 42 per cent. in ten years. Commonwealth countries now wanted to become industrial nations in their own right. We must face the fact that while the United Kingdom has retained full free entry for Commonwealth goods, our system of preferences 'has been very gradually but certainly eroded'. We shall hold our own in world markets, he continued, only if we expose ourselves to a certain degree to 'the astringent of competition'. The Common Market is not the only way of doing this but it has the great advantage that, while it exposes our industries to competition, it will open up to them wide and fresh opportunities for investment and enterprise and expansion over that range of products which we are well equipped to supply.[5]

The general current of debate ran very favourably for negotiations. The Lord Chancellor reckoned that twenty-five of the twenty-eight speeches in the Lords approved of the new approach, as did the majority of the leaders of British industry and of the trades unions. There was no division between 'pros' and 'cons' on party lines. It was widely taken for granted that for Britain entry into the European Community would be beneficial provided certain problems could be solved.

Of these problems the first rose from the special position of agriculture in Britain which for a long time had been considerably subsidized and protected. Membership of the Common Market would naturally affect this agriculture and take away its privileged status. However, there was no particular concern on this point because British agriculture was now in a healthy condition, capable of meeting competition and also on the grounds that the whole question of agriculture had still to be studied and worked out within the Common Market, where Western Germany had difficulties very similar to those of Britain.

Nor was any great concern shown about EFTA, the association of the 'Seven'. It was felt, I think, that EFTA had been called into existence largely as an alternative to the Common Market or as an attempt to slow down its development. It had not proved a workable alternative nor had it retarded the growth of Western Europe. In any case, its membership was very disparate. Norway and Denmark were now anxious, like Britain, to join the Six. Austria and Switzerland were 'neutral' countries whose commercial relations were closest with Western European States. Portugal was so closely linked with Spain that it could scarcely be considered apart.

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[5]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 120, cc. 111-123.

Realistic Talk

The common and more popular objections were dealt with very effectively by Labour speakers in the House of Commons. It might have been argued that the British standard of living was higher than that of Western European countries or that entry into the European Community might prejudice the Welfare State, as it exists in Britain, or that it might make it difficult if not impossible for a Labour government to exist in Britain.

Mr H. Hynd made it clear that in the Common Market States the trades unions had played a full part. Two of the nine members of the Coal and Steel High Authority, he reminded the House, are former trade union leaders, and the trades unions are represented on the Consultative Committee.

> The support of the trade unions has been fully justified by results. Wages and conditions have improved in those countries. The principle of the forty-hour week has been accepted. The principle of holidays with pay, three weeks per year, has been accepted and is being applied. The principle of equal pay for women has been accepted and will be applied by all those countries by the end of next year. The trade unions in the Common Market countries want us to join. The Socialist parties in those countries want us to join.[6]

Mr Charles Pannell urged members to look up their statistics and to discover what had been happening in Western Europe in the past ten years. Wages and conditions of life, he insisted, were improving far more rapidly on the Continent than in Britain. In gross hourly wages there was an increase last year in Germany of 10 per cent.; in France of 6½ per cent.; of 5 per cent. in Italy; of 9 per cent. in the Netherlands; but of only 3 per cent. in Britain. The purchasing power of weekly wages—the figures were taken from the European Labour Bulletin—had risen last year in Germany by 8½ per cent.; in France by 4 per cent.; in Italy by 5 per cent.; in the Netherlands by approximately 2½ per cent.; but again by only 1 per cent. in Britain. 'We are not exactly'—he commented—'keeping up in the league'. He quoted from a recent statement of Mr William Carron, the president of his own union:

> We should face the fact, squarely, that no economic control or device yet invented can maintain full employment in a country like Britain, which relies on a large overseas trade to make a living, if it chooses to live in comparative isolation from the fastest expanding and the most dynamic groupings of the world such as

[6]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 161, cc. 1564-1565.

> the Economic Community of the Six. And let nobody try any longer to make us believe that it is either the Commonwealth or Europe with whom we have to develop trade. Both can be done simultaneously.[7]

With reference to the Welfare State and the apprehension lest closer contact with the Continent would reduce British standards of living Mr Roy Jenkins had some blunt remarks to make. Anyone—he argued—who looked at Western Europe to-day from a Left-wing point of view and suggested that Britain was far in advance of the countries of the Six must have gone to sleep in 1949 and never woken up again. He would be living in a world of twelve years ago.

> Let us consider [he declared] what has been done in Europe. We have the most rapid rise in national incomes shown by France, Germany and Italy; the fullest of full employment shown by France and Germany; a model system of economic planning in France; highly successful nationalized industries in France; a very developed system of retirement benefits, which makes anything that we have in this country look a disgrace, in Germany, and excellent family allowances in France.
>
> In many respects the Europe of the Six has far more to offer the people, and has shown a greater achievement in the last ten years, than anything we have been able to get in this country.[8]

The Political Question

I have quoted from and commented upon these various speeches to show that a large unanimity exists in all political parties and in both industry and labour on the advisability of this approach to Western Europe. There was considerable plain speaking on the economic state of Britain and the illusions that persisted in many quarters; much of this came from the normal Opposition benches. On this particular plane the arguments were overwhelmingly in favour.

There was, however, a tendency to soft-pedal the political implications, and it was the Prime Minister who set the tone. He argued that it was an economic question, that of collaboration between inde-

[7]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 162, cc. 1712-1713. Mr Roy Jenkins indulged in some very forthright statements. Britain, he declared, is suffering from a general ineffectiveness of performance and a national mood which is partly a misplaced complacency and partly a growing lack of self-confidence. 'There is a real danger that we shall go into a kind of drab decline rather detached from the main currents of life in the world, blaming other countries for our misfortunes and occasionally deluding ourselves, but no one else, with illusions of grandeur.' In his opinion, the best remedy and prophylactic was entry into the European Community. Lord Boothby read an extract from a recent edition of the *Financial Times* to the effect that for a whole variety of reasons—constitutional, social, political and economic—a psychological climate had been created in Britain which was a powerful obstacle to change.

[8]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 161, c. 1587.

pendent States for specific economic purposes. Other speakers insisted on interpreting the clauses of the Treaty of Rome very literally and legally, arguing that these did not refer explicitly to federation, forgetting all too conveniently the well-known spirit of the European movement and the expressed intentions of many of its prominent personalities.

Mr Gaitskell turned the tables adroitly on the President of the Board of Trade when he read an extract from a speech made by the President two years previously, in which he stated that

> We must recognize that the aim of the main proponents of the Community is political integration. We can see that in article 138 of the Treaty [of Rome] which looks towards a common assembly, directly elected. The whole idea of the Six, the Coal and Steel Community and Euratom is a movement towards political integration. That is a fine aspiration but we must recognize that for us *to sign the Treaty of Rome would be to accept as the ultimate goal political federation in Europe, including ourselves.*[9]

Mr Gaitskell was pointing in fact to a possible misunderstanding which may seriously affect the negotiations between Britain and the Six. You cannot use the existence of this movement towards political integration as an argument against Britain's entry into the European Community and then, when your point of view has altered and you are now advocating the British entry, pretend that the movement towards integration is not there. There is a real danger, of which Continentals are fully conscious, that Britain may attempt—more perhaps unconsciously than consciously and from long-ingrained habits of thought—to reap the economic benefits of the Common Market without paying the political price and to act as a brake and drag upon this movement towards closer political union. It is a point at which the British and the European mind will inevitably differ and where both may clash, all the more so since the people in Britain have little notion of the great changes in political thinking and outlook in Western Europe since 1945. To the Continental of 1961 the average Englishman seems politically old-fashioned, clinging to nineteenth-century ideas which he himself has now discarded.

How far the German and the French attitude towards the Common Market transcends the merely economic sphere was excellently brought out in a symposium in *Studies* (Autumn, 1959). Professor Hallstein, President of the Commission for the European Community, there stated that 'the reasons for establishing the Common Market are *largely political*'. Our object, he asserted, was to develop a new strength, *a new political factor* in the free world which will, by its

[9]Hansard, vol. 645, no. 161, c. 1498.

very existence, strengthen the camp of freedom. His concluding paragraph was most illuminating:

> We can already scarcely envisage the wheel of Western European history being turned back, and in a short while it will be quite impossible to imagine any such thing. Quite apart from all other successes, we have already established a firm and durable foundation for genuine and lasting peace between the Six countries of Western Europe. We will not let ourselves be deprived of this basis for ever closer co-operation in the future. The practice of looking upon the countries of the European Economic Community and their policy with the eyes of the nineteenth century is both mistaken and dangerous. Our activities are, we believe, commensurate with the requirements of twentieth-century politics. We live in the age of large areas. Of course this cannot happen without continuous efforts at compromise and give and take. The spirit in which we have set about our work of unification, however, guarantees the future continuity and steadfastness of the forces of unity and we are perfectly aware that the responsibilities cn our shoulders go far beyond the boundaries of the selfish interests of our Six countries alone.

M Lucien Faure, a former Foreign Secretary for France, stated in the same symposium that the European Economic Community is not merely an economic organization but a psychological and political reality. Politicians on the Continent understand how true this is, and how this concept of a united Europe has altered the thinking habits of Western Europeans. The Treaty of Rome was, in his judgment, a first step in the political integration of Europe, a step essential if Europe is to maintain its position vis à vis the other large groupings in the world. 'The political will surpasses all limited commercial aims, all economic aims. You can perhaps reproach me for being a dreamer; but to my mind it is this political will for unity, for political integration which will not alone bring about the unity of Europe but will also preserve what is left of liberty in the Western world'.[10]

The Marquess of Salisbury confessed that he was worried by the political implications. To stress the economic aspect of the Community might be seriously misleading. The surrender of sovereignty called for in the Treaty of Rome may be restricted to economic matters but that was by no means the whole of the story. Membership of the Common Market would profoundly affect not only the economic but also the social and political life of each member people. Even as it stands, the Treaty of Rome imposes far more severe restrictions on the individual liberty of member States than anything in the constitution of the British Commonwealth. In the event of Britain's entry into the European Community it will no longer be possible to

[10] *Studies*, vol. XLVIII, No. 191. Pp. 249-272.

say that our obligations to States of the Commonwealth come first. We shall have closer and more imperative obligations to the nations of Western Europe. This has to be recognized, and indeed Mr Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister, made it very clear when he stated that negotiations with Britain as a separate, independent and uninhibited power would be made impossible were Britain to join the Common Market.

With regret Lord Salisbury allowed that a new grouping of forces may be necessary in this strange and bewildering world in which we are living and he commented on the fact that, whereas the Commonwealth nations were drawing further away from one another, the nations of Western Europe were moving towards a narrower unity. Let us not forget, he added, that the older members of the Commonwealth are the best friends we have anywhere in the world, better friends than we are likely to meet or make upon the Continent. On the other hand, he insisted that, if Britain is to negotiate her entry into the Common Market, she must be ready to accept—or at least face—the political implications. It would be morally wrong, in his opinion, to seek membership of the European Community with the intention of watering down the Treaty of Rome. He identified himself with Lord Strang's view that

> . . . it would be less than honest to apply for membership if our objective, once inside, would be to try to water down or dilute the political content of the Treaty, present or prospective. If the Treaty of Rome has any outstanding value—and I think it has—it is because it offers to Western Europe the possibility of closer union, which will meet a need felt by the peoples of the six countries. If we do not want to go along this road we had better not set foot on it.[11]

The Problem of Sovereignty

Entry into the Common Market would necessarily involve a derogation of national sovereignty or, as Lord Gladwyn preferred to express it, restrictions on our freedom of action in the economic field.

To begin with, there is the Commission of the European Community—a body of civil servants, functioning in Brussels and seconded from their national governments. Their work is to draft plans for bringing into effect the various chapters of the Treaty of Rome which concern the formation of the Community. The Commission cannot, of course, override any individual member. It represents, to some extent, an International Civil Service of the future but it can

[11]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 121, c. 260.

only function under an international High Authority when Britain will have agreed to the setting up of such a High Authority. The 'assembly' foreshadowed in the Treaty of Rome can be established only when all the members have agreed that it is to be established.

At the same time, there exists the International Court to which we should be bound to refer disputes relating to the interpretation of the Treaty, and there is the Council of Ministers to which the Commission is subject. We should have to accept a common external tariff and accept also the fact that this cannot be altered except by a majority vote.

But—it might be interjected—is not this discussion of sovereignty rather arbitrary and academic? The idea of an absolute and sovereign State, with its freedom of action entirely unimpaired, is quite unreal. It has been completely abandoned in practice. Every international agreement, every treaty and association, limits the freedom of action of the power concerned. Our national sovereignty has been seriously circumscribed by membership of the United Nations' Organization, of NATO, of OEEC and of Western European Union and many similar bodies. The economic obligations of the Treaty of Rome would doubtless be closer and more coercive but they are only one step further along a pathway which the Western Powers have accepted as inevitable.

It is all a question of why sovereignty is abrogated. What advantage is to be derived, what balance secured? Indeed, the term 'abrogation' when applied to the European Community could be misleading. Britain will not be abrogating a measure of national sovereignty and handing it over to any other power. It will merely be 'pooling' that degree of sovereignty with other States for their mutual benefit.

However, it is worth remarking that the British approach to this question differs from that of the enthusiastic devotee of the European idea. In British eyes an abandonment of sovereignty is to be regretted. It may be necessary but it remains always a painful necessity. No one would welcome or accept it for its own sake. It is a price that has to be paid, a sacrifice to be offered. On the contrary, many a good European of to-day regards such a loss of national sovereignty as a gain and a good. It is better, he would argue, to be less consciously French or German and more consciously European. In both these countries, in Germany perhaps in particular, there is a strong and steady reaction against the nationalistic spirit of the nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries. For most Englishmen it will not be easy to acclimatize themselves to these new habits of thinking because of their long tradition of isolation. Here, too, it is the Englishman who is behind the times, and the Continental abreast of them.

Lord Gladwyn's summing up is worth reproducing:

> There is no doubt, to my mind, that if we did eventually sign the Treaty of Rome, on satisfactory terms, we should be, as a nation, in a far stronger position than we now are. By and large, the authority and influence of this Parliament would be increased rather than diminished. Nor have I any doubt that, always if we achieve satisfaction as regards the trade of the Commonwealth, that unique body, with a Europe united economically behind it, could play a rôle the importance of which can hardly be imagined in the present state of affairs. *But in order to achieve all this* we must be prepared to accept certain rules without which European unity cannot in fact be achieved. This may well require a great change in our ingrained habits of thought, and to accomplish it there must be an inspired effort of leadership.[12]

Back to Europe

Surprisingly little was said during these debates about a return of Britain to the Continent from which it came and from which it derived its religion, literature and culture. There was next to no reference to the centuries of common experience during the Middle Ages. In fact the term 'medieval' has become an unfortunate adjective to be attached to nouns like 'brutality' and 'barbarism' which are far more characteristic of the twentieth century. Protestant history has always stressed Britain's differences with and from the Continent with the consequence that its more ancient links and harmonies have been forgotten. This again reveals a difference of attitude between the peoples of Britain and Western Europe for which considerable allowance will have to be made and much patience exercised during the coming negotiations.

In a singularly inept speech Sir Lynn Ungoed-Thomas attributed this movement towards closer integration in Western Europe to an inferiority complex on the part of its six members. They had been defeated in the last war and disappointed in their present status and they were looking for a sense of security and confidence that they were lacking. Traditional Europe, he added, as represented by the European Community, offered no spiritual reply to the 'spiritual' challenge of Communism. As Mr Roy Jenkins put it elsewhere in the debate, this speaker must have fallen asleep in 1949 and never awakened since.

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[12]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 120, cc. 148-157.

It was left to Lord Hailsham to strike the European note more confidently and clearly than any other speaker, and it is on this note that we may very suitably conclude:

> The truth is that Britain does not seek to enter Europe either as a suppliant or as an alien. Being British is only another way of saying that we are part of Europe, culturally and spiritually. Our language, our law, our literature, our religion; the things which make us characteristically what we are, what we have been and what we want to be; the things we have passed on to America and the Commonwealth, old and new; the very failures which leave us far short of what we would be—all these are European and Christian. Our roots go deep down into the soil of European history and experience; our present has been inextricably intertwined with the agony and bitterness of the twentieth century European tragedy, of which we are the fellow sufferers and in which we have been the joint participants. If we deserve to survive, as survive we mean to do, the chaos and the darkness of the present international anarchy, it is because we are, with others, the joint guardians and heirs of something more precious than ourselves, which thousands have died for, which some, indeed, have betrayed and which more still who are alive to-day desire to live for and to pass on to unborn generations.[13]

[13]Hansard (Lords), vol. 234, no. 121, cc. 223-224.

Reflections on the Church in the Congo

STEPHEN KACHAMA-NKOY

MUCH has been written about the Congolese scene this last year by well-informed observers, and much more by those who had little or no insight into the situation there. But both classes of reporters have been almost exclusively preoccupied with the political and diplomatic aspect of affairs; other whole areas of the problems facing this young country have scarcely been touched upon by commentators. The Catholic Church, for instance, has found little mention, yet more than a third of the people are Catholic; and in a population of fourteen millions the Catholics constitute a very significant community. In the sphere of education alone, the Church has played a role out of all proportion to the actual number of her members. In fact, the future of the Congo is intimately bound up with that of the Church and her works.

The Success of the Church in the Congo

When one considers that Catholic missionaries arrived in the Congo as recently as 1888, the results achieved in seventy years are clearly remarkable. Christianity in the Congo, if we consider the situation before Independence, was numerically, at least, flourishing. Catholics numbered nearly five millions. In some areas up to 95% of the population were baptised. In the countryside, the Church feasts and notable religious occasions, such as marriages, ordinations and first Masses, had become the festivals of the people. Of the 56% of the youth able to attend school only a fifth went to schools other than those conducted by the missionaries. Hospitals were for the most part in the hands of religious or of christian organisations. There were about four hundred and fifty Congolese diocesan priests and about one thousand five hundred men and women-religious, members of native congregations or affiliated to European orders and congregations. Among the bishops there were at the time of Independence four Congolese (there are now seven), of whom the first, Mgr P. Kimbondo, bishop of Kisantu, was consecrated in 1956 and the other three during the period 1956-60. On the 29th November 1959 the ecclesiastical hierarchy was established.

We may legitimately ask the question 'Was all this merely a superficial success?' As a matter of fact, it seems to me that a good

part of these results was rather on the external plane. It is sad to relate, for instance, how easily many of our Christians return to their traditional magical practices, especially in matters which affect them intimately in time of expectancy, sickness, death and in trials of every kind. In a village almost entirely composed of Catholic families situated less than two kilometres from a major seminary, one can assist every week at ritual ceremonies of divination, imprecatory dances and attempted cures performed in the old magic huts. The healer, who lives in this village, is in general demand everywhere.

There is another disturbing fact: the general passivity of the Christians during the campaign of denigration of the Church, the beatings and violence done to priests, European and Congolese, and to men and women-religious in many parts of the Congo these last months. This is what a missionary had to say, writing on the 3rd March 1961:

> The apostolate in the mission stations and in the villages remains rather difficult, especially in some places. This is chiefly because some individuals excite the populace with their calumnies and false tale-bearing against the missionaries and the local African secular priests. The real tragedy is that our 'good Catholics' lack the courage to silence them and that the majority of the people are too ready to believe everything reported to them—even the least likely tales.

A third significant fact, not too reassuring, is provided by the astonishing grip on the people—Catholics included—of those self-styled messiah prophets who start to preach a religion in harmony with our traditions, a religion in which one's entire life, even one's political life, is integrated. These messianic movements are sometimes called Kibanguisme (after the prophet Kibangu who founded his religion in 1921). Other variants pass under such names as Mpadisme, Kintwadisme and others.

In the Crucible: The Church on Trial

The fact is that just now the Church in the Congo has entered on a phase of its trials which should purify and strengthen it.

For more than half a century the ecclesiastical authorities were on friendly and cooperative terms with the colonial government. In 1906 the first 'Agreement' between the Catholic Missions and the colonial authorities was signed. In 1926 a 'School Agreement' came into operation, by the terms of which subsidies were granted to the Mission schools, mainly in the form of salaries for the teaching personnel. In time, as a result of this policy, it has become extremely

difficult for the average Congolese Christian not to identify missionary with civil servant, and to mistake the Church for just another department of the Colonial machinery. Such an impression moreover is reinforced by the fact that almost all the Vicars Apostolic and missionaries have been of Belgian nationality. We should remember too that the time is not so long past—up to the years immediately preceding the Second World War in fact—when the higher ecclesiastical superiors enjoyed a power comparable to the Missi Dominici of Charlemagne. Of course, the religious authorities often used their influence to defend the Congolese from abuses of every kind. Thus in 1928 the Bishops of the Congo raised an energetic protest against forced labour and the methods of so-called 'recruitment of workers' employed by the agents of the colonial government. Whether the use they made of their power was good or bad, the fact remains that the Church was powerful and appeared as such in the eyes of the populace.

The strict collaboration between Church and State and the considerable power of the ecclesiastical authorities were particularly evident in the field of education, which was directed as a quasi-monopoly by the Church until 1954.

The Church was undoubtedly powerful but *was* she the instrument of colonialism? If one understands by colonialism the exploitation of man by man, authority exercised in an arbitrary manner, desire, even thirst for domination, one would have to be exceptionally biased to lay against the Catholic Church in the Congo the charge of colonialism. For, understood in this sense, the colonialist spirit is in formal opposition to the very doctrine of the Church.

In 1956 when a group of young Congolese intellectuals, presided over by Mr Joseph Ileo, (who was later Prime Minister of the Central Government of Leopoldville) publishing the famous 'Manifesto of Africa's Conscience' in which they expressed in unequivocal terms the urgent necessity of preparing Congolese for self-government, the Bishops of the Congo seized the opportunity to affrm clearly and unmistakably the right of the inhabitants of the country to a share in the conduct of public affairs, and at the same time they recognized as legitimate the desire of the Congolese people for Independence, provided it be accomplished with respect for mutual rights and in a spirit of charity.

On the other hand the numerous institutions run by the Church (Schools, Hospitals, Social Services) in collaboration with the State have had to follow the regulations laid down by the colonial authority, and so have been inevitably identified with colonial policy. This is particularly in evidence in the field of education, and especially in that of secondary and university education. Thus, though the

first Congolese priest was ordained as long ago as 1918 (his formation must therefore have commenced at least ten years earlier) one cannot help being astonished that the Congo had by 1960 only a handful of university graduates.

In fairness, however, one must mention that in 1925 the Church made a step towards setting up higher education for Africans by founding a High School of Nursing and one of Agriculture at Kisantu. And in 1929 a School of Administration was added to this institution, though the students who graduated from these schools were sedulously kept in subordinate positions by the colonial authorities. As well as these schools, the Catholic Missions had been contemplating, since before 1950, the beginnings of some form of university education. The plan was to expand the studies in the medical and agricultural schools of Kisantu, and transform them with the help of the University of Louvain, into university faculties of medicine and agriculture. The School of Administration was to become an embryo Law Faculty. But unfortunately the effort came to nothing. In 1952 steps were taken by the Jesuit Fathers to found, come what might, some kind of a university. It was only two years later that these efforts bore fruit, against the opposition of the then Belgian Minister of Colonies, a front-ranking Freemason named Buisseret, who declared openly in the Chamber of Deputies at Brussels that in the existing state of affairs the foundation of a university in the Congo would be premature.

No one can doubt then that the Lovanium University was born through the goodwill of the Church alone. The Belgian colonial policy in matters of higher education and the training of Congolese for posts of responsibility, far from being either realistic or far-sighted, was a continual brake on the action of the Church.

This official policy I shall sum up in one word: paternalism. In other words (by way of caricature, as it were): everything for the Congolese people but nothing through them. Later perhaps, (had they in mind the year 2000?), when they shall be better formed. . . . Meantime we ourselves shall do everything for their happiness.

True though this may be, no one can deny that the standard of living of the average Congolese was considerably raised in the seventy-five years of colonization, and the condition of the people's health much improved. Primary education was provided on a very large scale. Many modern highways connect the different provinces of the country. More than one-third of the population has been baptized in the Catholic religion. Is not all this magnificent?

One can only agree wholeheartedly. But in what degree was the intelligence of the Congolese called on to plan and organize the means set up to attain his own happiness? In none. The Congolese

had to be satisfied up to the immediate present with a state of things in which he had to be prepared to receive everything at the hands of others and to bear no concern for the morrow, because the State and the missions would see to everything.

This paternalism was, until recently, found even in the Church; not so much with regard to the native clergy as towards the Congolese laity. In the mission station the missionary was responsible for everything. He preached, he administered the sacraments; he also directed all the schools, called the roll, distributed meat, salt and flour to the pupils, supervised and inspected all building operations, presided at every important meeting and so on. In short, the missionary was doing everything. The mission was *his* business. Is it any surprise that paternalism on the part of the authorities, governmental and ecclesiastical, should have fostered in the Congolese people a demanding and irresponsible mentality? What wonder is it, too, when the colonial system was rapidly collapsing, that the institutions of the Church should also undergo profound shocks? I think one can affirm that one of the principle sources of the Congolese revolution which plunged the country into chaos was fundamentally an *anti-paternalist reaction,* a violent rejection of the state of constant subordination to a colonial Providence. I feel that this goes a long way to explain the attitude of many of the political leaders towards the missionaries, no less than towards the Belgians in general. Many Congolese are in a state of revolt against their old educators, and the image they conserve of the Fathers is that of 'schoolmasters,' who submitted them to discipline, without at the same time leading them sufficiently far along the way of instruction and progress. The numerous vexations to which priests and religious in the Congo are subject to-day all have the same purpose: to humiliate and discredit our masters of yesterday.

A Time of Self-Examination

Put to the test, the missionaries are standing up well. During the worst of the July crisis, almost all of them remained at their posts. With a heroism devoid of ostentation, they are continuing to bear witness to Him who should always be the ultimate justification of their presence and their action. The campaign launched against the Church, notably in the province of Kivu, has, assuredly, endangered the Christian future of the country, but it has led also to the purification of the Church and to much heart-searching. For, in the midst of its trials, the Church in the Congo is now asking itself whether Christianization is Westernization.

I said at the beginning that the success of the missions in the Congo seemed to me somewhat superficial in character. My reason

is expressed in the opinion of more than one African who is thinking on the problems of the Church in our continent, somewhat like this: 'Some think that the way in which Christianity is being spread has torn away the very basis of African society, beginning with its culture. In fact, in their understandable haste to convert and baptize, the missionaries in the Congo thought fit to take the shortest road; instead of becoming African themselves, they westernized us.' To become a Christian always required of the adult Congolese the making of a sort of *tabula rasa* of all the ancestral traditions in which he was born and grew up.

Granted the near-monopoly of the Church in the matter of education for more than half a century, there was a close link between Christianity and education. Until 1954 it was practically impossible to learn even the three R's, except in a mission school (Catholic or Protestant). And in the social order brought by colonization, the literate man alone had standing and could more easily escape occasional arbitrary measures of the colonial agents, get a good position by putting himself at the service of the Missionaries as a teacher or catechist, or by working for the government or in some business concern. Thus the surest way to climb the new social ladder created by colonial rule was to become a Christian. Not surprisingly there grew up a type of Christianity which we might call sociological.

Within the Church itself the missionaries did not escape that general tendency which prevailed in European countries until about twenty years ago, the tendency to think Western values the only criterion of worth. As a result, Christianity was presented through Western eyes, in Western terms. The Congolese Christians had only to adapt themselves, to assimilate the Western manner of presenting God and Jesus Christ, the world and the family, life and love, suffering, sickness and death. The average Congolese Christian managed this adaptation and assimilation very poorly indeed. Instead of integrating himself through Christianity, he developed a sort of divided personality: his Christianity (Western) on one side, his life (African), with the customs and traditions of his environment, his worries, hardships, regrets, and daily trials, on the other. Certainly the average Congolese Christian made a genuine effort not to believe in magic any longer. But what happened in fact was that he inhibited and stamped underfoot, rather than integrated into his religion, his own philosophy of life.

There precisely we have one of the great weaknesses of the Church in the Congo. An urgent task now confronts her: to Africanize herself, to adapt herself to the African mentality, in other words, to strike roots in Congolese soil.

In fact, a beginning *has* been made. It is ten years since the

Church in the Congo began to prepare a responsible, Catholic élite, but the Church has had to fight against colonialist paternalism within as well as without. At the moment it is a question of life and death for the Church.

Unless, within the next ten years, a numerous and highly qualified Congolese laity is integrated into the very heart of the national life, and unless this laity assimilates the dynamism in African nationalism without denying the values of Catholic Christianity, I fail to see how the young Christian community of the Congo will be able to resist the attacks of international Communism. In short: profound adaptation to the African mentality, formation of a highly educated African laity, these are the major preoccupations of the Catholic Church in the Congo. The aim to be reached? That the Church in Africa may become a Church of Africans, free, and responsible for their union with the Lord Jesus.

(II) EDUCATION IN THE CONGO

From this rapid glance at the major problems which confront the Church in the Congo to-day, it should be evident how vital is the role of education, which actually absorbs more than a third of the Church's personnel in the country. It is, moreover, precisely in the field of education that the most delicate problems of cooperation between Church and State are set.

I. A DIFFICULT GROWTH

We of to-day easily forget the innumerable difficulties which had to be surmounted by those who set out to start the first schools in the Congo. One has only to mention for instance the prejudices they had to overcome. For long years the people of the Congo harboured grave suspicions against any organized form of education. (What persuasive pressure the missionaries had to exert to bring children to their schools and to keep them there once they had brought them!) What an incessant struggle the missionaries had to make against that *nzala ya bwala,* that home-sickness, so overpoweringly strong in the heart of every Congolese child away from its home, and alas, how often they had to bring their charges back again, by force almost, after their constantly repeated flights from school! All this seems scarcely credible now, when one considers that great tide of students pouring into the schools in the Congo in recent years (since the period immediately after World War II).

The difficulties and resistance met with by those promoting the education of girls was even greater, at least until about ten years ago.

Those whom one managed to inscribe on the primary-school roll, paid in general, literally "flying" visits; the higher classes vanished as you watched them, and post-primary education gathered only a few individuals in the central schools serving vast regions. The root cause of this was, of course, the organization of tribal society and its conception of the role of woman. The tribes in general were long opposed to the Christian emancipation of women, an emancipation which could only be brought about by giving her a serious education on a worthwhile scale and one that continued over a fairly long period of years. Fortunately, a progressive and quite tangible change has been setting this situation right for more than a decade. To-day it is the school which, for lack of accommodation, has to close its doors against the far too numerous applicants who want to enter it.

A third obstacle, which has long retarded the progress of educational development, is the very geography of the country. The Congo is a vast country and the problem of providing education is further complicated by considerations of distance between educational centres. In a country without roads, the missionary, until quite recently, could only move out from his central mission-station on foot or by river. The larger missionary stations are widely scattered and the foundation of an outstation, at which an adequately supervised school could be set up, was often out of the question. Since the second world war, however, this situation has been considerably improved thanks to the multiplication of means of transport.

Fourthly, there was the added, ubiquitous language difficulty. The European moving through the Congo found himself confronted by a veritable Babel of dialects—no less than thirty in fact—belonging to the different tribes which cover the country. As can be imagined, this linguistic mosaic did not exactly facilitate the progress of instruction. What language was the teacher to use when there might be a Mupende, a Mumbala and a Muyansi sitting in the one classroom? This was a very acute problem in the beginning but it faded little by little into comparative insignificance. Under the joint influence of the government officials and the missionaries and their schools, a certain linguistic unification has been brought about. A progressive and exclusive adoption, for administrative and scholastic purposes, of certain dialects more widely spoken than others has achieved this. Thus in Léopoldville province, Kikongo is used; in Equateur and part of Stanleyville, Lingala, the official language of the Congolese army; in Kasai and North Katanga, Tshiluba; and throughout the East, Swahili. With the increase of instruction came the gradual introduction of French, right from the first years of the primary school. This has provided a simple solution of the language problem, for at present many schools conduct all their classes exclusively

through French. One hardly requires the gift of prophecy, however, to predict that within ten years or so, no matter what political structure prevails in the Congo, the Congolese peoples will have on their hands their own little "language question".

II. Present-Day Situation

So much for the background to education in the Congo. Let us now consider the present position. First of all, primary education.

How does education stand at present in the Congo? In particular, what percentage of the children receive primary education?

1. *Percentage attending primary schools.*

Between 1930 and 1934 only 12% of the school-age population were actually in school. This figure rose to 37% between the years 1950-1954, and in 1959 out of 3,040,000 children of from 5 to 14 years of age, 1,700,000 were at primary schools, that is to say 56% of the total. The Congo then, has reached the average world standard in this respect. For the period 1954-1959 the annual percentage increase in the number of primary pupils passed from 6% to 10%; this is one of the highest percentages of growth in the world, though over the period 1950-1954 Ghana had a rate of increase of 9.2%.

A few comparisons with other African countries will throw our statistics into relief. In 1956 only 20% of Nigerian children were attending school; in Ghana the number was 35% and in the French Cameroons, 30%. Other countries showed lower figures; French Sudan 6.6%; Mauritania 5.3%; Upper Volta 4.7%; Tchad 4.7%; Niger 3%. These low percentages are, no doubt, in part explained by religious considerations peculiar to these countries. Each of them contains a very high proportion of Mahomedans who are naturally reluctant to send their children to Mission schools but who also, surprisingly, are unwilling to send them to "lay" government schools. Nevertheless, despite these considerations, the vast educational drive in the Congo is clearly outstanding.

2. *Educational network*

If we take a general look at school attendance in the Congo we find that in 1960, out of a population of almost 14 millions, there were 1,571,076 pupils in the various types of schools. Of this number 1,471,443 were attending primary school and 13,818 secondary. 15,819 more were receiving technical or agricultural education and 829 were at the university. To enliven these statistics let us present them in the form of a pyramid.

Taking for our unit of height each of the six years of primary

and each of the six years of the secondary course, we shall have thus twelve horizontal divisions. Each unit at the base will consist of 1,000 pupils. Our pyramid will stand as follows: first year of primary, the great base of the pyramid, 700.5 units; last year of secondary, its tiny summit, 0.45 units. For the primary classes the pyramid ascends thus: 351 units in the second year; in the third year 245.9; 165.6 in the fourth; in the fifth 112.8; and in the sixth and final year 60. Continuing into secondary and technical we have 21.8 in first year; 9.7 in second year; 6.1 in third year; 3.9 in fourth year; 0.58 in fifth year; 0.45 in sixth year. Little danger of top-heaviness here!

The number of students receiving higher education was correspondingly small. In 1960 there were 829 university students in the Congo and a further 300 in Belgium. All the world knows that in June 1960 the Congo Republic numbered a mere 20 university graduates.

Two main conclusions leap forward from the study of this well-proportioned pyramid. The first is that an immense effort has been made to broaden its base by increasing the number of primary schools. The second is that even when one takes into consideration that there must of necessity be careful selection and thinning out of pupils as they advance through the schools, there is nevertheless a manifest disproportion between primary, secondary and university numbers. An effort, long overdue, must be made to add to the proportionately small number of secondary schools and to increase the number of pupils admitted yearly to this level.

3. *Standard of Pedagogy.*

So far we have considered the quantitative aspects of Congolese education. What of its quality? What standard of studies has been reached in the Congo? The question is highly important but not at all easy to answer. There are differences of degree and of kind. The main determinant is the level of teaching attained in the Ecoles de Moniteurs (training colleges for teachers) and the standard of education of the different religious teachers, whether Congolese or European.

Taking the country as a whole, here are the conclusions that present themselves when one compares the results obtained in different public examinations and competitive tests between several Congolese and Belgian schools of the same level:

Congolese children finishing primary school with a standard result of 50 to 60% are capable of following with profit a vocational education up to the Belgian standard, which will qualify them as skilled workers.

Congolese leaving primary with a mark between 65 and 75% are considered suitable for a programme of secondary education identical with the Belgian "Humanités" course, but at a rather less intense tempo. They would take three years to complete what the Belgians would complete in two.

Congolese leaving primary schools with results higher than 75% would profit from the actual Belgian "Humanités" programme or some comparable technical course. We note in passing that this is what actually happens in the seven colleges run by the Society of Jesus in Léopoldville, Kisantu, Mbansa-Mboma, Kiniati, Kikwit, Bukavu and Usumbura, as well as in the minor seminaries of Kinzambi and Lemfu.

As for the level of higher studies, the results in the universities of Lovanium and Elizabethville are proof that the Congolese student finishing his humanities, or secondary course, has reached a level of intellectual formation comparable in every point with that of his Belgian colleague, if not at times even higher. This last phenomenon is to be attributed to the rigorous selectivity practised in the Congolese secondary schools, and to the greater desire for learning, characteristic of the Congolese student in general, as compared to the normal run of Belgian alumni.

4. *Education for Life.*

School, however, does not mean simply the dispensing of information. (Much less is this true of the Christian school.) We have to ask ourselves therefore what is the real *educational* worth of the system of education in the Congo.

The vast chain of schools organised there by the Belgian authorities undoubtedly did a great service to successive generations of Congolese in making them aware of the outside world and in introducing them to western culture. But this very benefit has carried with it its ill effects. Until the very recent past the Congolese seemed to have been dominated by one chief desire, to become like the Europeans, to westernise himself. Such a tendency was only too natural five years ago, but it is highly questionable whether it remains the best preparation for the future. Without denying anything of the value, for the world at large, of the best elements of western culture, ought we not to agree that the schools of the Congo must at the same time be the means of handing on the traditional values of African life to the new generations? Such values as the "Wisdom" contained in our numerous proverbs, our heritage in art, spoken poetry, in music and in the dance—instead of leaving all these valuable treasures to the anthropologists and specialists should it not be the task of our

schools to give them vigour and a new lease of life, by using them to fashion the minds and hearts of the Congolese citizens of the future; citizens who would at once be deeply rooted in African soil and perfectly open to the universal heritage of mankind no less than to every kind of modern technique.

I am aware that serious efforts have been initiated in this direction in certain Congolese educational centres. When one knows, for example, the passionate love of Africans for dancing, one can only rejoice to see a course in African dancing included in the curriculum of the Jesuit College of the Holy Spirit in Usumbura. This adaptation of the syllabuses to the realities of African life has yet to penetrate all the other subjects of our educational programmes; but plans are in course of preparation.

What effect is the present system of education in the Congo having, on the development of the personality of the young Congolese student? First, the schools of the Congo do not stop at the mere imparting of knowledge to their pupils; they have gone further and formed them spiritually. This fact seems to me admirably illustrated in a petition addressed in 1956 to the Governor-General of the former French Congo by a group of intellectuals of Brazzaville, in which they asked the Governor to support the establishment of a college staffed by religious: . . . "If we support the mission schools it is because they do not content themselves with imparting information to us, they bring us *Education.*"

Indeed the mission schools put their entire effort into producing the type of man we can characterize by those two rather simple words: *"bon chrétien"*. The complete ethic of this good Congolese Christian could be summed up, I think, in this phrase: *"Observa mandata, et habes vitam aeternam"*.

Unfortunately, much of this excellent effort has been undermined by the 'paternalism' already referred to. A great deal of energy has been expended for instance in our schools, in inculcating into young minds an ideal whose main lines seemed to gravitate entirely around those perennial themes: obedience, docility, and confidence. "Have confidence in us and obey", that was the task. Should it not have been rather; obedience and sense of initiative, confidence and sense of responsibility, docility and development of one's powers of judgment? It seems to me that only thus can any system of education succeed in forming men and avoid producing irresponsible types.

Considered from the viewpoint of its consequences for the country as a whole, this lack of formation in a sense of public responsibility has manifested itself acutely in a collective lack of "national consciousness" in the masses. For this there are doubtless several reasons. Primarily the fact that the Congo, as it exists with its present

boundaries, is a purely artificial creation of the colonial powers, dating from the Berlin Conference of 1885. Added to this there is the tribalism traditional among a people ruled by custom. But there is a third explanation no less important, I think—a lack of *national spirit* in our educational system. This lack is undoubtedly connected with the country's former status as a colony. But surely one of the titles of justification to the right of colonisation is precisely the duty of educating the colonised people by promoting their consciousness of themselves as a people; in other words, of bringing them to "national consciousness". I am far from preaching the transformation of the schools into a political platform but it is perfectly legitimate to expect from the Christian school of the Congo, that it would communicate to each Congolese child a real national spirit, enlightened and responsible. Otherwise this same Congolese when he becomes an adult will be simply the easy prey of a blind and irresponsible nationalism.

5. *University Education*

Lovanium, the first university of the Congo, was started in 1954. Its situation is magnificent, at the top of a hill some seven kilometres to the south of Léopoldville. During the seven years since its foundation its growth has been significant, fulfilling all that was expected of it. For the scholastic year 1958-1959 the university had an enrolment of 236 students of whom 132 were Africans. This number rose to 551 for the year 1959-1960.

The second university of the Congo, that of Elizabethville, was opened in 1957 at the instigation of M. Auguste Buisseret, the then Minister of Colonies in the Belgian government. It was intended as a "liberal" rejoinder, under the aegis of the University of Brussels, to the Catholic move in establishing Lovanium. In the scholastic year 1958-1959 Elizabethville had 171 students, and of these 138 were Belgians. In the following year the total rose to 245.

To the number of those studying in the Congo must be added more than 400 who are pursuing their studies in Europe, chiefly in Belgium. If university education has had a tardy commencement in the Congo, it is now at any rate experiencing an accelerated rate of growth.

III. The Future

In the present politico-economic situation in the Congo, we cannot but regard the future of education with grave apprehension. Two problems in particular stand out: the demographic and financial problem, and the problem of personnel.

Demographic and financial problems.

In a country of 14 million inhabitants, how are we to provide each year for new classes, while maintaining the present level of development of primary-schools, keeping in mind at the same time the increase in the birth-rate of 2% per annum? This last supposes that 7,000 new classes of 50 pupils each would have to be opened every year. And this when in the 1960 Budget Education was already absorbing 15% of the ordinary expenditure, in other words a sum of 2,558,065,000 Belgian francs (£17,053,766). This expenditure amounts to 5.1% of the Congolese national revenue. These figures are the extreme limit of what the Congo can allow itself in this field. Moreover, Independence has brought with it new and very heavy expenses for the country, the so-called expenses of "sovereignty", of government and administrative machinery. The cost of the army, for example, has risen by almost 400%. And this, when the Congolese political crisis has brought the finances of the country close to general catastrophe. Without foreign aid on a massive scale and a vigorous and progressive revival in the economy, Education in the Congo runs a grave risk of being severely restricted through lack of funds.

Problem of personnel.

Even in the event of our being able to find the necessary resources, will we be able to provide annually the 7,000 qualified teachers required? The existing Teachers' Training Colleges are a long way from being able to meet so great a demand. In secondary education the shortage of personnel is exceedingly serious because many Belgian teachers have returned to Europe as a result of political instability in the Congo. Even in the normal course of events, to meet the demand for secondary education, the existing schools would have needed another thirty or forty classes a year, as well as a yearly addition of between forty-five and sixty properly qualified teachers.

If I have dwelt at some length on these different aspects of education in the Congo, it is because I am convinced of the importance of this factor for the future of the Congolese people. Today, the survival of the educational system in the Congo depends on the urgent solution which the Congolese must find for their political and economic problems. The laws and institutions, the cultural climate, the very national spirit of our people will be profoundly affected by the quality of the leaders which the different educational establishments, especially our secondary, technical and university centres, will have formed in the next fifteen years.

Ernest Hemingway (1899—1961)

Formulating the Data of Experience

JOHN C. KELLY

HEMINGWAY wrote books that are easy to read. He wrote books that can be read with pleasure over and over again. Some people find that hard to forgive in a writer unless he is surrounded by a forbidding fence of learned apparatus like that which encircles, for example, the eminent readableness of James Joyce. Some who admit that they have read Hemingway and even reread him are yet chary of praising unreservedly books that they have enjoyed. It seems hard to be sure how seriously Hemingway is to be taken. Is he merely a writer of highbrow thrillers? Is he perhaps too undignified, too unrefined to be literature? Surely his books are too exciting to be real literature which should be of sterner, more difficult, more profound stuff? It is reassuring that his name crops up in books of literary criticism: that makes it permissible and even obligatory to read him. But again it is also unfortunately true that he is an author who is taken down when one is relaxed, idle and perhaps weary. Such extreme readableness—although it need not necessarily imply that a more alert attention can reveal no unseen depths—increases suspicion. If this is literature then it is too good to be true. So, in spite of having the Hemingway habit, it is possible to have doubts about the literary value of the books and to wonder if their author will merit any secure place on his own merits in the history of literature. I would like to show here that one need not be ashamed of liking Hemingway.

To do that it is necessary first to see more clearly what it is in Hemingway that embarrasses his readers. Then it is necessary briefly to formulate some critical notions that tend to be left in the background. Here I attempt to draw on some of the ideas expressed and so brilliantly suggested by Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., in his book *Insight : A Study of Human Understanding*. What I am trying to do has not, to the best of my knowledge, been tried before and is intrinsically difficult. All I can hope to do here is outline a method of criticism which it would be desirable for abler minds to work out in full. Let us turn first then to the embarrassment caused by Hemingway.

American writers are the occasion of our vacillating lack of critical

poise. They have let air and light into serious writing. The best of them have rid themselves of the emigrant mentality and, as a consequence, of the notion—still operative here and there in Europe—that literature should be literary in some undefined academic sense. A good American novel of the present day hits one hard—sometimes in an unrefined and unacademic way—from the first sentence. Attention is caught, as it is by the first line of a good sonnet, by a direct approach to the matter in hand. Concentration is not dissipated by a leisurely preamble with which one must use great ingenuity to discern necessity or even relevance. 'You know how it is there early in the morning in Havana with the bums still asleep against the walls of the buildings; before even the ice wagons come by with the ice for the bars?' 'He lay flat on the brown, pine-needled floor of the forest, his chin on his folded arms, and high overhead the wind blew in the tops of the pine trees.' One may simply not know how it is in Havana, nothing is known yet of Robert Jordan but straight away the story has started. Harry Morgan is near trouble; Robert Jordan is near the bridge; our attention is held. That, of course, is one of the more obvious characteristics of good modern American writing. Even William Faulkner—who will never have to meet the charge of being too easy to read—knows how to begin directly. So does Scott Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald and Hemingway are, perhaps, the first and chief of the Americans who are easy to read and they are in the company of Nathanael West, Ring Lardner and J. D. Salinger along with—in the second, third and fourth rows—Steinbeck, Damiell Hashett, Raymond Chandler. There is no good reason for being ashamed of liking these writers because they are easy to read. Their readableness is intentional and they had to work hard to achieve it. Readableness is not an automatic result of composing on a typewriter: it was all quite deliberate and a result of artistry.

The obituary notices I have read—following the pattern of suspicion just outlined—praise Hemingway's mastery of a style but are economical in measuring out praise for his ideas or his outlook. He was next to Joyce, says *Time,* in his mastery of English. He performed a major operation on the English language 'cutting out the adjectives and prompting words that tell a reader how to feel' and replacing them with 'spare, brisk monosyllables'; with what he himself called in a poem the 'ugly short infantry of the mind'. Gertrude Stein taught him, her aptest pupil, the worth of simple repetition and word rhythm. He was, wrote Mr Marcus Cunliffe in the *Sunday Telegraph,* 'one of the few great, decisive innovators in literary technique . . . first inevitable, then obvious . . . in danger of being underrated . . .' He relied on the power of simple nouns. He was master of the straightforward conjunctions *and* or *with.* In the one

article that seemed to praise enthusiastically, John Wain claimed that Hemingway was not merely unromantic but—by his terseness, lucidity, economy of means and great care for essentials—positively classical. Hemingway can be and is parodied and imitated by lesser writers who think that the formula for success is simply to write about violence in short sentences. For Mr Wain, Hemingway is above and beyond his imitators by a concern for language: a 'passionate fastidiousness about words and rhythms, a contempt for imprecision, and the wholeheartedness of a Flaubert'. Flaubert is high literary society but when Mr Cyril Connolly deprecatingly says that Hemingway is not so much, perhaps, a great novelist as the makings of a great novelist he is thinking of greatness in terms of Balzac, Stendhal, Flaubert and Tolstoy. In spite of his doubts and misgivings, Connolly called his piece, in the *Sunday Times,* 'Death of a Titan'.

These remarks (except possibly the best of them: Mr Wain's *Observer* piece) are fairly commonplace and trite as one would expect in rapidly written notices. They are skilfully constructed out of more leisurely Hemingway criticism. But the leisurely critics are infected with the same doubts. For instance, Dr Seán O'Faoláin in *The Vanishing Hero* measures the shortness of the sentences (two lines: twenty words, at most thirty-nine) in this style adapted to deal with pure fact. It is a style at the opposite pole to that of Henry James, Proust or Faulkner: those formulators of oblique and complex sensibility. A preoccupation with factualness stripped Hemingway's writing of all associations, suggestions, implications, traditions. He is said to have no memories and, of course, no thought. Dr O'Faoláin pointed out that the Hemingway hero calls for a Martini, or its equivalent, 'at the sight of anything in the nature of an intellectual problem'. There is always this doubt about Hemingway's intellect.

Sometimes the dissatisfaction is explicit. Hemingway is accused, by Cyril Connolly, of 'a sadistic facetiousness which went with a tendency to sentimentality—sneering at intellectuals, smart wisecracks in what should have been naturalistic dialogue, needling homosexuals, unpleasant details in the hope of giving offence . . .' His wish to represent his era, the era of the Lost Generation, made it impossible for Hemingway to escape from the limitations of his epoch. Among those limitations an obscurity of intellect was conspicuous. The twentieth century, says *Time,* was ready for him and his psychology of sensations, his 'literature of brute fact, tactile thrill and stream of sensuousness'. *Brute, thrill* and the play on words in the last phrase imply—in the usual skilled manner—that *Time* does not quite approve. His heroes are trapped by bad luck and fail to be tragic because they never understand their fate: weakness of intellect again. 'The reader is saddened without being purged.' Life is reduced to the

art of doing things in a certain style, of behaving honourably according to one's professional code of soldier, hunter, bullfighter or fisherman.

All seem to be agreed that Hemingway's subject is not the bull-ring, the battlefield or life on the Florida Keys but death or, at least, failure. Most suspect that he deals inadequately with this theme except John Wain who writes of Hemingway's tragic, stoic, pessimistic view of life:

> It is the losing fight, or the fight carried on under some cruel disadvantage, that interests him. He sees life as essentially a losing battle, but instead of reasoning from this that nothing matters much he takes the attitude that is, in fact, normal among lofty tragic writers: that a defeat, if it is faced with courage and endured without loss of one's self-respect, counts as a victory.

Dr O'Faoláin might accept *tragic* and *pessimistic* but he insists that stoicism is too delicately adjusted a system, too elaborate a philosophy to expect in Hemingway's bacardi-drinking heroes. All are agreed that the best pages of the novels are the barest accounts of action or sensation: Hemingway's aim, writes John Wain, is

> To get below the skin and present the universal, underlying truth to experience . . . His best books exist at that rare level at which literature becomes experience . . .

The length of the above *pot-pourri* of praise and blame seems justified by the interestingly large amount of misunderstanding it contains of the nature of the novelist's art. There is an apparent tendency all the time to ask more of Hemingway than one has the right to expect or demand from any novelist. These critics seem to demand from Hemingway a cognitional level which no novel can attain while remaining a novel. Three words, for instance, used by Mr Wain, *reasoning, universal* and *truth* illustrate the uncertainty of his critical postulates. The only truth possible in the kind of writing Hemingway wanted is potential truth. Nothing that he says will be universal in any strict sense of the word. No reasoning—in the sense of deductive reasoning—is to be expected from him.

This is not at all to blame Hemingway. As long as he remained within his expressed notion of what a novel should be like he wrote some excellent books. These books are certainly serious and valuable. They are certainly beautifully written, constructed and conceived and (it seems pointless to add the customary modest *probably*) they are truly great.

Hemingway knew he was on the right lines. He may not have

been so exactly sure why they were the right lines. He may not have been aware that the limitations he imposed on himself were the immanent limitations of the novel. His critics seem much more unaware of these limitations which are not merely the limitations of Hemingway but of all prose fiction. To ask more of Hemingway than he gave is to ask more than one has a right to ask from any writer who is not a scientist writing about science or a philosopher writing about philosophy. It is necessary to remember that the novelist is a story teller, a writer of fiction, a worker in words representing the data of experience remembered or freely imagined. In doing what he set out to do Hemingway was making literature. Critics are wrong to demand more from him than he gave not merely because one should be inclined rather to accept from an artist what he does than demand from him what one wants but—as well and more importantly—because to demand reasoning, universality, moral codes or philosophies of life is to ask more than the creative novelist can give. Such demands not merely go beyond the immanent limitations of a genre but beyond the immanent limitations of a cognitional level. To see why this is true it is necessary to turn to Fr Lonergan but, before doing that, it will be as well to see in what terms Hemingway expressed the task he set himself. He formulated his ideal in *Death in the Afternoon.*

Hemingway realized, early on as a journalist, two of the cardinal difficulties of writers. The first was to know truly 'what you really felt, rather than what you were supposed to feel, and had been taught to feel . . .' The second difficulty followed on the first. It was the problem of how to catch the sincerely felt emotion or sensation in words: 'to put down what really happened in action; what the actual things were which produced the emotion that you experienced.' John Wain observes that Hemingway was looking for what T. S. Eliot called the objective correlative: as Eliot put it '. . . a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that *particular* emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given the emotion is immediately invoked'. (*Selected Essays : Hamlet,* p. 145.) Hemingway continues: '. . . but the real thing, the sequence of motion and fact which made the emotion and which would be valid in a year or in ten years or, with luck and if you stated it purely enough, always, was beyond me . . .'

One is tempted to quote from the impressive, lucid and hard-hitting passages in which he outlines his ideals. The main passages are in chapters one and sixteen of *Death in the Afternoon.* But the passages are fairly long and space forbids. It is necessary to compromise by summarizing.

The following seem to be Hemingway's precepts and aims. He was singularly faithful to them:

(1) Isolate and determine the true pattern of the given experience. To do this it is necessary to shed all prejudice: to beware of feeling as you think you ought to feel or as you have been taught to feel.

(2) Formulate accurately and exactly the given sequence of experience and emotion and nothing else.

(3) Learn to do this by trying to formulate the simplest experiences first. Among the simplest experiences is the awareness of violent death. It turns out to be very difficult to formulate this simple experience which however is a fundamental one and certainly 'one of the things about which a man may write'. Writing about death makes the novelist, in some sense of the term, a tragic writer.

(4) Strive for complete clarity of expression and avoid all 'pseudo-scientific jargon': write like a writer of fiction trying to mirror experience in words. Thus, if a writer expresses an experience incompetently or over-elaborately he gives the impression of 'blur'. 'Blur' may indicate 'faking'.

(5) The so-called rules of grammar and syntax may be broken if it is necessary to do so in order to produce an otherwise impossible effect.

(6) It is faking to write obscurely or with complexity of an experience that is neither obscure nor complex. If it is not faking it is incompetence.

(7) Novels should contain people rather than *characters. Characters* tend to be caricatures: over-simplified and too clearly defined. Characters are in danger of becoming merely vehicles for ideas or show-cases for culture.

(8) A display of his own education or knowledge or sensitivity to finer things (painting, philosophy) is out of place in a novelist unless it is an indispensable means for the expression of the lived and imagined experience out of which the novel is made. If the people of the novel would talk about art then let them do so in the novel. If they would not talk of art then the novelist should not allow himself to do so. So that, writing, as Hemingway has chosen, about soldiers, hunters, matadors—all people of small education—any asides in an educated and well-bred tone by the novelist will be out of place: such asides are showing off.

(9) The writer must learn from what has been written and done before his time. That will be the bulk of his knowledge. But, to

tradition, it is essential that he adds his own experience which must necessarily be small because he has only one life-time in which to gather it. It follows that, although he must know and appreciate the good writing done before his time, the writer must not live in an ivory tower of scholarship and culture. Ideally he should have experienced everything. This is impossible but he needs to have experienced what he writes about or, at least, not write about what he has in no way experienced.

(10) A good writer, then, who is not showing off will omit many things that he knows. But the part of his knowledge that he suppresses will so shape what he includes that an alert reader will sense what has been omitted as clearly as if it had been expressed. For example, Hemingway writes of inarticulate people. They appear inarticulate in the books but the reader knows that only a very articulate man could so depict verbal impotence: the reader senses the power over words that makes this expression of verbal inadequacy possible. But if the writer omits because he does not know he makes a 'hollow place' in his books that is recognizable as such.

Two corollaries can be added. A man's experience is necessarily limited. By choice and providence, Hemingway's experience—at least that part of it about which he chose to write—was of extroverted men of action. This is advantageous for two reasons. Action is interesting and not too many serious writers had studied Hemingway's kind of people. Secondly, for anyone who takes as much trouble with words as Hemingway, the discovery of rhythm is inevitable. The rhythm will not necessarily be that of Augustan English prose (which while being facile of imitation can be monotonous in sound and is yet the only rhythm the mass of people know) but a varied pattern of rhythms arising from a clear and natural use of language in which, however, when emotion blows there can sound an organ tone more impressive than Burke's because more spontaneous. 'The line rose slowly and steadily and then the surface of the ocean bulged ahead of the boat and the fish came out. He came out unendingly and water poured from his sides. He was bright in the sun and his head and back were dark purple and in the sun the stripes on his sides showed wide and a light lavender . . .' Hemingway's rhythmic use of bare, simple and often ugly words ('I'll kill him though, he said. In all his greatness and his glory') may well have been learned from the King James bible.

This is Hemingway's creed as a writer. Before trying to see how he carried it out one must ask if his ideals are proper ones and whether or not (as his critics imply) they are an unwarranted diminution of the rights and scope of literature. It is here that Fr Lonergan's

analysis becomes applicable. It appears that Hemingway gave a true and proper account of what literature can and should do. It appears that literature suffers when it attempts to go very far beyond the scope Hemingway indicated. It is sometimes felt that a serious writer should do more than Hemingway, that, for instance, he should express some philosophy, some universal and general truth. But literature deals with concrete, particular experience which is not universal or general. Experience is merely potentially universal and it is not to be generalized by literature.

Hemingway was, perhaps, not fully aware of this. He was a novelist, not a philosopher or an epistemologist or a critic. But he had an insight that his was the proper way to write and as long as that insight was operative he wrote superbly. Whenever a lack of self-criticism obscured his insight he wrote badly but this did not happen too often. Critics who expect more from literature than literature can give are somewhat sceptical of Hemingway's worth. It is necessary then briefly to form a critical notion of literature. So, let us turn to Fr Lonergan.

Hemingway starts from what Fr Lonergan—and everyone else—calls the data of experience. All knowing goes back ultimately to that source but human knowing, which is polymorphic, deals with the data on different levels and from ever higher and higher viewpoints. What is Hemingway's viewpoint? What is the novelist's proper viewpoint? It is necessary to know that before one can decide the minimal and maximal limits of what a novel can communicate validly.

Most of the higher viewpoints can be excluded immediately. A novelist is neither a mathematician nor an empirical scientist. Hemingway describes things as they impinge on us. The scientist—although he starts from a description of things-for-us: a description already shaped by his ulterior motives and aims—sets out to explain things-in-themselves. This he hopes to do by means of measurements and frames of reference that will result in correlations. This is not what Hemingway sets out to do. He is detached but it is metaphorical to say that his detachment is scientific. Neither is Hemingway a metaphysician or philosopher in any strict sense of the word. True, like all men, he is a latent metaphysician because he is intellectually and rationally conscious of the appearance of questions that demand answers. But, of explicit metaphysics—'the conception, affirmation, and implementation of the integral heuristic structure of proportionate being' (Lonergan, p. 391)—he has nothing and he need have nothing. It is not necessary here to penetrate completely the meaning of Lonergan's definition to see that it is not what Hemingway set out to do in his novels. In order to be quite explicit it is necessary to say that Hemingway's viewpoint (and that of any novelist as such)

is not that of ethics or theodicy or theology or any other general scientific system. Hemingway's knowing, the proper knowing for a novelist, is on the important level of common sense.

A very important part of Fr Lonergan's book is devoted to an analysis of common sense. 'Common sense,' he writes, 'is a specialization of intelligence in the particular and the concrete.' It consists in

> A set of insights that remains incomplete, until there is added at least one further insight into the situation in hand; and once that situation has passed, the added insight is no longer relevant, so that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness'. It follows that common sense has nothing to do with theories, with generalizations or universal ideas.

Sometimes

> Common sense may seem to generalize . . . But the generalizations issued by common sense are not meant to be premises for deductions. Rather they would communicate pointers that ordinarily it is well to bear in mind . . . Common sense never aspires to universaly valid knowledge and it never attempts exhaustive communication . . . Its function is to master each situation as it arises. Its procedure is to reach an incomplete set of insights that is to be completed only by adding on each occasion the further insights that scrutiny of the occasion reveals. It would be an error for common sense to attempt to formulate its incomplete set of insights in definitions and postulates and to work out their presuppositions and implications. For the incomplete set is not the understanding either of any concrete situation or of any general truth.

It is in that world of common sense that Hemingway writes. It is clear that he—and every novelist—must be absolved from the task or the guilt of writing metaphysics or science or any system of general validity as long as he writes as a novelist. The novelist is concerned with the formulation of concrete insights on the level of common sense.

To do this is not easy. It is not easy to lay hold of and formulate accurately the data of experience, the 'pure fact', the 'real sequence of action and emotion'. The reason is that experience is in the subject who experiences. There is a scholastic tag *Quidquid recipitur ad modum recipientis recipitur*: in our case it implies that knowing is modified by the condition of the knower. Hemingway sought to free experience and its formulation from all personal elements except the purely empirical and very often he succeeded. His limitation then is not a fault but a virtue other writers might well imitate.

We can be more explicit about the immanent and necessary

limitations of the novel and the novelist. When we become aware of experience it is not pure chaos. It is already patterned either consciously or unconsciously or both. On the deepest, most primitive level experience comes in a biological pattern. Fr Lonergan says

> The pattern is a set of intelligible relations that link together sequences of sensations, memories, images, conations, emotions, and bodily movements; and to name the pattern biological is simply to affirm that the sequences converge upon terminal activities of intussusception, or reproduction or, when negative in scope, self-preservation.

That is a good basic, although partial, summary of Hemingway's subject matter.

But as well, says Fr Lonergan, for man, a liberation from serious-minded biological purpose is possible.

> There exists in man an exuberance above and beyond the biological account-books of pleasure and pain. Conscious living is itself a joy that reveals its spontaneous authenticity in the untiring play of children . . .

Man can break away—as the animals cannot do—from the tyranny of the biological pattern although he cannot do so altogether. This delightful liberation, this joy in conscious experience is informed by the aesthetic pattern.

> Moreover, just as the mathematician grasps intelligible forms in schematic images, just as the scientist seeks intelligible systems that cover the data of his field, so too the artist exercises his intelligence in discovering ever novel forms that unify and relate the contents and acts of aesthetic experience.

It should be remembered that the unification and relating in question have nothing to do with universalization: we are still in the realm of common sense, of the particular and the concrete. To unify and relate a series of images or remembered empirical data in a novel means to make them plausible or credible as well as making them clear and vivid.

The aesthetic pattern of experience is not merely a liberation from the stern purposefulness of biological living but as well a freeing of intelligence from the burden of 'mathematical proofs, scientific verification, common sense factualness'.

> The artist establishes his insights not by proof or verification, but by skilfully embodying them in colours and shapes, in sounds and movements, in the unfolding situations and actions of fiction. To the spontaneous joy of conscious living there is added the spon-

> taneous joy of free intellectual creation . . . For the validation of the artistic idea is the artistic deed.

The novelist has been absolved from the obligation of being a philosopher by being denied the possibility of reaching universal truth. Now, we can answer the question of what he does communicate by the 'ever novel forms that unify and relate' the data of experience: the proper communication of the artist. Then it will be possible to judge whether or not Hemingway has communicated too little to deserve a place among great writers. Again, it will appear that any writer who claims to have possessed, I do not say a more varied, but a higher form of knowledge to communicate than Hemingway, is claiming too much, is claiming more than is possible within the novelist's art.

What is the use of literature? Men seem to be consistently puritanical: they seek to justify everything that gives them joy.

> Free experience and free creation [writes Fr Lonergan] are prone to justify themselves by an ulterior purpose or significance . . . Art, then, becomes symbolic, but what is symbolized is obscure. It is an expression of the human subject outside the limits of adequate intellectual formulation or appraisal. It seeks to mean, to convey, to impart something that is to be reached, not through science or philosophy, but through a participation and, in some fashion, a re-enactment of the artist's inspiration and intention. Pre-scientific and pre-philosophic, it may strain for truth and value without defining them. Post-biological, it may reflect the psychological depths yet, by that very fact, it will go beyond them.

Obscurity may seem a sorry end for literature: especially for the literature of complete clarity that Hemingway sought to make. But there is no contradiction. The clarity has to do with the isolation of experience and its exact formulation. The obscurity attaches to many possible philosophic or scientific explanations under which the empirical data could be subsumed but ought not to be subsumed by a novelist. 'Indeed,' says Fr Lonergan, 'the very obscurity of art is in a sense its most generic meaning . . .' The obscurity is an echo from 'the deep-set wonder in which all questions have their source and ground. As an expression of the subject, art would show forth that wonder in its elemental sweep. Again . . . art should exhibit the reality of the primary object for that wonder . . .' The 'primary object' of the elemental wonder is the data of experience, Hemingway's pure fact and Eliot's objective correlative. The obscurity of art which is its most generic meaning arises then from the suggestion of questions that are not answered fully and need not be answered at all. What is man? How should he act? Why? There is then no point in asking

what Hemingway says about death, immortality, the soul or ethics. No answers to such questions can be expected from a novelist. All one has a right to are questions or suggested questions of individuals in concrete situations. But one of the charges against Hemingway is that he leaves his questions unanswered. He was right.

Sometimes a writer—through lack of a critical attitude to his cognitional processes, lack of self-knowledge or lack of a practical insight into what made writing good such as Hemingway had—may attempt an answer or expect one to arise, in some mysterious way, from the exercise of his own specialized skill. No answer of universal application can arise from the creative writer's skill and art: all that should arise is the possibility of suggested questions. Not seldom the explicit answers, if they are attempted, will be unsatisfactory because —without being a trained scientific observer, without using the accuracy of a technical language, without moving outside the realm of common sense—the novelist is trying to express a universal truth. The answers may be attractive or repellent: they are always unjustified. The proper function of literature, to quote Fr Lonergan again, 'is to communicate any of the moods in which such questions arise, to convey any of the tones in which they may be answered or ignored'.

Hemingway comes very well out of this analysis. His practical insight, his clear-headed and austere unpretentious scope has enabled his books to remain honestly within the proper province of literature: the arranging of the data of experience according to the aesthetic pattern so as to suggest questions. Hemingway's ideals square with the findings of cognitional analysis. Now it remains to see if his practice squares with his ideals.

He was consistently honest in the way he dealt with the data of experience. The datum of experience may be the awareness of what someone else is doing. Then the personal experience must be confined to hearing and seeing. For example, Harry Morgan sees the marlin coming for the bait:

> Then I saw a splash like a depth bomb and the sword, and eye, and open lower jaw and huge purple-black head of a black marlin. The whole top-fin was out of water looking as high as a full-rigged ship, and the whole scythe tail was out as he smashed at that tuna . . .

That is seeing. Harry hears only the whizz of the reel: the noise of the boat is not relevant and he is too excited to know what he is touching. Another kind of experience is that of the narrator who is doing something himself. Here touch enters in and takes a chief place because in the realm of common sense, though not of philosophy, touch is the sense that convinces us—like Dr Johnson—of objectivity.

One could write, for instance, 'the bullet hit him and he fell'. But the one who fires the shot has no experience of the bullet's hitting the victim: that is inference. What is experienced is firing the gun and seing the target fall.

> Robert Jordan felt his own breath tight now as though a strand of wire bound his chest and, steadying his elbows, feeling the corrugations of the forward grip against his fingers, he put the oblong of the foresight, settled now in the notch of the rear, on to the centre of the man's chest, and squeezed the trigger gently. He felt the quick, liquid, spastic lurching of the gun against his shoulder and on the road the man, looking surprised and hurt, slid forward on his knees and his forehead doubled to the road.

I do not know if Hemingway shot men in battle but he saw men shot and fall. He certainly fired guns. 'The quick, liquid, spastic lurching of the gun' is what Gerard Manley Hopkins would have called an inscape and so is 'the sudden, clustered thudding of the bombs'. Better examples could be found and some not as good but the effort to write honestly of experience is there all the time. Santiago, in the *Old Man and the Sea,* is a good example because for a long time the great fish is not even seen. The fight comes to us through the pain in the old man's back and hands.

There is another honest peculiarity in Hemingway's treatment of experience: it is limited. We are never given a complete description of Santiago's fish. The conspicuous things are seen: the stripes, the fins, the sword-bone. The main reason for this restriction (which is obvious too in Hemingway's landscapes and faces) is that the immediate experience, the spontaneous and unreflective experience, which is what he wants to capture, is not complete or detailed. One adverts first to the main things. Unless one is specially trained it is necessary to reflect, to return for another look before memory is total. Perhaps, of course, Hemingway's eyesight was the cause: eyesight even slightly defective limits, without one's being conscious of the limitation, what is really seen. There is too Hemingway's principle parsimoniously to exclude the irrelevant. When a quarry is at bay or a fish hooked the sportsman is not fully aware of the wild-flowers under his feet. When a bird or beast is in sight the shooting man's vision is narrowed down to the viewpoint so often used in Hemingway's books: the view over the rear-sight of a gun.

Finally we come to Hemingway's main themes. It is perhaps clear by now that we have no right to expect clear, universal affirmations from Hemingway or any other writer of fiction. The fiction writer's concern is with the concrete and the particular. His aim should be to formulate the data of experience in an aesthetic pattern. His scope is limited to the non-universal field of common sense. The writer's

truth lies merely in the likelihood, the humanity of the suggested and unanswered questions he indicates. Some of the questions that hover on the brink of formulation may have no answer: they may point to false and non-existent problems. As long as they represent the elemental deep-set wonder that is in every man they are legitimate material for the writer's art.

It should not surprise us, as a consequence, that so many of Hemingway's characters seem puzzled by the situations in which they find themselves. They often confess that they do not know or that they are not going to think. Whether deliberately or not, this is a neat device for keeping the novel in its proper field: the pre-philosophic field. Of course, Hemingway's people do think but they think in terms of practical common sense not in any conclusive universal way. They also decide and act. This is all one can expect unless one insists that Hemingway should have written a philosophy.

Space forbids me to deal with many sympathetic Hemingway themes: his compassion faced with social hardship, his admiration for manual workers, his detestation of alcoholic intellectuals. Here I can only deal with his main theme: death, violent and sudden.

Of course, it is not death but the moments leading up to death of which he writes. Beyond that moment there is no experience but only philosophical deduction or faith. The suggested question is: how is a man to behave when faced with violent death. The answer is practical, without any pretence to universality or transcendent value. He should try to die, if possible, usefully and with as much dignity as he can: he should go on living until he is dead. The answer is not an answer but a mere hint. The question prompting the hint is partial because common sense is a partial form of knowledge that needs complementing by science and metaphysics, by ethics and faith. But, within the field of common sense, it is a good partial answer. It sets a tone in which the question may be answered or ignored. Sordo, trapped on the hill shaped like a chancre, hates to die but makes himself do everything possible to stave off the inevitable. Robert Jordan also hates to die and cannot reconcile himself at first. He tried 'not to think at all' but the questions rose unbidden. 'Who do you suppose has it easier? Ones with religion or just taking it straight? It comforts them very much but we know there is nothing to fear. It is only missing it that is bad. Dying is only bad when it takes a long time and hurts so much that it humiliates you . . . I think it would be all right to do it now? Don't you?' The *it* is shooting himself. *'No, it isn't.* Because there is something you can do yet . . .' It takes him some time, in his semi-delirious state, to remember what it is he has to do. 'And if you wait and hold them up even a little while or just get the officer that may make all the

difference . . . All right, he said. And he lay very quietly and tried to hold on to himself . . .' Some of that sounds like universal propositions but it is not: it is all in the context of common sense. Any sentence that looks general is a pseudo-generalization of common sense.

To touch on a few more points: luck does not exist for the metaphysician but it is a word that may be used in common sense discourse. Cordelia was unlucky and so was Hamlet. Luck is an important theme for Hemingway: Santiago has a practical solution—'Only I have no luck any more. But who knows? Maybe to-day. Every day is a new day. It is better to be lucky. But I would rather be exact. Then when luck comes you are ready'. It may be conceded that Hemingway writes badly of women. Women are seldom enough at the very centre of his stories. It is possibly true, as Dr O'Faoláin holds, that Hemingway, like many of the tough American writers, loses his toughness when he writes about women and falls for the adolescent male fantasy. Racine, however, who is supposed to write well about women, never wrote about matadors. Even if Hemingway failed when writing about women, he still possesses the main, central, essential gift of a novelist: he is a marvellous story teller. If one condemns his stories as non-adult because they are heroic fables, one is condemning the Iliad and the Odyssey.

The World Council of Churches and its Forthcoming Assembly

The Background to New Delhi

MICHAEL HURLEY

FEELING OUR WAY was the title chosen by the former Archbishop of Canterbury (now Lord Fisher of Lambeth) for the published edition of the three sermons on Christian unity which he preached last year at Jerusalem, Istanbul and Rome. The title is surely significant: it reminds us that the Ecumenical Movement is as yet simply feeling its way: groping in the dark, proceeding tentatively, learning by process of trial and error. This is true, though with differences, of the movement in all its forms and expressions both Catholic and non-Catholic; and granted the pioneering nature of the work it is hardly surprising that it should be so. The Catholic ecumenist, unlike many of his separated brethren, will of course have no doubts as to his ultimate goal: the reconciliation of all the dissident Christian Churches and their members to full Catholic unity in communion with the Holy See, but as to the ways and means by which to reach this distant goal he is still very much in the dark, still feeling his way. Indeed it would appear that the Holy Father himself, in establishing the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity but merely as a preparatory body for the forthcoming General Council, was precisely 'feeling his way': testing the advisability and suitability and possibilities of such an institution as a permanent official organ of the Roman Curia.[1]

But what is true of the Ecumenical Movement in general is especially true of its main non-Catholic expression, the World Council of Churches. For the ten years prior to its formal establishment at Amsterdam in 1948 this body existed and operated as 'The World Council of Churches in Process of Formation.' The first Assembly gathered together in the Concertgebouw at Amsterdam on 21 August 1948 unanimously adopted the resolution 'that the formation of the World Council of Churches be declared to be and is hereby com-

[1]The establishment of a permanent official Vatican body to deal with questions of Christian unity had already been put forward as a suggestion for the Council in the early months after its first announcement. As I conclude in an article on the Secretariat in the October number of *Doctrine and Life* 'the one concrete ecumenical gesture which may confidently be hoped for from the Council is that of giving permanent status to the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity.'

pleted,' but in a very real and deep sense the World Council's process of formation was not finally and definitively completed in this solemn act.

> At Amsterdam, and in the years since Amsterdam, it became clear that the creation of the Council was the beginning of a new common pilgrimage, and that the Churches could only go forward in the faith of Abraham, not knowing whither they went 'to goals which we but dimly discern'.[2]

The General Secretary of the World Council of Churches, Dr Visser 't Hooft, who wrote these words, had in 1948 already emphasized that the Ecumenical Movement as embodied in the World Council was 'not a finished product'[3] and last year he was still insisting that as yet its 'pioneering stage was far from over.'[4] Indeed at the forthcoming Assembly the Central Committee will formally report to the Churches that the work of defining the nature and task of the Council is still 'far from being completed.'[5]

The fact is that, despite the large measure of agreement which has been reached about general principles, methods and doctrine,[6] the World Council of Churches is still in process of formation, still feeling its way: growing and developing not only in the number of its member Churches but also in its inner principles and outer structure. This fact, which partly explains and justifies the Roman Catholic attitude of reserve, will be illustrated very forcibly when the World Council meets next November for its third Assembly at New Delhi. The particular significance of this Assembly is that it will ratify a number of important and controversial developments and thus make an outstanding contribution to the Council's process of formation. The 'basis'[7] is to be modified, the position of Faith and Order is to be strengthened, the subject of proselytism and religious liberty is to be discussed, the Russian and other Orthodox Churches are to be admitted to membership and the World Council of Churches itself is to be integrated with the International Missionary Council. Each of these developments is of importance in itself but the last is undoubtedly the main one and it is in relation to this that the others would seem to have their chief significance: they are calculated, so it would appear, to obviate certain undesirable effects which integration might possibly cause. Integration itself, however,

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[2]W. A. Visser 't Hooft 'The Genesis of the World Council of Churches' *A History of the Ecumenical Movement* ed. R. Rouse, S. C. Neill (London 1954) p. 722. Future references to this work will use the abbreviation HEM.

[3]ER [*The Ecumenical Review*] I (Autumn 1948) p. 2. Dr Visser 't Hooft adds: 'and should not be judged as such.'

[4]EPS [*Ecumenical Press Service*] 7 October 1960 p. 2.

[5]ED [*Evanston to New Delhi.* Report of the Central Committee to the Third Assembly of the World Council of Churches] pp. 8-9, 222.

[6]B. Leeming, S.J. 'Ecumenical Conclusions' *The Heythrop Journal* I (1960) 18-33, 285-99; *ibid.* II (1961) 129-41.

[7]What the basis is is explained below. This and the following points of the New Delhi programme I discuss in the October issue of *Irish Theological Quarterly.*

seems on reflection to be simply a more striking manifestation of a growing tendency of the World Council to become absorbed in activities not immediately or obviously related to its function of promoting Christian unity. It is proposed therefore to devote the present article to a consideration of this tendency in the light of the criticism to which it has been subjected and in the light of the Council's own nature and principles as formulated by itself. This will serve the useful purose not only of preparing us to understand more fully the proposed integration of the World Council of Churches and the International Missionary Council but also of introducing us both to the Council's own theory of itself and to its actual life and concrete activities.

The World Council of Churches is the union of two non-Catholic world movements, *Faith and Order* and *Life and Work*,[8] and its very first function is to carry on the work of both. In origin and inspiration Faith and Order was missionary: it began in 1911 as a direct result of the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh the previous year; it owed its beginning to a missionary bishop, Charles Brent, who was deeply concerned with the christianization of the pagan world and with the great obstacle to this cause which Christian disunity presents. Life and Work on the other hand was not missionary in origin and inspiration: though its development owed much to the spirit of the men of Edinburgh, its beginnings cannot be directly traced to the Missionary Conference of 1910[9]; it was started by a homeland bishop, Nathan Söderblom of Uppsala, whose concern was with the social and political problems of christendom itself and the failure of the divided Churches to make a Christian impact on society. In aim and approach the two movements also form a contrast. Faith and Order was fully dedicated to the ideal of organic Church unity,[10] to doctrinal and structural unity, not only for the sake of a more effective evangelization of the heathen but also for its own sake as God's will revealed in Christ and in the New Testament; and the movement was committed to theological study and discussion as the best means of resolving the Churches' existing differences in faith and order. Life and Work, however, was not in itself committed to the ideal of organic Church unity. As its official title in French and German makes clear,[11] its aim and

[8]Cf. T. Tatlow 'The World Conference on Faith and Order' HEM pp. 405-41; N. Karlström 'Movements for International Friendship and Life and Work' HEM 509-96.

[9]It is usual to consider Life and Work as also the outcome of Edinburgh but cf. K. S. Latourette 'Ecumenical Bearings of the Missionary Movement and the International Missionary Council' HEM p. 361: 'It is less easy to trace a direct connection between Edinburgh 1910 and the genesis of Life and Work.'

[10]'Organic unity is the ideal which all Christians should have in their thoughts and prayers.' This was already laid down in 1913 and is one of the principles 'from which the movement never departed.' Cf. T. Tatlow, *art. cit.* HEM p. 411.

[11]Conseil oecuménique du Christianisme pratique; Oekumenischer Rat für praktisches Christentum.

purpose was pastoral, that of 'practical Christianity': without entering into questions of faith and order, without even demanding belief in Christ as God and Saviour, 'to unite the different Churches in common practical work, to furnish the Christian conscience with an organ of expression in the midst of the great spiritual movements of our time, and to insist that the principles of the Gospel be applied to the solution of contemporary social and international problems'.[12] The approach of Life and Work is well summed up in its oft-quoted slogan: 'doctrine divides, service unites'.

According to itself, the World Council of Churches resulting from the fusion of Faith and Order and Life and Work is not a Church and hence does not perform ecclesiastical functions.[13] Neither is it a Super-Church nor the World Church nor the Una Sancta of which the Creeds speak. It is a fellowship of Churches which can show evidence of autonomy and stability and which as members fully retain their autonomy. It does not usurp any of the functions which already belong to its constituent Churches or control them or legislate for them. It has no jurisdiction whatever over them; it is a 'conseil' not a 'concile' and its authority consists only in the weight which it carries with the Churches by its own wisdom.[14] The Council is a fellowship of Churches which accept our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour.[15] Agreement with the 'basis' as this statement is officially

[12]This was the aim of the Universal Christian Conference on Life and Work held at Stockholm in August 1925. The quotation is taken from S. Neill, *Men of Unity* (London 1960) p. 33.

[13]This assertion is taken from 'Statement on the Purpose and Function of the Basis' ED 215. The rest of the description in the above paragraph is taken largely and even verbally from 'The Church, The Churches and the World Council of Churches. The Ecclesiological Significance of the World Council of Churches' ED 245-50. This notable contribution to the Council's theological work of self-analysis and self-definition was received by the Central Committee at Toronto in 1950 and commended for study and comment in the Churches. Fr Leeming (*The Churches and the Church* [London 1960] 295-304) has a penetrating analysis of this 'Toronto Statement' and interesting remarks on its reception in the Churches.

[14]This phrase was first used by Archbishop William Temple in his Explanatory Memorandum submitted to the 1938 Utrecht Conference on the nature and structure of the projected World Council of Churches, cf. W. A. Visser 't Hooft, art. cit. HEM p. 704.

[15]Fr G. Weigel, S.J. has noted that 'Rule I, 3 understands the word "accept" as "express agreement with the Basis upon which the Council is formed." Rule XI, 2, g, (i) widens the understanding to this degree: "accept the Basis of the World Council of Churches or express its willingness to co-operate on that Basis." Hence, the Unitarian churches are not antecedently excluded from membership in the Council just because they do not believe in the divinity of Christ. They can join as long as they are willing to co-operate on the basis of Christ's divinity, no matter what they believe themselves.' (*A Catholic Primer on the Ecumenical Movement* [Westminster Md. 1957] p. 8). This conclusion however is based on a misunderstanding. Fr Weigel has unfortunately failed to note that 'to express its willingness to co-operate on that Basis' (= Rule XI (7) (i) of the new Rules of the integrated World Council of Churches and International Missionary Council, cf. ED 205) is not the criterion required of a Church seeking membership but rather the minimum criterion required of a national council of Churches (e.g. the British Council of Churches) seeking a 'working relationship' with the World Council. The representative of such a national council has no voting power in the Assembly of the World Council of Churches. Fr Leeming (*The Churches and the Church* p. 6) has observed with reference to the Basis that 'this acceptance of our Lord Jesus Christ as God and Saviour is not a mere formality.'

termed constitutes the fundamental criterion for membership but, as the Council has no authority, it remains the responsibility of each Church to decide itself whether in fact it can sincerely accept the basis. The one and only purpose of the basis is 'to say what holds us together in the World Council, what is the starting point of our conversation and the foundation of our collaboration.' The basis is therefore much more than a mere formula of agreement but on the other hand it is less than a confession. In particular it has never been thought of as a creed, nor as offering a full statement of the Christian faith. The member Churches of the World Council believe according to the New Testament that the Church of Christ is one; they feel a holy dissatisfaction with the present situation of a plurality of Churches which contradicts the very nature of the Church, they realize that it is a matter of simple Christian duty for each Church to do its utmost for the manifestation of the Church in its oneness, and to work and pray and make common cause that Christ's purpose for his Church should be fulfilled. The Council therefore stands for Church unity; it exists to promote the growth of ecumenical consciousness, to break the deadlock between the Churches, to bring them to face their differences and to explore these in mutual respect. It does not stand for the fundamental equality of all Christian doctrines and conceptions of the Church; it is not unconcerned with the question of truth. On the other hand the Council does not prejudge the ecclesiological problem, does not itself hold any specific doctrine concerning the nature of Church unity. Membership therefore in the World Council of Churches does not imply that a Church treats its own conception of the Church as merely relative, does not imply that it recognizes its fellow members as Churches in the true and full sense of the word, does not oblige it to change its own particular ecclesiology. Members of the World Council do however, recognize that membership of some sort in the one true Church of Christ does exist outside their own Church, do recognize elements of the true Church in other Churches. For these reasons they feel obliged to assume a positive rather than a negative attitude towards each other in conversation, cooperation and common witness, hoping that by this mutual exchange of thought and experience their lives may be renewed and the full truth recognized and unity based on this full truth ultimately realized.

The World Council of Churches, as at present organized for action, is composed of three 'divisions' and a Commission of the Churches on International Affairs.[15a] The Division of Studies includes the department on Faith and Order which is mainly interested in the

[15a]There is also a Department of Information and a Department of Finance and Administration.

dogmatic aspects of the problem of Church unity; the Department on Church and Society which concerns itself with social questions (such as 'our common Christian responsibility towards areas of rapid social change') and which has attached to it a special Secretariat on Racial and Ethnic relations; the Department on Evangelism which studies the theory and practice of the apostolate; the Department of Missionary Studies which does research work in missiological problems, and lastly the Secretariat on Religious Liberty to which we owe the well-informed work on *Roman Catholicism and Religious Liberty* by Dr A. F. Carillo de Albornoz. The second division is that of Ecumenical Action. Here we have a Department on the Laity which concentrates on 'the revival of the ministry of the laity'; a Department on the Cooperation of Men and Women in Church and Society which concerns itself among other things with marriage and family problems; a Youth Department which works for the integration of young people in the life and mission of the Church by sponsoring Ecumenical Youth Camps and Ecumenical Youth Assemblies; and finally the Ecumenical Institute at Bossey in Switzerland which organizes courses and conferences and consultations on various problems. The third division which is not divided into departments is that of Inter-Church Aid and Service to Refugees. This engages in relief work of almost every kind and what was begun simply to meet the immediate post-war needs of the Churches in Europe has expanded enormously in recent years. The division now provides assistance for long as well as short term projects to needy Churches all over the world. It has secretaries for Asia, Europe, Orthodox Churches and countries and for Latin America; and the decision has been taken to appoint a secretary for Africa. Its Service to Refugees is operated by a field staff of about five hundred working in some thirty different countries.[16] At the beginning of this year it appealed to the member Churches of the World Council to contribute almost five and a half million dollars towards its various projects for 1961.[17] Lastly the World Council has a Commission of the Churches on International Affairs which maintains close contacts with the United Nations and its specialized agencies. The aim of the Commission is to bring 'an effective Christian influence to bear on international decisions.' Either directly or through the Executive or Central Committees of the World Council it issues forthright statements on current affairs. Its most recent statement, one of the strongest ever issued, dealt with the situation in Angola and severely criticized the present policy of the Portuguese government.[18]

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[16]ED 109-10.
[17]EPS 3 February 1961 p. 2.
[18]EPS 2 June 1961 pp. 9, 15; 30 June 1961 pp. 1, 11.

Even this rapid survey of its organized activities makes it quite clear that the World Council of Churches is now deeply and widely involved over the whole area of Christian life and not exclusively concerned with the problem of Christian unity. The scope of its activities is as broad on the international plane as is that of the British Council of Churches in these islands. Those who followed through the press the proceedings of its Spring meeting here in Dublin last April will know that the British Council is concerned with a wide range of problems which include violence on television, the further education of young people and the seating of Communist China in the United Nations as well as Christian unity as such. In this the British Council of Churches faithfully mirrors the World Council of Churches which has now begun construction on the north-west side of Lake Geneva of a new headquarters building to provide two hundred and fifty offices and to cost two and a half million dollars. As was stated at the ground-breaking ceremony on 21 June last, this 'is a great tribute to the growth of the activities of the World Council.'[19]

To some of its Catholic friends, however, this very growth of the Council's activities has become an enigma and an object of criticism. Because of these activities the World Council has been reproached for being unfaithful to its true nature and purpose, for allowing itself like Martha to become careful and troubled about many things to the neglect or exclusion of the one thing necessary, the realization of Christian unity:

> This Council [The World Council of Churches] was intended from its beginning to promote Christian unity . . . It has come about, however, that the Council, once in existence, has devoted itself to activities other than the quest for unity . . . Doubtless the Christian has other tasks: to propagate the faith, to relieve misery, to strive for peace, to struggle against injustice, to enlighten ignorance. But organizations already exist, or can exist, for all these purposes. If the Ecumenical Movement becomes side-tracked in these directions it will lose its singleness of purpose; it will dissipate itself; it will immerse itself in particular issues, encouraging the one and impairing the other. It will no longer be a promoter of Christian unity but merely a relief agency for a certain number of Christian denominations which it will continue to maintain in their disunity.[20]

This criticism was and is so pertinent that the World Council's General Secretary took formal cognizance of it and made a reply in

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[19]EPS 9 June 1961 pp. 1-2; 30 June p. 7.
[20]C. Boyer, S.J. 'Misgivings on the Ecumenical Movement' *Unitas* X (1958) pp. 3, 5.

his report to the following meeting of the Central Committee at Nyborg in Denmark. The ever-widening scope of the Council's activities does indeed raise a problem, a twofold problem. Firstly, does this preoccupation with many things really involve the neglect or exclusion of the one thing necessary, Christian unity? Secondly, is it in accord or not with the Council's origins and ultimate principles? The two questions though closely related are really distinct. One might conceivably have to consider that the Council's present activities were not adequately or at all promoting Christian unity and at the same time have to admit them to be a true expression of its nature and purpose. It is however also possible to think that in this expansion of its work the World Council is both remaining true to itself and continuing to do great good in the cause of Christian unity.

In theory, Christian disunity is a matter of doctrinal differences: episcopacy, for instance, being the chief bone of contention between Anglicans and Presbyterians; the papacy, between Catholics and Orthodox. In theory, therefore, the restoration of Christian unity is a matter of reconciling these doctrinal differences, a matter of theological study and discussion in order to establish the truth. In actual fact, however, the theological factors involved in Christian disunity are intimately and almost inextricably bound up with a host of other social, political and psychological factors; and the importance of these is paramount as the history of inter-Church relations conclusively proves. The unhappy fate of the proposal to accept 'bishops-in-presbytery' which came before the Church of Scotland in recent years was not due to theological reasoning: 'if there has been a reasoned Presbyterian rejection of the *Report* [containing this proposal] based upon Scriptural evidence and theological principles, I,' wrote Fr Leeming, 'have not been able to find it.'[21] It was national sentiment rather than theology that contributed most to the Report's defeat. As Ronald Walls, himself a Scot and an ex-Presbyterian observed:

> Any attempt to alter the Church of Scotland is seen by the average Scot as interference in his national life. In the present issue, Episcopacy is regarded as English and autocratic, Presbytery as Scots and democratic; and the proposal to graft Episcopacy on to Presbyterianism is suspected as another move of the 'Auld Enemy' to absorb and destroy national independence . . . The popular imagination sees in the proposed integration an

[21] *The Churches and the Church* p. 121 note 2. Professor Torrance of the Church of Scotland and a signatory of the *Report* is quoted (*ibid.* p. 120 note 2) to the effect that Presbyterians 'have not to my knowledge offered a single purely theological reason why the corporate episcopate, which they hold as firmly as Anglicans, *may not devolve upon individual men.*' (italics in original).

> ecclesiastical parallel to the 1707 Treaty of Union and fears the absorption of Scottish institutions in those of England.[22]

The history of Catholic-Orthodox relations also shows the decisive importance of non-theological factors in ecumenism. Just as episcopacy is anathema to the Presbyterian so is Rome and the papacy to the Orthodox, and largely for the same non-theological reasons. The Union laboriously achieved at Florence in the fifteenth century by means of theological study and discussion soon came to grief because Mark of Ephesus was able, through the vacillation of the Emperor, to fan the deep-seated anti-Latin feelings of the uneducated mass of ordinary clergy, monks and laity, exhorting them:

> Do you, therefore, brethren, flee communion with the incommunicable and the commemoration of the incommemorable. Behold I, Mark the sinner, tell you that whosoever commemorates [in the liturgy] the Pope as an orthodox prelate has taken upon himself the whole of Latinism, even to the shaving of the beard on his chin.[23]

In Greece today so deep-seated is the identification of the Orthodox Church with nationalism, so deep-seated is the conception of the Pope as a foreign political potentate that, as Mgr Etteldorf once again reminded us recently, 'it will be a long and extremely difficult task to convince them [the Greeks] that the true Church of Christ transcends nationalism, that one can be subject to the Holy Father and remain not only a good Byzantine-rite Christian but also a loyal Greek citizen.' And that expert on Orthodox Christendom did not hesitate to conclude with the following forthright statement: 'But until this is accomplished, the theological and historical arguments in favour of papal primacy will not avail.'[24]

In the light of all this, one is surely forced to conclude that, in ecumenism, it is simply unrealistic to neglect the non-theological factors, to imagine that study and discussion of the doctrinal issues alone will of itself lead to recognition of the truth and from there to submission to it. The confidence of the nineteenth century theologian in the power of reason and the force of apologetics is not shared to the same extent by his modern counterpart. We appreciate now more clearly that the whole man must be influenced before the mind is free to see, that if the truth is to be seen and done it will be seen and done in charity, that 'antipathy is an obstacle

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[22] *The Tablet* 24 May 1958 p. 484; 1 June 1957 p. 513.

[23] *Letter to Theophanes of Euboea* quoted by J. Gill, S.J. *The Council of Florence* (Cambridge 1959) p. 356.

[24] R. Etteldorf 'Church and State in Greece. A Study in Identification before the Pan-Orthodox Congress' *The Tablet* 29 July 1961 pp. 730-2. Mgr Etteldorf is a member of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church and author of *The Catholic Church in the Middle East* (New York 1959).

not only to loving but even to knowing, that mutual knowledge and understanding demand mutual sympathy and love.'[25] The realistic ecumenist is therefore convinced that, if any progress is to be made towards Church unity, the isolation and inbreeding on which arrogance and antipathy thrive must give way to mutual intercourse: to conversation, cooperation and common witness. In the past, it is true, the cause of Christian unity was thought to be best served by the refusal of such intercourse but the situation then and the situation now are scarcely comparable. In the past there was a universally acknowledged centre of Christian unity and to be deprived of communion wih the Holy See was an obvious anomaly and salutary punishment. Today this unfortunately is no longer the case and the radically changed conditions of our time seem to demand a new approach. Intercourse and cooperation between the Churches has its theoretical foundation in the unity which is already theirs through the reception of baptism and the acknowledgment of Christ as God and Saviour. As Pope Pius XII stated, 'against the confederate forces [of anti-christians] they cannot continue in idle disunion and separation who, by the sacred character of baptism, have been commissioned to fight the good fight of the Saviour.'[26] It has its practical justification not only in the growing need to defend the fundamental values of Christianity but also in the fact that there would seem to be no other effective way of dissolving the corporate pride and prejudice of the Churches, of shaking their implicit, undistinguishing confidence in their whole traditional way of life, of making them humble and teachable of God. The sanction given by Pius XII to 'collaborating with neutral and non-Catholic movements and organisations if and insofar as by so doing you serve the common good and the cause of God,'[27] the establishment by Pope John XXIII of the Secretariat for Promoting Christian Unity[28] and, in general, the development and

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[25]M. Hurley, S.J. *Towards Christian Unity* (Dublin 1960) p. 30.

[26]*Sempiternus Rex* AAS 43 (1951) p. 642.

[27]In his allocution to the delegates attending the Second World Congress of the Lay Apostolate at Rome in October 1957, AAS 49 (1957) p. 938. The 1949 Instruction of the Holy Office on the Ecumenical Movement had already made it clear that mixed gatherings of Catholics and non-Catholics which have as their purpose 'to take counsel concerning joint action in the defence of the fundamental principles of the natural law and the Christian religion' or 'to deal with the rebuilding of the social order and similar questions' are not forbidden, AAS 42 (1950) p. 145.

[28]According to its Director Cardinal Bea, the Secretariat was established 'to promote the union of all Christians and assist effectively the forces which are directed from so many people to the achievement of this sublime purpose'. ('Obstacles to Christian Unity' *The Apostleship of Prayer Directors Service* January 1961 p. 2). This almost certainly includes collaboration with the World Council of Churches. Questioned on this latter point last January the Cardinal replied that in principle there was no difficulty, cf. *La Civiltà Cattolica* 4 February 1961 pp. 309-10. Fr C. Dumont, O.P. has made interesting suggestions for such collaboration in his article 'The Forthcoming Council and Christian Unity' *Unitas* XI (1959) 43-4.

official encouragement given to ecumenism in the Catholic Church would already seem to involve on its part a definite if tentative recognition of dialogue and cooperation as the best way in our day of resolving the deadlock between the Churches. This practical ecumenical approach has of course its limitations and its dangers but it also has its decided advantages; and it will not perhaps be an exaggeration to say that the current emphasis in the Catholic Church on renewal and reformation[29] is in God's providence owing in large part to the stimulus of our growing intercourse with other Churches. As the Latinizing tendency of our relations in the past with the Orthodox and the heathen seems to show, it is not too easy for an isolated inbred Latin Catholicism to distinguish unity and uniformity, to keep the accidental distinct from the essential, matters of discipline from matters of faith, to give a real and not a mere notional assent to the principle that a Roman Catholic is not necessarily a Latin Catholic. The implications of this latter truth we have already if belatedly acknowledged in the East; its precise implications for groups of our separated brethren in the West seeking communion with the Holy See we as yet but dimly if at all perceive.[30]

It is considerations such as these that seem to explain and justify not only the existence of the World Council of Churches but also its expanding programme of activities. In all these the Council's professed aim is to advance the cause of Christian unity:

> The World Council of Churches seeks to promote this co-operation and mutual service, not merely with a view to realizing the objectives of the particular activities themselves, not merely for the sake of organizational effectiveness, but also for the sake of the deeper unity for which they prepare the churches.[31]
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> As we carry on our work of inter-church aid, as we learn from each other in our common studies, as we bring together young

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[29]Cf. H. Küng, *Konzil und Wiedervereinigung.* Erneurung als Ruf in die Einheit [Council and Reunion. Renewal as a Call to Unity] Vienna, 1960. This work is already available in French and will shortly be available in English. As we were reminded by one of the lecturers at the recent Summer School on Christian Unity at Maynooth 'all must do their part to ensure that the Church, which is ever in need of renewal—*ecclesia semper reformanda*—corresponds as fully as possible to Christ's ideal of it.'

[30]Many hope that the matter will engage the attention of the forthcoming Vatican Council and their hopes have been further raised by the recent statements of Cardinal Bea reported in *Catholic Herald* 11 August 1961 p. 1.

[31]'Report on Programme and Finance from the Central Committee to the Third Assembly' ED 218. Cf. H. d'Espine, 'The Role of the World Council of Churches in Regard to Unity' *Minutes and Reports of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Central Committee of the World Council of Churches* pp. 112-3: 'Whether it is a question of evangelism or mutual aid, of the mobilization of the laity, men and women, young and old, or of Christian responsibility in modern society—all [the Departments] are called, each for itself and in its own sphere, to contribute to this restoration [of Christian unity]—and all do in fact contribute to it in their own ways.'

> people of many churches in work camps or in courses at the Ecumenical Insitute we are not running away from the difficult issues of full and manifest church unity; we are helping to bring into being that spiritual situation between the churches without which unity is inconceivable, and so we are dealing with these issues in a very direct way.[32]

To question the sincerity of this conviction or to challenge its basis is to view the ecumenical problem more academically than realistically, to underestimate the importance of the non-theological factors. Dr Visser 't Hooft has remarked with perhaps more caution than necessary 'it might be that we are in a period of ecumenical history in which the churches have to learn to live together and to grow together before they can take far-reaching steps in the realm of actual reunion.'[33]

The question, however, remains as to whether the World Council, in promoting and pursuing all these activities, is being true to itself, to its origins and deepest insights. Would it not appear that the Life and Work tendency is submerging that of Faith and Order? Against this view, however, it must be noted that Christian unity, much less Church unity, was not originally the direct concern of Life and Work. The movement was mainly interested in the realization of its practical aim: the christianization of the social order; it was interested in promoting inter-Church cooperation as a means to this end and not as a means of furthering the cause of Christian unity. Christian unity in general, for Life and Work, was a mere by-product: a valuable effect, no doubt, but secondary and not directly intended. Organic Church unity does not seem to have concerned it at all and in this respect it simply reflected the bias of contemporary theology against the Church as an institution alien to the New Testament. There is quite a distinct formal difference, therefore, between the present activities of the World Council and those of the original Life and Work movement. Besides it must also be noted that Life and Work, as will be obvious, was not greatly concerned with the non-theological factors affecting Christian unity and their elimination. It is on these, however, that the World Council justifies to a large extent its various activities. Strange as it may seem, practical recognition in the World Council of Churches of the relevance of the non-theological factors dates back little more than a decade. It was during the preparations for and in the course of the Third World Conference on Faith and Order at Lund in 1952 that they became the object for the first time

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[32]Dr Visser 't Hooft in his report to the Central Committee meeting at Nyborg Strand, Denmark in August 1958 as quoted in *Unitas* X (1958) p. 217 note 1.

[33]'Notes on Roman Catholic Writings concerning Ecumenism' ER 8 (Jan. 1956) p. 192.

of any serious consideration. The *Report* of the Conference had to admit that study of these factors was still in its infancy but it urged the participating Churches to closer collaboration and mutual service as a means of eliminating them and coming to the truth. The measure of unity already possessed by the Churches demanded as its due expression and manifestation a corresponding measure of united action; acting together in obedience to the unity already theirs the Churches would begin to perceive truths about the nature of God and the Church which would otherwise remain closed to them.

> We have now reached a crucial point in our ecumenical discussions . . . The measure of unity which it has been given to the Churches to experience together must now find clearer manifestation. A faith in one Church of Christ which is not implemented by *acts* of obedience is dead. There are truths about the nature of God and His Church which will remain for ever closed to us unless we act together in obedience to the unity which is already ours . . . Should not our Churches ask themselves whether they are showing sufficient eagerness to enter into conversation with other Churches, and whether they should not act together in all matters except those in which deep differences of conviction compel them to act separately? Should they not acknowledge the fact that they often allow themselves to be separated from each other by secular forces and influences instead of witnessing together to the sole Lordship of Christ who gathers His people out of all nations, races and tongues?[34]

In considering therefore whether the manifold activities of the World Council imply that the Faith and Order tendency has been submerged by that of Life and Work, it should surely be borne in mind firstly that the Council's activities, unlike those of the original Life and Work movement, have as their direct aim the promotion of Christian unity and in particular the renewal of the Churches by the elimination of those 'secular forces and influences' which are the non-theological factors; and secondly, that it is precisely to the Faith and Order Commission that the Council owes its recognition of the importance of non-theological factors as well as the principles based on them which govern its programme of inter-Church collaboration. The original Life and Work movement has undergone a profound if invisible modification. It still remains true of course that Faith and

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[34] *The Third World Conference on Faith and Order* ed. O. S. Tomkins (London, 1953) pp. 15-6. This passage from 'The Report to the Churches' borrows heavily from Dr Tomkin's own contribution to the Conference 'Implications of the Ecumenical Movement' *ibid.* pp. 169-70.

Order itself is at present somewhat anxious about certain trends in the World Council but its main concern, as we shall see, is that 'Christian unity is becoming ever more visible and therefore ever more in danger of being imprisoned in false forms', i.e. that the Churches may become satisfied with the visible embodiment of Christian unity already realized in the World Council, considering it to be the 'fullness of unity for which the ecumenical movement has prayed and worked.'[35]

Finally it remains to ask whether or not the extensive programme of activity of the World Council of Churches is in point of fact adequately, or at all, advancing the cause of Christian unity. The intercourse and cooperation between the Churches which the Council is promoting has of course its limitations. The Eucharist being the sign and sacrament of perfect Christian unity, most of the divided Churches cannot in conscience participate in each other's celebration of the Lord's Supper; this however is perhaps the most salutary of all their experiences together. It also has its dangers but those who fear a resultant weakening of conviction and watering down of doctrine have to face the well-known fact that in general membership in the World Council has on the contrary brought about a strengthening of denominational loyalties and that the Orthodox members in particular have distinguished themselves by their open unswerving fidelity to Catholic tradition on many moral and dogmatic issues. The real danger is that which is the concern of Faith and Order and which the forthcoming Assembly is to take steps to obviate: that the World Council may become 'a magnificent monument of ecumenical despair', that it may be accepted by its members as the organ of a sort of federal union, as the final solution to the problem of Christian and Church unity.[36]

Notwithstanding these limitations and dangers, the World Council seems to have achieved a considerable measure of success in advancing the cause of Christian unity. It is true that the old ecumenical enthusiasm of fifty years ago and 'the hopes of ecumenizing the world in this generation' (which no doubt shared the nineteenth century spirit of evolutionary optimism) have in this generation given way to a healthy disillusionment and sober realism; but the movement has by no means lost its spirit or its sense of urgency and it has great achievements to its credit. In his sermon at Jerusalem last year the former Archbishop of Canterbury spoke of the 'great wind' now blowing through the Churches: 'a wind of fellowship in Christ, a wind of the Holy Spirit' bringing with it 'a growing bond of peace

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[35]K. R. Bridston, 'The End of Churchly Unity?' *World Council of Churches Division of Studies Bulletin in* 6 (Autumn 1960) pp. 14-23.

[36]*Ibid.*

in which truth is spoken in love, and love mellows and refines truth, a reviving power of faithful witness to the Kingdom of God.'[37] In recent years the Pope has formally met the head of the Greek State and Church: the first time such a meeting took place since 1439.[38] In recent years too, theologians of the Church of England and of the Reformed Church of the Netherlands have been meeting: the first official contacts between the two Churches for nearly three hundred and fifty years.[39] Last December the Archbishop of Canterbury visited the Pope and greeted him with the words: 'Your Holiness, we are making history': it was the first time Rome and Canterbury had met since the Reformation. At about the same time, Patriarch Alexei of Moscow visited Patriarch Athenagoras at Constantinople: 'the first time since 1589 when the Russian Patriarchate was established, that the patriarch of Moscow paid a visit to the city.'[40] These few examples of ecumenical 'firsts' in recent years illustrate—though no more—that changing pattern of inter-Church relationships to which the former Archbishop of Canterbury referred in his sermon at Jerusalem. These changes are of immense significance and we owe them in large part to the pioneering work of the World Council in drawing the Churches out of their long isolation from each other.

Those who consider that the World Council is at present careful and troubled about many things to the neglect of the one thing necessary doubtless interpret this one thing necessary as reconciliation with Rome. There cannot of course be any doubt that reconciliation with Rome *is* the one thing necessary but, though anti-Romanism is essentially unecumenical and unworthy of the World Council,[41] pro-Romanism marks a high point of ecumenical perfection that can hardly in the circumstances be generally expected as yet of its members. We are perhaps inclined to forget that the World Council of Churches exists 'to promote the growth of ecumenical consciousness,' that it is not a society of perfected ecumenists but a school for the acquisition of ecumenical perfection. A fairly general absence of pro-Romanism, indeed occasional outbursts of anti-Romanism, among the Council's members should not therefore cause any surprise. There are certainly many of its member Churches who already would agree with the famous Anglican statement: 'that there can be no fulfilment of the Divine purpose in any scheme of reunion

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[37] *Feeling our Way* (London 1960) p. 7.

[38] *Unitas* XI (1959) p. 155. The meeting took place in May 1959.

[39] EPS 27 Jan. 1961 p. 6.

[40] EPS 6 Jan. 1961 p. 5.

[41] Cf. 'Report of the General Secretary' *Minutes and Reports of the Thirteenth Meeting of the Central Committee* p. 111: 'The WCC is a body *sui generis* which refuses to become the adversary of any church or group of churches and stands for unity in Christ of all who recognize Him as God and Saviour.'

which does not ultimately include the great Latin Church of the West, with whom our history has been so closely associated in the past, and to which we are still bound by very many ties of common faith and tradition.'[42] But it is surely too soon yet to expect such sentiments or statements from the majority of the Council's members. Longanimity, 'the ability not to be discouraged because the good aimed at is so far off, the road so long'[43] is perhaps the essential ecumenical virtue.

[42]'Lambeth Conference of 1908. Report of the Committee appointed to Consider and Report upon the Subject of Reunion and Intercommunion' *The Six Lambeth Conferences 1867-1920* (London, 1929) p. 422. The statement was repeated in the 1920, 1930 and 1948 Conferences. In *The Lambeth Conference 1958* (1.27; 2.21) the Encyclical Letter says: 'We know that we must pray and work with a new sense of urgency . . . for the healing of the breach between ourselves and the Church of Rome'; the report of the Committee on Church Unity and the Church Universal states: 'We must hope and pray for such eventual agreement in faith and order as shall lead to the healing of the breach between ourselves and the Church of Rome.'

[43]G. Vann, O.P. *The Divine Pity* (London, 1945) p. 96.

Book Reviews

THE NEW ENGLISH BIBLE: NEW TESTAMENT. Oxford University Press/Cambridge University Press. 1961. Library Edition 21s., Popular Edition 8s. 6d.

THE authors of this new translation of the Bible set themselves a down-to-earth task: to make the Bible easily readable for a public which does not go to Church to hear the Bible explained, which does not respond to such religious vocabulary as 'holy', and which will be put off by an involved sentence, an archaic word or a hieratic phrase. The result, a sort of pre-digested New Testament, is as engagingly clear as a good modern prose version of Shakespeare. Poetic rhythm, high rhetoric and curt simplicity have shed much of their charm and impressiveness in the process. But, as the authors claim in their Introduction, the 'overriding aims' were 'accuracy and clarity'. They were trying to open the scriptures 'to many who have been hindered in their approach to it by barriers of language'. When one remembers that a strict translation, on the same literary levels as the original (such as we have in the American Protestant 'Revised Standard Version') leaves many barriers between the Bible and the ordinary reader, one can only admit that the translators were right in principle. One may also say that they have been admirably successful in performance.

This approach to Bible translation is not of course new. It was used by the Roman translators of the Psalter in recent years, who sacrificed the classical and complicated to the easily intelligible. Modern English translations of the New Testament, on this principle, have multiplied in this century. The peculiar advance which the New English Bible represents is that it embodies in the text a solid and illuminating commentary on the original, a commentary which is representative, almost everywhere, of the best scholarship. This leaves them open to the charge of having made a paraphrase rather than a translation, to which they answer that 'every intelligent transaltion is in a sense a paraphrase'. They seem to be right. An adequate translation must take into account the actual needs of the readers aimed at, as well as the efforts at communication of the original writers. If (modern) readers and (ancient) authors can communicate only through a paraphrase, then paraphrase let the translation be. There is all the more excuse here, since the original idiom of all the New Testament authors, and the idiom deliberately adopted for much of his work by the only non-Jew, St Luke, was the sacral Hebrew idiom. Much of the New Testament is a mosaic of Old Testament reminiscences, some of it is tributary to the rabbinical scholasticism. This must have needed a running commentary even in the primitive churches of Judaea. It soon became remote and strange to the Greek public for which the New Testament was published. Origen felt bound to apologise to the Greek public for so 'far-

fetched' a phrase as 'man of iniquity'. We are conditioned by our religious history to such phrases, but it is worth remembering that they are unnatural to Greek or English. Our culture is basically Hellenic, and today far more removed from the Hebraic than when the New Testament began to circulate. The translator has far more work to do on the New Testament than on Plato.

Some die-hards will hold that the Bible should create its own English and impose it on the readers. There is much to be said for that point of view. When Kant, after his first essays in metaphysics, was warned by his friends that he would have to write much more simply and clearly if he were to reach a wide audience, he answered, No, they will have to read me.

But is there such a captive audience for the Bible? As wide as there is for Kant, perhaps. And they can always use, say, the Revised Standard Version, if they wish to keep the bone-structure of the original Semitic before their eyes. The vast majority of readers will have to be enticed to read the Bible, and that can only be done by offering them a text which carries its own built-in commentary. The New English Bible does that.

The translating committee was commissioned by the Protestant Churches of the British Isles. It is hardly necessary to say that there is little which a Catholic will quarrel with. Indeed, he may be glad to see that the 'Petrine text', on the translators' principles, comes out stronger than ever: 'You are Peter, the Rock; and on this rock I will build my Church' (Matthew 16 : 18). The insertion of 'the Rock' after 'Peter' may be called paraphrase. But the play on words in the original demanded some such clarification, and the translators behaved consistently in giving it. Some may see a Protestant principle unconsciously at work in some places, especially in the rendering of 'holy' and allied words. A typical translation is 'dedicated'. This is good, but insufficient, because when persisted in, holiness is on the way to being reduced to an ethical concept, a disposition of the human will. In the New Testament, it is an objective quality and elevated status conferred by God on man. It points ultimately to what Catholics call 'sanctifying grace', a notion unfamiliar perhaps to many Protestants. But the full reading of the text should correct the defects of 'dedicated'.

The translators may hold that 'dedicated' was unavoidable, within their terms of reference. If so, they were doubly unfortunate, because the currency of 'dedicated' is being rapidly devalued. Everyone is dedicated nowadays, from golfers to actors and scientists. Here is where the literary experts should have helped. 'Since sound scholarship does not always carry with it a delicate sense of style, the Committee appointed a panel of literary advisers'. The task of being consciously literary and delicate is probably too much for anyone. At any rate, this panel sometimes missed out. 'You can take it from me' (Galatians 5 : 3) does not suit St Paul, nor does the concession to the Corinthians, that to avoid all pagans they 'would have to get right out of the world'. It was well to defer to the 'natural vocabulary, constructions and rhythms of contemporary speech', but that should not have been the green light for such clichés as 'all too

human', 'flowing locks' and 'scum of the earth'. Then there are unfortunate jingles and alliterations, like 'enlighten the benighted', 'to the weak I became weak, to win the weak'.

It was, one hopes, merely to avoid 'the stilted or archaic' that in Luke 1, the angel was sent to 'a girl whose name was Mary', and not to 'a virgin'. The new translation has been defended on the grounds that nowadays one speaks of an engaged girl, not of a betrothed virgin. But that is to confuse two quite different contexts. What holds for a newspaper announcement does not hold, say, for the report of a marriage case before the Rota, where Canon Law is involved. Now, the opening of Luke is highly charged with theology, of which a dominant theme is the virginity of Mary. One may not blur such sacred history by applying to it the rules used in the social columns of the 'Times'. Such quarrels could be multiplied, but they would not make a major grief. The New English Bible is on the right lines, and goes far towards attaining its ideal. As realistically as they gave up Empire, the British have provided a replacement for their venerated, but antiquated Authorized Version, and in so doing they have given students of the Bible a tool of the highest quality.

KEVIN SMYTH.

THE PASTORAL SERMONS OF RONALD A. KNOX. THE OCCASIONAL SERMONS OF RONALD A. KNOX. Each edited with an introduction by Philip Caraman, S.J. Burns Oates. 1960. 42s. each.

THESE two titles may dismay auctioneers with memories of nineteenth century shelves clogged with volumes of collected sermons. They need not worry. These books are unlikely to come under the hammer for generations to come. The wise librarians, spiritual readers and Knoxians who spend four guineas on them will not part with their treasures easily. Mgr Knox was a model for preachers in the care with which he prepared every word of his sermons; none of his short minutes in the pulpit were wasted in vapid repetitions, or in manoeuvrings towards a suitable conclusion. He was a model too in the love with which he made every sermon unique, adapting his material and approach to his audience of the day. But preachers who sought to imitate his style would run great risks of flippancy or preciosity. It is not as a model for preachers that these books are recommended, but as spiritual reading of the most palatable yet sustaining kind.

It is so palatable that spiritual readers, accustomed to harder fare, might shy from it as frothy. In fact nothing could be more solid or more profoundly Catholic than this. On all spiritual questions Mgr. Knox shows a rare love of reality, never satisfied with the catch-phrases of traditional spirtuality, nor yet irreverent towards them, but rather casting

about to show, by example and parable, what truth they contain. There is the same realism in his use of Scripture, which lends such strength to every sermon. Commentators on Scripture may sometimes show us clearly the meaning of a particular text, but leave us feeling that the Bible puts it badly. Knox so lights up a text that we realize that the Scripture is more precise and luminous than any explanation or theologizing could be; the Scripture seems to explain theology, not vice versa.

In one of his *Occasional Sermons* Knox describes the two types of English convert, illustrated by Newman and Faber: the one retaining to the end some traces of his Anglican scruples, concerned over the difficulties of Anglicans, cautiously delimiting the spheres of faith and reason; the other striking out boldly in the opposite direction, as if determined to be a better Papist than the Pope. Mr Evelyn Waugh has shown us the Newmanesque side of Knox: the sensitivity as anguished as Simone Weil's, yet not too proud to recognize a home in the Church, nor too self-reliant to accept God's consolations. He has shown us that Knox, for all his successes, did suffer and was misunderstood. These sermons illustrate further that side of him. He was keenly alive to the difficulties of his Protestant or pagan countrymen, and accepted the sincerity of their doubts. 'Our neighbours are so ready to believe that Catholics remain Catholics merely by force of habit . . .' 'Our neighbours learn to shun us as people with a King Charles's head'. 'Where Fénelon saw the manifest hand of Providence, we see the result of natural selection . . .' The difficulties are put clearly, but never more clearly or convincingly than the answer of faith.

The strength and enthusiasm of that faith is perhaps the more surprising revelation of these sermons. Knox preaches for his Catholic congregations, not for the newspaper critics. It is astonishing to see this son of Oxford commit himself, like Faber, not merely to the essence of his new faith, but to all its contemporary trappings, even those which most offended the taste of Oxford. How he can see the goodness, and God's hand, in the dogmatism of the Church, in pseudogothic churches, in Father Faber's hymns and Francis Thompson's poems and the Little Flower and (in one of the greatest modern panegyrics) in Hilaire Belloc. Even in his sermons on the Blessed Eucharist, that sacrament of unity which is the most divisive of doctrines, Knox was enthusiastically a Catholic of his generation. The Eucharist was the centre of his priestly life, the most beloved theme of his preaching. He did not speak as a liturgist; his emphasis was not that of today. But today's Eucharistic spirituality will be much the richer for his contribution.

The happy owner of these two volumes will have all Knox's sermons (though not his retreats or Oxford conferences). Where praise is impertinent and further comment merely gilding the lily, the only thing the reviewer can decently do is to urge all librarians, Knoxians, and discerning readers to throw caution to the winds and make this gilt-edged investment.

PAUL ANDREWS

THE SCIENCE OF THE CROSS. A Study of St John of the Cross. By Edith Stein. Edited by Dr L. Gelber and Fr Romaeus Leuven, O.C.D. Translated by Hilda Graef. London: Burns and Oates. 1960. Pp. 240. 30s.

EDITH STEIN, philosopher, disciple of Husserl, Carmelite, victim of Auschwitz, in the eleven months before her arrest, composed the present study of St John of the Cross. This is not a description of his life nor an exhaustive evaluation of his teaching; it is, the author affirms 'an attempt to understand St John in and through the unity of his being as it is expressed in his life and works'. Her method is to follow the presentation of his works by her own interpretation 'offering what she believes a lifetime of effort to have taught her about the laws of intellectual being and life'.

One of the great merits of this work lies in the original approach: it is the interpretation of a phenomenologist. She points out that all her interpretation is not derived from the writings of St John, in particular her theories on spirit, faith, and contemplation, in spite of the fact that certain points of contact may be found. Such theories were remote not only from his leading intention but from his mode of thought 'for only modern philosophy has set itself the task of working out a philosophy of the person'.

Edith Stein searches to see if her theories agree with the teaching of St John and may serve to throw a yet clearer light on it. Showing first the ways by which the message of the Cross may have reached John, she then demonstrates the effect of this message on the doctrine and life of the saint. John did not give a systematic presentation of mysticism. His aim was to support his work as director of souls by his writings: the commentaries on his Canticles he made at the request of his spiritual sons and daughters. On examining these treatises, Edith Stein finds that the leading symbol in these as well as in his poems is not the Cross but the Night. She therefore investigates the relation between Cross and Night in John's works and signals the difference in their symbolic character: 'the Cross is a sign of all that is casually and historically related to the Cross of Christ; the Night is the necessary cosmic expression of the mystic world-view of St John of the Cross'. She considers the prevalence of the Night symbol as indication that he speaks pre-eminently as a poet and mystic, not as a theologian, and she examines the mystic night to show how it echoes the message of the Cross. Following John's thought through the Dark Night of the Senses to the Night of the Spirit, she finds the heart of his message: our goal is union with God; our way the crucified Christ with whom we are to be united on the cross. The only adequate means to achieve this is faith; faith leads through the Dark Night and it is a way of the Cross.

In the *Ascent of Mount Carmel* and the *Spiritual Canticle* John distinguishes three modes of union with God. St Teresa in the *Interior Castle* treated this question. Having compared the seemingly different presentations of the two Carmelites and by combining their teaching, Edith Stein is confirmed in her view that the three modes of divine indwelling are not

only different in degree but in kind. These differences she works out with precision.

Reverence and delicacy of perception characterize the present study of St John. The treatment of the *Spiritual Canticle* in its relation to the other writings is especially impressive. The simplicity and silence of the *Dark Night* and the *Living Flame of Love* contrast with the *Canticle* where the soul and the whole of creation are in motion. This contrast arises not from a difference in poetic style but from a profound difference in the basic experience. While in the *Dark Night* and the *Living Flame* the relation of the soul to the things of the world is treated in retrospect, the *Spiritual Canticle* describes the whole mystical development not only in the commentary but in the verses themselves and is written by a man who was profoundly moved by all the charms of the visible creation. Edith Stein considers in detail thought and artistic form of the *Canticle* and assesses the importance of the principal image, the bridal symbol. She states her intention to attempt to understand the meaning of the work even more deeply than the explanations of the saint himself allow us to do. Then she demonstrates how the whole way of the soul has been laid open before us in this varied sequence of images and concludes that 'the bridal union of the soul with God is the end for which the soul was created, bought by the Cross, accomplished on the Cross and sealed with the Cross for all eternity'.

ELIZABETH P. CROWE

PRIESTS AND PEOPLE. By Conor K. Ward. Liverpool University Press. Social Research Series. Liverpool. 1961. xi-182. 25s.

'Is the parish anything more than an artificial administrative unit? Do the "parishioners by law" acknowledge their membership of the parish and enter into relationships and activities as a result of that membership? To what extent does the existence of the parish affect the modes of thought, patterns of behaviour, and social relations of the parishioners?' (p. 43). These questions are frequently asked in one form or another at the present time, and in the midst of the confused and partisan thinking which exists on the subject there has appeared an outstanding book which is concerned with precisely these questions. It must be welcomed on two counts. In the first place it is a major contribution to the understanding of factors involved in religious behaviour, and, secondly, it throws valuable light upon the way in which a parish is trying to adapt to contemporary urban society. The book is based on research carried out by the author for a doctoral thesis in the Department of Social Science at Liverpool University, and it is published as a volume in the Department's Social Research Series. It is a study of a Liverpool Catholic parish, but there will be many who will affirm that much of what is said of the parish of Saint Catherine, as the author calls it, is true of many other parishes. not only in Liverpool, but elsewhere. In fact, some readers have incorrectly drawn the conclusion that this study represents a composite picture of several parishes. It is to be noted with relief that we have here a piece of social research in the sphere of religion which has used various scientific

methods of research and is not a collection of superficial impressions. Moreover, the careful use of techniques of social research, including intensive interviewing, observation, and documentary sources, has been directed by sociological imagination. The importance of the investigator in eliciting co-operation emerges clearly in the book, and it is obvious that Dr Ward gave much thought and attention to this matter.

In recent years studies on the Continent of Europe of religious behaviour have been prolific, but their nature has been sociographic rather than sociological, as their authors are often only too willing to point out. Here for the first time in Britain is an attempt to analyse the social structure of a parish and its relationship to the wider society. The preface is by Father Francis Houtart, Director of the Centre for Socio-Religious Research in Brussels, and Secretary of the International Conference on the Sociology of Religion; it emphasizes the advance that this book represents in the investigation of the social institutions and relationships resulting from religious beliefs.

The student of the sociology of religion is dismayed by the amount of literature on the subject, notably on the Continent, and we owe a good deal to Dr Ward for his admirably lucid delineation of the trends found in these publications. In this connection special note must be made of the bibliography, a scholarly piece of work which meets a great need. In view of the large number of similar studies we must be grateful for the author's selection in this matter. The catholicity of the references in this book is a clear indication that the empirical approach has not been stressed to the detriment of more traditional methods of research.

The systematic study of religious institutions is of comparatively recent origin, and its value and use in the apostolate is not yet widely recognized in many parts of the world. It will come, therefore, as a surprise to some to realize the extent to which such research has been undertaken on the Continent, and the prestige which it enjoys. It is evident that much remains to be done, and it is to be hoped that Dr Ward's pioneer work will encourage and stimulate interest in this rapidly developing field.

However, in acclaiming the value of the book as a contribution to the analysis of religious institutions, the practical aspect of this research must not be overlooked. Indeed, it is the findings of this study of the traditional parochial structure as it operates in Liverpool, rather than the theoretical framework, that will be of interest to most readers, and one can be glad that while the language of the introduction is rather cumbersome and somewhat difficult, the findings of the survey are presented coherently, and the use of extracts from interviews adds a lively touch to the book. The conclusions are cautiously drawn, and readers will find that the implications of the facts presented, both in the text and in the appendix of tables, mercifully comprehensible, offer much food for thought.

In view of the contemporary revival in community worship the fact that large numbers of Catholics live in isolation from the institutional life of the Church is of great importance. It is clear that in the parish of St Catherine membership of the parochial community received only notional assent and loyalty to the parish consisted mainly of the recognition of an

obligation to contribute to parish funds. As this is a common complaint the author's description of this phenomenon within the framework of sociological analysis is enlightening.

The central position of the priest in the life of the parish emerges with great clarity, and the close contact between priests and people is a characteristic of St Catherine's parish, unlike some parishes described by sociologists in the United States and on the Continent. Significantly frequent visitation of the homes by the priests appears to be a major factor in establishing and maintaining this relationship. The author also concludes that the parish school was a factor responsible for personal contacts between parishioners and this finding leads to speculation as to the consequences that the disappearance of the all-age parochial school, now rapidly becoming a thing of the past in Britain, will have for the Liverpool parishes. These and similar questions are discussed in relation to the parish of St Catherine but in a context in which the specific findings of this research are relevant to the solution of many critical problems facing the Church in the twentieth century.

The definition of the area of competence of the social scientist in the sphere of religion has been the source of extensive disputes, and Dr Ward offers a solution which is acceptable not only to theologians but to many who do not share Christian values. This attitude of seeking common ground with sociologists holding different values is a characteristic feature of the book. The author does not, however, stop there. He goes on to demonstrate how the Christian who is a sociologist can contribute to his discipline, not only by the competent and effective use of techniques of research but also in that by his acceptance of revelation he has access to knowledge which will lead him to a deeper understanding of social processes.

Above all the book must be welcomed for its integrated approach to the question of research in the sphere of religious behaviour. The treatment of religious behaviour as a purely social phenomenon, while lamentable, is to be expected on the part of those whose philosophy of life admits the validity of nothing more. What must disappoint us, however, is the failure of Christians, especially on the Continent, to develop theoretical outlines and practical methods of research which would enable us to co-operate 'with God's grace in the reintegration of human society and the rehabilitation of mankind in Christ' (p. 128). This book responds magnificently to the challenge to Christians to pioneer such an approach and it is to be hoped that the deceptively modest (though technically excellent) presentation of this book will not mean that its outstanding value will be overlooked.

JOAN BROTHERS

RELIGION IS REASONABLE. By Thomas Corbishley, S.J. London: Burns and Oates. 1960. 124 pages. 16s.

THIS book is a collection of seventeen essays, first delivered as conferences to the Catholic undergraduates of Oxford, on the main points of Catholic apologetics of today. The subjects cover a wide range: 'The Fact of

Religion' discusses whether that primitive and persistent urge of the human being is merely an endemic neurosis. 'The possibility of proving fundamental truth by reason' re-asserts the rights of the human mind, which have been defended against scepticism since Socrates, and gives a glimpse of the riches and well-roundedness of the traditional philosophy of the Church in contrast to the fragmentary, arbitrary and limited views of post-Kantian critics of reason. 'Are the proofs still valid?' discusses chiefly the logical positivism which has been the staple of Oxford scepticism of recent years. 'The problem of human freedom' is a brilliant and effective defence of the liberty of the will. 'The moral law' engages very practically with the typical undergraduate problem which is posed by the variations of moral conscience. Some savages seem to have thought it right to kill off their parents, which might suggest to some that morality was a set of conventions, taboos or utilitarian procedures. 'Divine providence' faces the problem of evil, physical and moral, temporal and eternal. 'The monotheism of the Jews' shows the uniqueness of this race as a peremptory challenge to the enquirer. 'The Gentile world and Christianity' shows that others than the Jews had exigencies which could only be met in the Christian way. (This essay in particular is a masterly examination of the culture of Greece and Rome.) 'The genuiness of the New Testament record' establishes a priori probability of the story of Christian origins, while the 'Background of our Lord's Life' and 'What our Lord claims to be' bring the central claims of Christianity into clear light. 'The Church of the Catacombs' discusses the impact of Christ on the world, with side-lights on the continuity of the early Church and the Church of today. 'Salvation outside the Church' deals admirably with a question which has been a stumbling-block to many, especially the 'For God's sake, gentlemen, let's have no zeal' type of Englishman. The last three essays, 'Re-birth in Christ', 'The doctrine of the Incarnation', 'The Holy Trinity', are highly successful endeavours at presenting theological truths in modern terms and illustrations in a way which gives them meaning and relevance.

These conferences are in the great tradition of Chesterton and Knox, without so many quips perhaps, but without so many quirks. This is a book which university students and indeed many enquiring Christians, especially teachers of apologetics in schools, should welcome and find of great value. Not the least of its attractions is the often humorous and trenchant style, which makes the book as readable as it is solid.

KEVIN SMYTH

THE CHURCH IN CRISIS. Philip Hughes. London. Burns & Oates. 1961. 35s. pp. 342.

THE CHURCH IN COUNCIL. E. I. Watkin. Darton, Longman & Todd. London. 1960. 18s. 6d. pp. 227.

THE GENERAL COUNCILS OF THE CHURCH. A Faith and Fact Book. Francis Dvornik. London. Burns & Oates. 1961. pp. 112. 8s. 6d.

MONSIGNOR HUGHES'S book is the most elaborate treatment of the Councils that has appeared recently in English. Certainly no reader of this

book can remain ignorant of the background to each Council, which is treated in fair detail, if at times in a very packed style. Possibly for this reason, one must confess to a sense of disappointment at the fact that history predominates so much at the expense of theology. One would expect more at the price. The virtues of Monsignor Hughes may be illustrated by his chapter on what we now call the First Council of the Vatican. The procedure adopted, the organization of the Council, and the course of discussions are treated with great detail and clarity. On the other hand, one will look in vain for any but the barest hint of a treatment of the theology of General Councils, with special reference to the difficult problem presented by the summoning and ratification of these Councils in antiquity. This may seem ungenerous, but somehow the reputation of Monsignor Hughes convinced one in advance, as it were, that here we would find more than mere history.

E. I. Watkin's book, which has also appeared in a paper-back 6s. edition, is very good value. It also takes us through the main facts, and there is the added interest that the author sets out the main difficulties on the way very clearly. One might comment that he does not usually offer any solution, or attempt what we may call a synthesis of conciliar theology, but it is good to meet such honesty.

Father Dvornik, who has distinguished himself in Byzantine studies, has the Orthodox position on the Primacy of the Pope very much in mind throughout his book. Hence this present work has great value as an apologetic treatment of the subject. The definition of Papal Infallibility at the Vatican Council is examined very closely, and the author points out how the convocation of the new Vatican Council by the present Holy Father strengthens the position of those at the Vatican Council of 1870 who maintained that, even after the definition of papal infallibility, Ecumenical Councils will be as necessary and profitable to the Church as before. Towards our final hope of the reunion of Christians, this book should make a useful contribution.

PATRICK O'CONNELL

[*In this issue we have devoted so many pages to the Irish University question that we have had to cut down greatly the number of pages given to book reviews.—Editor*]